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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

RONALD ALAN HARRY,

:

Case No.

920633-CA

Category #2

Defendant/Appellant,:
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE

The State of Utah appears through counsel Jan Graham, Attorney
General, and David N. Sonnenreich, Assistant Attorney General, and
submits the following Brief of Appellee:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The

Appellee

agrees

with

the

Appellant's

statement

of

jurisdiction*

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court abuse its broad discretion when
it allowed expert testimony in a securities fraud case as to the
materiality of certain misrepresentations and omissions?
STANDARD:

"Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is

a question of law, and [appellate courts] always review questions
of law under a correctness standard," but when the rule of evidence
"vests a measure of discretion in the trial court," the appellate
court reverses only If it concludes that the trial court exercised
its discretion unreasonably.
82 n.3 (Utah 1991),

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 481-

With respect to expert testimony, the trial

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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court's determination will not be reversed on appeal
absence of a clear showing of abuse."

"in the

Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d

602, 607-608 (Utah 1974) (as cited in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d
487, 492 (Utah App. 1992).
ISSUE 2:

Was the defendant entitled to a jury instruction

that specific intent to defraud is an element of securities fraud
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) & (3) and 61-1-21?
STANDARD: This is an issue of statutory construction, and is
reviewed for correctness.

Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782

P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
ISSUE 3:

Was the defendant entitled to a jury instruction

that his alleged subjective good faith constituted a complete
defense to a prosecution for securities fraud under Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-1(2) & (3) and 61-1-21?
STANDARD: This is an issue of statutory construction, and is
reviewed for correctness.

Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782

P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
ISSUE 4:

Was the trial court's determination that the

defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial clearly erroneous, and if so, is the defendant therefore
entitled to a new trial?
STANDARD: This exact issue was recently reviewed in State v.
Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990):
"The Strickland Court held that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of
fact and law. Therefore, in a situation where a trial
court has previously heard a motion based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are free to make
an independent determination of a trial court's
- 2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conclusions. The factual findings of the trial court,
however, shall not be set aside on appeal unless clearly
erroneous."
805 P.2d at 186 (footnoted omitted).
ISSUE 5:

Did the facts proven at trial with regard to Count

4 constitute a public offense?
STANDARD:

This is a mixed question of fact and law because

the defendant, in his brief, argues for a particular statutory
construction, and then asserts that the facts at trial did not meet
the elements of that construction.

The question of statutory

construction is reviewed for correctness.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).

Grayson Roper Ltd. v.
The question of factual

sufficiency requires that
. . . we defer to the jury and evaluate the evidence in
a light favorable to the verdict.
We accept the
evidentiary inferences that tend to support the verdict
rather than the contrary inferences that support the
appellants' version of the facts, even if we might have
judged those inferences differently had we been deciding
the matter in the first instance, and not as an appellate
court. When the testimony of witnesses is in conflict,
we accept that testimony which supports the jury's
verdict, unless it is inherently implausible, and ignore
the evidence which does not support the verdict, even if
we might think it more convincing. For the appellants to
overturn the jury verdict, therefore, they must set out
in their briefs, with record references, all the evidence
that supports the verdict, including all valid inferences
to that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people
would not conclude that the evidence supports the
verdict.
Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991).
ISSUE 6: Did the facts proven at trial with regard to Counts
2 and 3 constitute a public offense?
STANDARD:

The standards for this issue are the same as Lue

standards for Issue 5.
- 3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989):
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from a Third District Court jury
verdict finding Ronald Alan Harry ("Harry"), the Defendant and
Appellant, guilty of four counts of securities fraud in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989).

In summary, the State charged,

and the jury found, that Harry had committed securities fraud with
respect to sales of a real estate limited partnership that he made
to three of his clients between May 6, 1988 and May 10, 1988, * and
that he further defrauded his brokerage house by selling those
securities without the brokerage house's permission in an attempt
to avoid sharing the commission. After the trial, Harry vigorously
challenged the verdict on the grounds set forth in this appeal, and
lost. Judgment and conviction was entered by the Honorable Richard
H. Moffat on September 25, 1992. The facts of the case, which
follow, are set forth in the light most favorable to the verdict,
as this Court is bound to "accept the evidentiary inferences that
x

Sorry, but these exact dates are important, as will be seen.
- 4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tend to support the verdict rather than contrary inferences that
support the appellants' version of the facts, even if [this Court]
might have

judged those inferences differently had

[it] been

deciding the matter in the first instance, and not as an appellate
court."

Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah

1991).
A. HARRY'S BACKGROUND
1.

Harry had been a registered securities representative

("stockbroker"2) since 1975. R. at 1124. He worked at E.F. Hutton
for eight years and at Prudential Bache for four years before he
joined Private Ledger on January 11, 1988. R. at 716, 1125-1128.
He took and passed numerous securities examinations, including the
basic Series 7 examination, the Series 63 all states examination,
and the Series 24 supervisor's examination.

R. at 877, 1027 (for

an explanation of the exams, see R. at 701-702).

He took the

supervisor's examination on April 18, 1988. R. at 904. In short,
by April of 1988 Harry was a very experienced, well trained
stockbroker, who knew what his clients and his brokerage house
expected of him, and what the law demanded of him.
2

Although both sides' briefs refer to Harry as a "stockbroker"
as a matter of convenience, the term is not technically accurate.
Harry was a registered representative of Private Ledger, which is
a licensed broker-dealer. Registered representatives are agents,
as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(2) (Supp.
1992). Notably, "[t]he license of an agent is not effective during
any period when he is not associated with a particular brokerdealer licensed under this chapter or a particular issuer." Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-3(2)(a) (Supp, 1992). Thus Harry's legal right to
act as an agent, and to cond r.t transactions such as the ones at
issue in this case, was tota
dependent upon the existence of a
contractual relationship with Private Ledger or some other licensed
broker-dealer.
- 5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B2.

SUMMARY OF THE RED RIVER DEAL

In February of 1988 Harry and several other Private

Ledger brokers had a meeting with Ross Farnsworth, who was a
general partner of a newly formed real estate limited partnership
named Red River Mountain Limited Partnership ("Red River").
772, 774-775.

R. at

Ross Farnsworth explained that Red River planed to

purchase two plots of land for speculation in the Phoenix, Arizona
area, and he gave the brokers a Pre-Offering Summary Memorandum
(the "Pre-Offering Memorandum," admitted as Exhibit P-l).3

R. at

775-780, 1093. According to Mr. Farnsworth, among other things, he
specifically discussed the following aspects of the Red River deal:
A.

Farnsworth discussed the payment schedule shown on

page 13 of the Pre-Offering Memorandum, which shows that an
investor (limited partner) would make an initial investment of
$5,100 per unit, but could be liable for up to 13 additional
annual payments of differing amounts, for a total investment
of $39,975 per unit.

R. at 776-777; Exhibit P-l, at 13. He

testified that his discussion with Harry of the possibility of
future payments was "the thing that was most important," and
he went on to say "so we talked about annual payments, you
know, obviously being an important part of the project."

R.

at 777B.

Ross Farnsworth discussed his own track record, and

he showed Harry page 18 of the Pre-Offering Memorandum, which

3

A11 of the State's Exhibits at trial (P-l through P-21) are
included as Addendum "A" to this brief.
- 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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shows that of 10 completed projects, five lasted for 12 months
or more and required at least one additional annual payment.
One project lasted for 27 months, and required at least two
additional annual payments,

R. at 776-778•

Farnsworth was

emphatic with respect to what he told Harry on this point:
Q (Sonnenreich): Did you give any opinion as
to the time frame that you used to sell these
projects, specifically that you used to sell the
project "Red River Mountain" to investors?
A (Farnsworth): Yes, sir. We were. I was
very clear that I sold all my limited partnerships
hoping for three to five year goals.
Q: Meaning?
A: Meaning that — they should figure that at
least they should be involved —
the limited
partners would be involved for three to five years.
Q: Even though in fact your track record was
better than that?
A:
Right. But we took into consideration
because we were involved in a fairly strong market
at that time; and we knew that that was more
realistic.
R. at 778-7 79.

In short, Harry new that there was a very real

possibility that investors in Red River would have to make at
least some additional payment beyond the original purchase
price of $5,100 per unit.
C.

Farnsworth also told Harry that he would receive a

10 percent commission on Red River/
3.

In March of

1988, Harry told

R. at 7 80.
Farnsworth, during a

telephone conversation, that Red River was "a lot tougher" to sell

A

Harry did not retain any commission. Farnsworth sent him a
check for a portion of the commission, which Harry returned because
he "cannot accept the payment on a piecemeal basis." R. at 780782; Exhibits P-13, P-14. Farnsworth later sent Harry another
check, but voided it because of concern over Harry's relationship
with Private Ledger. R. at 782-787.
- 7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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than regular brokerage deals because Red River required annual
payments.
4.

R. at 780.
Neither Ron Harry nor any member of Ron Harry's family

ever personally purchased any units in Red River.
C.
5.

R. at 793.

THE SELLING AWAY ISSUE

An important issue in the case was whether Harry was

"selling away" from Private Ledger with respect to the Red River
deal. The State's expert, Steven Nielsen,3 offered this definition
of the term:
"Selling away" refers to the acts of an agent of a
broker-dealer selling a security that is not being
offered by the broker-dealer. It is also referred to as
a private securities transaction. The broker-dealer has
no knowledge of that transaction.
. . .

The problem is that an agent or a broker-dealer must
supervise all agents' activities as they transact
securities. If an agent sells away or effects a private
securities transaction, the broker-dealer is unable to
supervise and therefore the investors lose the protection
that the supervision provides. Normally a broker-dealer
will conduct due diligence; that is, he will take the
time to review the offering to make sure that it's
something they want to sell, to make sure that the
offering is legitimate. And then they will monitor the
activities of their agents as those agents sell those
securities that the broker-dealer has approved.
R. at 894, 897-898.

Selling away is a violation of the rules of

the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), R. at 706707, and is considered by experts to be illegal.
6.

R. at 895.

The Series 24 exam that Harry took on April 18, 1988,

covered the concept of selling away.

R. at 705.

Private Ledger,

5

Mr. Nielsen is the assistant director of the Utah Division of
Securities. He is an attorney and a certified public accountant.
R. at 875.
- 8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in compliance with NASD rules, had an explicit policy against
selling away.

On December 5, 1987, Ron Harry signed a memorandum

that states that selling away, without Private Ledger's prior
written

approval, is prohibited by NASD rules and Private Ledger

policy.

R. at 714, 716; Exhibit P-17. On April 18, 1988, Private

Ledger mailed a copy of its procedures manual to Harry; he signed
a receipt stating that he had received and read the manual on May
3, 1988; Private Ledger received the receipt on May 10, 1988, and
entered it in their records the following day.

R. at 715-717;

Exhibit P-18. The procedures manual contains numerous prohibitions
against selling away.

R. at 717-720; Exhibit P-19.

Clearly, Ron

Harry knew that he should not be selling away, and that he needed
written

permission

to

sell

any non-Private

Ledger

sponsored

investment.
7.

The undisputed evidence is that Harry was selling away

from Private Ledger in the Red River deal. Even Harry does not say
that he received written permission from Private Ledger; all he
claims is that his Salt Lake City branch manager, Craig Cannon (who
was a general partner in Red River, along with Farnsworth) told him
that a person at Private Ledger had given oral permission.
1156.

Harry's witness, Craig Cannon, acknowledged

R. at

(on cross-

examination) that he never received any authorization from Private
Ledger to sell Red River, that he never told Private Ledger about
Red River, that he had never cleared the issue of Red River
commissions with Private Ledger, and that he never told Harry that

- 9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he had received written permission to sell Private Ledger.6

R. at

1090-1092.
8.

Harry took pains to conceal from Private Ledger the fact

that he was selling away Red River. A compliance questionnaire for
Ron Harry, submitted to Private Ledger on October 17, 1988, five
months after the sales at issue in this case, shows the answer "no"
to two questions asking if Harry had sold away investments, or
received a commission on sold away investments.7

Further, Harry

submitted weekly sales reports to Private Ledger, which were
6

Cannon did say that he lied to Harry and told Harry he had
orally received permission from a person at Private Ledger (who was
not actually authorized to give permission). R. at 1091; cf. R. at
736-741, 1099. This court should infer that the jury decided
Cannon was lying on that last point. Cannon was Harry's friend and
business associate, and he had an incentive to lie for Harry.
Cannon had recently pled guilty to two counts of felony securities
fraud in connection with a related investment (another real estate
limited partnership that was sold away from Private Ledger) • R. at
1089.
Unlike the points Cannon admitted on cross-examination,
Cannon knew that there was no way for the State to categorically
disprove this statement.
Another defense witness, Val Butcher, testified very similarly
to Cannon, stating that Cannon told him that Red River had been
orally approved by Private Ledger. R. at 1112-1113. Butcher was
another registered representative who sold for Private Ledger, and
he was a long time friend of Harry's. R. at 1112. He suffers from
the same credibility problems as Cannon with respect to the issue
of oral approval.
In any event, even if Cannon were believed, Harry knew that
unless he received written
authorization from Private Ledger, he
was selling away.
7

Harry admitted that he filled out most of the form, but he
claimed that someone else filled in the two critical "no" answers
and signed his name to the form without his authorization. R. at
1033-1040. It does seem odd that Harry would leave a form mostly
filled out, except for the signature and the two critical
questions, so that some nefarious third party could fill out the
remainder of the form fraudulently. The jury reasonably could have
believed either (a) that Harry filled out the whole form, or (b)
that he asked someone else to fill out the two questions, and to
sign the form, so that he could later deny having done so.
- 10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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supposed to list all investments he sold that week, including
private securities transactions that had been approved by Private
Ledger. R. at 727-728. If Harry believed that Private Ledger had
authorized Red River, then he would have reported his sales; as it
was, he did not include Red River sales in his weekly reports. R.
at 729.
9.

Donna

Nauss,

Private

Ledger's

compliance

testified about the harm caused by selling away.
A.

officer,

In summary:

Private Ledger lost the potential of its share of

commissions on Red River8;
B.

Private Ledger was exposed to the risk of a lawsuit

by a disgruntled investor (R. at 724); and
C.

Private Ledger's reputation could be hurt if clients

invest in a bad investment that they think Private Ledger had
investigated and recommended (R. at 725).

D.
10.

HOW HARRY SOLD RED RIVER TO THREE CLIENTS

Three of Ron Harry's longstanding clients, in the spring

of 1988, were Virl Thornton, Frank Brgoch, and Seymour Isaacs. R.
8

Actually, the way it would have worked if Red River had been
a transaction approved by Private Ledger is that Private Ledger
would have received the commission, and Harry would have received
his share.
Ms. Nauss stated, in response to a hypothetical
question that matched the facts of the case, that for every $5,100
Red River unit, Harry would have received approximately $390, and
Private Ledger would have retained approximately $120. R. at 707709, 717-718, 742-743; Exhibit P-16, Schedule A(D). This means
that Private Ledger lost the potential for some $1,800 ($120 X 15
unitr) worth of commissions from Red River. Of course, once Red
Rive ««7as sold away, Private Ledger no longer wanted any part of
the commission because of potential liability concerns. R. at 743744.
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at 633, 823A-824, 913-914 . Ron Harry sold units in Red River to
each of those clients.
11.

Virl Thornton testified, inter

A.

He had known Ron Harry and his family for a long

period of time.
B.

alia,

as follows:

R. at 632-633.

He talked to Harry about Red River on April 29,

1988, before he purchased three units. R. at 640-641. Exhibit
P-2.

The purchase was consummated when a certificate was

issued on May 6, 1988.
C.

Harry lied and said that both he and his father had

invested in Red River.
Thornton on Red River.
E.

Exhibit P-10.

That lie was "primarily what sold"
R. at 641-642, 644, 656.

Harry did not mention the possibility of future

payments beyond the original $5,100 per unit.

If Harry had

mentioned the possibility of future payments on Red River,
Thornton "would not have touched it with a ten-foot pole." R.
at 648.
P.

Harry did not tell Thornton that he was selling Red

River without
Ledger.

involvement

or authorization

from

Private

If Thornton had known that Private Ledger had never

reviewed or approved Red River, he would not have bought it.
R. at 644.
12/

Frank Brgoch testified, inter
A.

alia,

as follows:

Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs are retired airline

pilots and old friends who knew each other since 1950. R. at
823.
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B.

Brgoch had used Harry as his stockbroker since the

mid-1970s. R. at 823A. It was important to Brgoch that Harry
was affiliated with a reputable brokerage house such as
Private Ledger.
C.

R. at 825.

Prior to Red River, Brgoch had been involved in

several limited partnerships that "didn't turn out too well."
R. at 826.
D.

Brgoch gave Harry limited discretionary trading

authority.9 From the time Brgoch received his retirement fund
in 1985, through 1988, Brgoch and Harry had discussions about
the limit of Harry's authority with respect to the retirement
fund.

Brgoch and Harry agreed to these limits:
(1)

Investments were to be bonds with practically

no risk;
(2)

Investments were to be liquid, with no long

term investments;
(3)

"And positively, no limited partnerships."

R. at 826-830.
E.

Brgoch met regularly with Harry to discuss his

investment accounts; sometimes Isaacs was also present.
e.g.,

See,

R. at 825, 827, 830, 834, 839, 867.

9

Discretionary trading authority means that the stockbroker
can make trades on behalf of the client without first obtaining the
client's approval as to the specific transaction. Discretionary
trading authority can be unlimited (i.e. "do whatever you think is
best for me"), or limited by specific restrictions (i.e. "don't
invest more than $5,000 without my prior approv
or, in this case
"don't invest in limited partnerships that require future
payments.")
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F.

In May of 1988, Harry bought six units of Red River

on Brgoch's behalf, using Brgoch's retirement funds.

R. at

832-833, 840. Brgoch's funds were transferred to Red River on
May 9, 1988.
G.

Exhibit P-7.

Shortly

thereafter,10 Brgoch

office to check on his accounts.

stopped

R. at 830.

by Harry's
He had a

conversation with Harry in which Harry said that he had
invested some of Brgoch's money "in real estate" and that it
was "looking good."

Id.

Because of the agreement limiting

Harry's discretion, Brgoch understood this to be an investment
in

a

real

estate

development

investments that Harry had made.

bond,

similar

R. at 830-832.

to

other

Harry did

not say anything to indicate that this was not a bond, or was
a real estate limited partnership with future payments. R. at
832.
H.

Brgoch confronted Harry after he received a June 30,

1988, bank statement showing funds from a retirement IRA
account had been used to purchase "Red River Mountain Limited
Partnership":
A (Brgoch):
He told me that that was the
money that he got into with his partnership. I
said what partnership?
He said, the one that I
told you about the other day, that real estate that
we put in Arizona.
I said, you didn't tell me
anything about being in a partnership.
R. at 834; Exhibit P-7.
DT
io
Brgoch

obtained a bank statement dated 6/30/88 "a couple of
months" after he talked to Harry. Therefore, his conversation with
Harry must have been shortly after the May 9th purchase date, or
even perhaps before Red River had closed. R. at 832; Exhibit P-7.
- 14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I.

Brgoch stated that Red River "certainly does not"

fit within the investment criterion that restricted Harry's
discretion

because

partnership.
13.

Red

River

is

long

term

limited

R. at 840.

Seymour Isaacs testified, inter
A.

a

alia,

as follows:

Frank Brgoch and Seymour Isaacs are retired airline

pilots and old friends who knew each other since 1950. R. at
912.
B.

Isaacs had used Harry as his stockbroker since 1977

or 1978.

R. at 913.

It was important to Isaacs that Harry

was affiliated with a reputable brokerage house such as
Private Ledger.
C.

R. at 914.

Prior to Red River, Isaacs had been involved in

several limited partnerships that Harry promoted, but "the few
that we got into weren't being resolved as he recommended."
R. at 916.

Instead, those partnerships went on much longer

than Harry said they would. R. at 916-918. As a result, and
considering Isaacs' age, in 1987 and 1988 he told Harry "I
wasn't interested in anything like that anymore. I might not
live to enjoy the benefits of it."
D.

R. at 918.

Isaacs gave Harry limited discretionary trading

authority. In 1987 and 1988, Isaacs and Harry had discussions
about the limit of Harry's authority with respect to Isaacs'
investments.
fl)

Isaacs and Harry agreed to these limits:
Investments were to be conservative, with

practically no risk;
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(2)

Isaacs

"didn't

want

any

part

of"

any

investments with multiple payments; and
(3) Harry

was

not

to

invest

in

limited

partnerships.
R. at 918-920, 1019.
E.

Isaacs met regularly with Harry to discuss his

investment accounts.

See, e.g.,

R. at 867, 923, 926, 928,

1012, 1019.
F.

In May of 1988, Harry bought six units of Red River

on Isaac's behalf, using Isaac's retirement funds. R. at 914915,

922, 923, 929; Exhibit

P-4.

transferred to Red River on May 9, 1988.
G.

Isaac's

funds

were

Exhibit P-4.

Isaacs received a June 30, 1988 statement from a

bank in Kansas, showing funds from a retirement IRA account
had

been

used

Partnership".

to

purchase

"Red

River Mountain

Limited

He confronted Harry about the transaction:

A (Isaacs): Well, he said that I had invested
in the Red River Mountain Land Promotion of some
sort.
Q (Sonnenreich): How did he describe it, as
best you can remember, in that meeting?
A: His description of it was that--his term
was this was a one-time drop, single investment and
that this land--the company who was handling this
thing rarely had an investment go beyond two years,
there would be no further moneys involved in it.
R. at 923; Exhibit P-4.

Clearly, at this meeting Harry did

not identify the investment as a limited partnership with an
obligation for multiple payments.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The Brief of the Appellant asserts six arguments in favor of
relief:
I.

the court erred in allowing Donna Nauss and Steve

Nielsen to testify as to materiality;
II.

the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that

a specific intent to defraud is an element of securities
fraud;
III. the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that
the defendant's subjective good faith is a complete defense to
a charge of securities fraud;
IV.

the defendant received ineffective assistance of

counsel from his trial counsel;
V.

the facts proved with respect to Count 4 do not

constitute securities fraud; and
VI.
not

the facts proved with respect to Counts 2 and 3 do

constitute

securities

fraud

because

the

alleged

misrepresentations and omissions are not in connection with
the sale of securities.
The State's short answer to these six points is:
1.

the very recent case of State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d

487 (Utah App. 1992), has resolved issues I and II explicitly
in favor of the State, and by implication has resolved issue
III in favor of the State;
2.

the alleged acts of ineffective assistance on the

part of the defendant's trial counsel were rational tactical
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decisions that were not clearly harmful to the defendant; and
3.

Counts

II, III, and

IV were

properly

pled,

constitute securities fraud, and were proved with sufficiency
at trial.

ARGUMENT OF THE APPELLEE
I. THE STATE WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED TO ELICIT EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON THE ISSUE OF MATERIALITY.
The exact issue raised in point I of the defendant's brief,
whether an expert can testify as to materiality in a criminal
securities fraud case, was recently resolved by this Court in State
v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1992). n

This Court held that

"[s]ince the State is required to prove all of the essential
elements of a crime, and materiality is an element of the offense
charged in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing
the expert testimony."

828 P.2d at 493. Thus, the testimony of

n

The defendant's brief spends a great deal of time trying to
convince this court that it wrongly decided the Larsen case, which
is dispositive of the defendant's first three points on this
appeal. Because the Larsen case is barely a year old, because it
is directly on point, and because the law has not changed since it
was issued, the State views Larsen as definitive and sees no reason
to extensively rebrief the case in the body of this brief.
Furthermore, Larsen itself is currently before the Utah Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari. The issues addressed in Larsen will
therefore be definitively decided by a higher court, regardless of
the outcome of this case at this level of appeal. (Presumably, if
the Utah Supreme Court still has Larsen under advisement, and if
the outcome in this case rests solely on one of the issues decided
in Larsen, the losing party will seek a writ of certiorari to
obtain the possible benefit of a reversal based upon the outcome of
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Larsen. )
A copy of the
State's brief before the Utah Supreme Court is attached hereto as
Addendum B, and is incorporated herein by reference, in the event
that the court wishes to review the reasoning underlying the
State's position on the issues decided in Larsen.
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both Steve Nielsen12 and Donna Nauss13 on the issue of materiality
was proper.

12

Although expert testimony on materiality is admissible under
Larsen, the Court may have some concern over Mr. Nielsen's express
statement that "selling away" is illegal under Utah securities law.
A close examination shows, however, that (contrary to the assertion
in the defendant's brief, page 14) Mr. Nielsen did not thereby
render an expert opinion that Mr. Harry was guilty. Indeed, Mr.
Nielsen did not opine that Mr. Harry had actually "sold away," and
Mr. Harry was not charged with a crime of "selling away" from
Private Ledger.
Instead, the issue was whether Mr. Harry's
undisputed failure to tell Thornton, Isaacs, Brgoch, and Private
Ledger that he was "selling away" constituted an omission of a
material fact.
Mr. Harry's trial counsel, Jim Barber, had previously
repeatedly attempted to assert that "selling away" was merely a
contractual issue between Mr. Harry and Private Ledger, see, e.g.,
R. at 752-755, and hence Mr. Harry's failure to disclose the fact
was not a willful omission of a material fact. Mr. Nielsen's
testimony was aimed at rebutting that assertion by showing that
failing to disclose that you are "selling away" is material and
that Mr. Harry would have a motive (the fact that the practice is
illegal) for willfully concealing it from his clients. After
expressing his opinion that "selling away" was illegal, Mr. Nielsen
went on to explain the risks caused by the practice in some detail.
R. at 897-898.
Although Mr. Barber moved for a mistrial, asserting that Mr.
Nielsen's opinion that selling away is illegal was effectively an
opinion that Mr. Harry was guilty of a crime with which he had not
been charged, Judge Moffat, who had observed the whole course of
the trial, understood the context of the question, and stated that
"I couldn't see in any way whatsoever at this point that the
question inferred the point that [Mr. Barber had] just made." R.
at 896-897.
13

Actually, Nauss' testimony was less expert testimony about
materiality than it was a statement of what was material to Private
Ledger. Since Private Ledger was a victim, its compliance officer
could certainly testify as to what it expected of its stockbrokers
and what types of omis ons were material to it. In this respect,
Nauss' testimony is n
ifferent than the testimony of Thornton,
Isaacs, and Brgoch as to what they expected Harry to do, and what
types of omissions were material to them.
- 19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II. SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF A
SECURITIES FRAUD CASE.
Another holding in the Larsen case was that "willfulness" and
not "specific intent to defraud" is the required mental state in a
criminal securities fraud prosecution under Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-11 and 61-1-21

(1989).

"The trial court, therefore, properly

instructed the jury that the culpable mental state for the crime of
securities fraud is 'willfulness,' rather than specific intent as
proposed by Larsen."

828 P.2d at 495. This Court then went on to

specifically approve a jury instruction on "willfulness" that is
nearly identical to the one used in the case at bar.1A

14

The jury instruction approved in Larsen reads:
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct
intentionally or with intent or willfully, with respect
to the nature of his conduct or to the result of his
conduct, when it is his conscious desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
828 P.2d at 495.
By way of comparison, the first sentence of Jury Instruction
# 12 in the case at bar reads:
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct
willfully, with respect to the nature of his conduct or
to the result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the
result.
R. at 250.
The only difference between the two instructions is that the
one used in this case left out the phrase "intentionally or with
intent or." That phrase adds nothing, as "intentionally" and "with
intent" are synonyms for "willfully" under Utah law. See, Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1990).
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III. THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT GIVING AN INSTRUCTION
THAT THE DEFENDANTS SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH IS A
COMPLETE DEFENSE TO A SECURITIES FRAUD CASE.
A.

GOOD FAITH IS NOT A DEFENSE TO A SECURITIES FRAUD CASE.
The Larsen case did not directly address the question of

whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction to the effect
that "good faith" is a complete defense to a securities fraud case.
Even so, the Larsen case effectively resolves the issue in favor of
the State by implication.

See, Brief of Appellant at 29.

The good faith defense is merely the flip side of the specific
intent coin, as Mr. Harry concedes.

Id. If the prosecution must

prove that the defendant acted with a specific intent to defraud
the victim, then the defendant can defend by claiming that he acted
with subjective good faith, and not with an intent to defraud the
victim.

Hence

the defendant

would

be entitled

to a jury

instruction to the effect that his good faith is a complete defense
because such good faith would necessarily defeat an element of the
State's case, namely the existence of a specific intent to defraud
the victim.

If, on the other hand, specific intent to defraud is

not an element of the crime, then there is no basis for a "good
faith defense" jury instruction.
In Larsen the Court of Appeals ruled that the State does not
have to show a specific intent to defraud the victim. All that the
state must show is that the defendant acted willfully, that it was
his conscious desire to engage in the conduct or, cause the result.
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The good faith motivation of the defendant is irrelevant.
The conduct at issue in this case is found in section 61-1-1,
which makes it illegal for the defendant, "in connection with the
offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly
to:
(1) employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person."
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989).

It is possible to consciously

engage in a misrepresentation, and to thereby violate subsection
(2) of the statute, without intending that the recipient of the
misrepresentation actually be "defrauded," at least in the sense of
losing money. For example, a defendant could misrepresent facts to
an investor in an effort to overcome the investor's unwillingness
to invest in an opportunity that the defendant honestly thinks is
in the investor's best interest, yet that defendant has clearly
violated the statute on its face.

Likewise, the language of

subsection (3) expressly contemplates a case where the intent of
the act, practice, or course of business may not be to defraud, but
the effect is to "operate" as a fraud.15

Under subsection (3), if

a defendant has the conscious desire to engage in an act, practice,
or course of business, and if that action "operates or would
15

If subsection (3) were to be read as requiring a specific
intent to defraud, it would become mere surplus verbiage, since the
act, practice, or course of business would then by definition be
limited to devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud, which are
already prohibited by subsection (1).
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operate as a fraud or deceit," then the defendant is guilty
regardless of whether he had a specific intent to defraud.

Thus,

good faith is no defense to a subsection (2) or subsection (3)
claim, and no good faith jury instruction need be given with
respect to either subsection.16
B. IF GOOD FAITH WERE A DEFENSE, THE DEFENDANT STILL WOULD NOT
BE ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Harry's factual grounds for a good faith jury instruction are
"that he had a good faith belief that there would be no future
payments in the Red River Limited Partnership." Brief of Appellant
at 32. Presumably, Harry therefore felt no need to emphasize the
possibility of future payments to Thornton, Isaacs, or Brgoch. On
the other hand, the defendant never asserted that he did not
receive information about the possibility of future payments (such
as that contained on page 13 of the Pre-Offering Summary), or even
that he did not know that some of Farnsworth's projects went over
one year (as shown by page 18 of the Pre-Offering Summary).
That is not a good faith defense.

Instead, it is at best an

argument as to the materiality of the omission, a claim that if the
investor had all of the information the defendant had, including

16

Actually, in light of Larsen, the State would submit that no
good faith instruction need be given with respect to subsection (1)
either, since specific intent to defraud is now clearly not an
element under that section either. However, in this case Harry
received an instruction on specific intent as it relates to the
theory that he violated subsection (1) by engaging in a device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud* R. at 264, Jury Instruction 26.
Because specific intent is th flip side of good faith, this
instruction is effectively t'
equivalent of a good faith
instruction. If the instruction was unnecessary under Larsen/ it
could only have aided the defense, and hence was harmless error.
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all of Ross Farnsworth's rosy projections, then the possibility of
future payments would appear so remote as to be immaterial.17 Even
if a good faith defense could still be raised after Larsen, jury
instructions for such a defense would be inappropriate based upon
the facts in this case*

IV. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THIS CASE.
Harry claims that the performance of his trial counsel, Jim
Barber, was so defective that it denied the defendant the effective
assistance of counsel.

This claim is based on the following

alleged errors:
1.

A failure to make an opening statement;

2.

A failure to introduce the Red River Mountain

Limited

Partnership

Subscription

Booklet

(including

a

subscription agreement and suitability questionnaire);
3.

A failure to demonstrate the suitability of the Red

River Mountain Limited Partnership for Virl Thornton, Seymour
Isaacs, and Frank Brgoch; and
4.

A failure to prevent certain testimony by Donna

Nauss.
The basic test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is
the two part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

17

At worst, it is an arrogant assertion that the defendant was
somehow entitled to substitute his judgment for that of his
clients', even to the extent of deliberately hiding the truth from
them.
The law clearly prohibits an agent from saying "I know
better than you, and I may therefore freely lie to you if I feel
that doing so will protect you."
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That test puts the burden on the defendant to show "that counsel's
representations

fell

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonableness," 466 U.S. at 687-688, and that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different."

466 U.S. at 694. That standard has been refined

at length by the Utah appellate courts.

This Court set forth a

detailed set of criterion for evaluating an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim in State v. Wight:
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised reasonable professional judgment. Defendant
must prove not only that counsel's representations fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also
that counsel's performance prejudiced defendant. This
Court will not second-guess a trial attorney's legitimate
use of judgment as to trial tactics or strategy.
765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah App. 1988).

Clearly, there is a "wide range

of professional and competent assistance," State v. Frame/ 723 P. 2d
401,

405

(Utah

1986),

and not even plain error

constitutes

ineffective assistance, unless there is "a reasonable likelihood
that the verdict would have been different" but for the error.
Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982).

The burden of

proof is on the defendant with respect to all elements of an
ineffectiveness claim, and "[t]he proof must be demonstrable, not
speculative."

State v. Malmrose, 649 P. 2d 56, 58 (1982).

With

these principles in mind, the State shall address the specifics of
the defendant's claim.
A-

THIS COURT SHOULD GIVE GREAT DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT COUNSEL WAS COMPETENT.
The standard for review on this issue was recently explained
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in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990):
"The Strickland Court held that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of
fact and law. Therefore, in a situation where a trial
court has previously heard a motion based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are free to make
an independent determination of a trial court's
conclusions. The factual findings of the trial court,
however, shall not be set aside on appeal unless clearly
erroneous."
805 P. 2d at 186 (footnotes omitted).

In this case, there was a

lengthy post-trial hearing on the defendant's motion for a new
trial. Much of that hearing centered on the ineffective assistance
of counsel claim.

After taking a great deal of testimony, and

reviewing numerous briefs, Judge Moffat made the following minute
entry with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel issue:
Point four is a claim by the defendant that his
trial counsel was ineffective in assisting him. This
claim raises a great deal of concern on the part of the
Court because it has become fashionable as a defense
tactic to throw the original trial counsel in criminal
cases to the wolves on the platter of ineffective
assistance of Counsel giving little or no credence to the
circumstances of the trial. The trial court supervised
the proceedings in this case and is of the opinion that
there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. The
Court does not believe that trial counsel's performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The
Court certainly does not feel that the failure to make an
opening statement in any way reduces effectiveness of
counsel. That is often done and in the facts before the
court in this case is [sic] impossible to determine that
failure to make an opening statement would have altered
the outcome of the case in any way whatsoever.
The
question of introduction of the subscription booklet to
the Red River Mountain Project appears to the Court to be
much more a tactical decision than it does to be
ineffective assistance of counsel. There is certainly no
evidence here that would tend to show that introducing
the booklet would have altered the outcome of this case.
As a matter of fact there was no way of knowing what the
testimony might have been by Mr. Thornton if the document
had not been used but there is some substantial reason to
believe that his testimony could have been damaging to
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the defense.
R. at 485-486.

As more fully explained below, Judge Moffat's

findings are anything but clearly erroneous. They should be upheld
on appeal.
B.

A FAILURE TO MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT IS NOT INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
After the State made its opening, but before the beginning of

the State's evidence, Mr. Barber expressly reserved his right to
give an opening statement until after the close of the State's
case. R. at 627.

The decision not to give an opening statement

before the State put on its evidence was obviously a conscious
tactical decision made by Mr. Barber, and therefore per
ineffective assistance.

se not

That decision has not been challenged by

Harry.
When the prosecution had rested, Mr. Barber did not make an
opening statement.
counts

should

proceeded

be

Instead, he argued at length that certain
dismissed,18

R.

at

to call his first witness.

1039-1064, and

then he

Harry challenges this

omission of an opening statement, which the defendant's brief
characterizes as forgetfulness on Mr. Barber's part.
The decision not to give an opening statement before the
defense put on its evidence was not an act of forgetfulness, but
rather it was a tactical decision, if a subconscious one.

Mr.

Barber testified to this point at length during the April 10, 1992

The motions were taken under advisement, and later denied.
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portion of Harry's post-trial motion hearing.19

At the time that

he chose to not give an opening statement prior to the State's
case, he states that:
I thought my general impression there was that if I
felt at the end of the State's case that an opening
statement was appropriate and helpful, I would give one.
But I still had the right not to give one and therefore
I had not made any electable determination one way or the
other.
Addendum C at 37. Barber's opinion of the situation when the State
actually rested is shown by this exchange:
Q (Sonnenreich) : Okay. First of all, what was your
opinion with respect to the length of the trial at that
time?
A (Barber): It was dragging unmercifully.
Q: And did you have an opinion as to the effect of
that upon the jury?
A: Yes.
Q: What was your opinion?
A: Though I did not have the sense that the jury
was angry that it was dragging, I thought the jury might
be prone to reward those who would get on with it.
Q: Did you have an opinion at that time as to
whether you had been able to communicate the theory of
your case to the jury through cross examination?
A: Yes.
Q: What was your opinion at that time?
A: I believed that the jury understood the issues.
Addendum C at 42. Although Barber may have told Mr. Bugden the he
•' forgot" to make an opening statement, Addendum C at 38, he
explained at length that he did not mean "I had made a decision to
19

For some reason, only the transcript for the March 18, 199 2
portion of that hearing was included in the Record, at 947-998
(through an error, it was inserted into the middle of the trial
transcript). The transcript for the April 10, 1992 portion is just
as much a part of the Record under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
11. A copy of the missing transcript has been attached as Addendum
"C." The quotes taken from this transcript are those that support
the trial judge's finding of no ineffective assistance of counsel,
in keeping with Templin.
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make [an opening] statement and then forgot that I had made the
decision to do it."

Addendum C at 49.

Instead, the decision to

not make an opening statement was a subconscious one, based upon
the situation of the trial at that time:
. . . What I am saying is that I was satisfied to
proceed without making the opening statement and whatever
circumstances were then extinct [sic] that led me to be
satisfied, appeared to have discouraged from the fact
that I forgot to put the statement in, to spend any more
time thinking about it or analyzing that prospect. I
can't express it any more clearly than that.
. . .

In the sense that in light of all of those other
circumstances that I have given you about eight times, I
did not think about the process of not giving the
statement.
I am not going to say it is forgetting,
though, because I think it implies more than I mean to
say, and that is, that there was a reason to remember.
You understand what I am saying?
Addendum C at 51, 53.

Subsequently, the following exchanges took

place:
Q (Bugden):
And are you suggesting today, Mr.
Barber, that just somehow subconsciously these other
things you told Mr. Sonnenreich about, that is, that the
trail was running on, that you thought that the jury were
bored, that you thought you were losing the jury, you
think that just subconsciously helped you make the
decision?
A (Barber): Of course.
Q (Bugden): Oh, I see.
A (Barber):
That is how you make decisions in
trial.
. . .

Q (Sonnenreich): Do you make many decisions just
subconsciously as a matter of reflex?
A (Barber):
If you want to call that making a
decision, yes. What you do is act on the basis of the
circumstances as you then perceive them.
Addendum C at 54, 56. It should be noted that Mr. Barber has tried
more tr n one hundred cases. Addendum C at 55. Thus Barber made
a subconscious decision, based upon years of trial experience and
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his perception of the current status of this trial, that he would
not make an opening statement.

Given the situation as it existed

when the State rested its case, namely that Barber had made his
point through cross examination, was only going to call three
witnesses in defense, and felt that the jury was restless, this was
a perfectly valid exercise of professional discretion.20
Even if the lack of an opening statement was mere oversight
falling below a standard

of professional

reasonableness, the

defendant has utterly failed to provide any demonstrable proof that
giving an opening statement would have been likely to change the
outcome of the trial, as Judge Moffat found.

R. at 486.

For

example, Harry has failed to marshall the evidence and show why
Barber's closing argument was inadequate to make up for any harm
done by the lack of an opening statement.

Likewise, Harry has

failed to explain why this case was so complex that a jury could
not understand Harry's defense from the evidence at trial.21
Typically, a failure to make an opening statement has been

20

Even Harry's own expert witness on this point, Ed Brass,
conceded that there were times when he might choose not to make an
opening statement, and that other trial lawyers might choose to not
make opening statements in other situations. Addendum * at 8.
21

Just calling this a complex securities case is not enough.
There are some securities cases that involve convoluted financial
transactions, boxes full of exhibits, and months of highly
technical testimony. In this case, by contrast, Harry's defense
can be summarized as follows: "Ross Farnsworth told me that Red
River would close within a year, so I didn't think the possibility
of future payments was relevant. Craig Cannon told me that Private
Ledger had approved my sales of Red River, so I didn't worry about
that. I never intentionally lied to anyone, and I didn't even care
about the commission. I just thought this was a good investment
for my clients." That defense is not difficult to understand.
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held not to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
e.g.,

See,

United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1990);

United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988); Gilliard v.
Scroqqv, 847 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lane, 834
F.2d 645 (834 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1987); Fink v. Lockhart, 823 F.2d
204 (8th Cir. 1987); and Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir.
1985).22
C.

FAILURE TO INTRODUCE VIRL THORNTON'S SUBSCRIPTION BOOKLET IS
NOT AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Mr. Barber did not introduce the Virl Thornton's Subscription

Booklet, which includes both the Subscription Agreement and the
Suitability Questionnaire,23 while Virl Thornton was on the stand,
but he did try (unsuccessfully) to introduce it when the defendant
was on the stand.

This smacks strongly of a tactical decision.

The Subscription Booklet was introduced in the preliminary hearing
in this case

(as Preliminary Hearing Exhibit D-l), and Virl

Thornton was questioned at length about it, both by counsel for the
defendant24 and by counsel for the State.

The result of that

22

There are a few cases that postdate Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), where a failure to make an opening statement
was held, in connection with an almost total lack of any effort to
make an adequate defense, to constitute incompetence of counsel.
See, e.g.,
Jemison v. Foltz, 672 F. Supp 1002 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
23

The complete Subscription Booklet was introduced at the
preliminary hearing as Defense Exhibit 1. Cf. R. at 489-524 with
R. at 454-463 & 467-477.
24

Mr. Harry was represented by Max Wheeler at the preliminary
hearing. Mr. Wheeler terminated his representation of Mr. Harry
prior to trial, Mr. Barber represented Harry at trial, and Mr.
Bugden took up Harry's case after trial. The pre
dnary hearing
was transcribed over a year before the trial began, and Mr. Barber
had access to a copy of that transcript.
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questioning can be summarized as follows:25
1.

Harry called Virl Thornton to his office, and then

presented the Subscription Booklet to Thornton approximately
a week after Thornton gave Harry the check for his units in
Red River Mountain;
2.

Thornton was given no opportunity to review the

Subscription Booklet and did not remove the Subscription
Booklet from Harry's office;
3.

Thornton merely signed and initialed those pages of

the Subscription Booklet that were pointed out to him by
Harry; and
4.

Thornton never saw, and Harry never pointed out,

those pages of the Subscription Booklet that discussed the
possibility of future payments.
In short, if the exhibit had been introduced through Virl
Thornton there is every reason to believe that it would have hurt
the defense, as Judge Moffat found.26 R. at 486. Far from showing
that Thornton had been aware of the possibility of future payments,
the exhibit, combined with the testimony that it would have
elicited from Thornton, would have tended to support the State's
contention that the defendant was doing everything possible to hide
25

See, Preliminary Hearing Transcript, at: page 38, line 15
through page 39, line 8; page 55, line 20 through page 56, line 12;
page 58, line 17 through page 62, line 10. Those pages, along with
a few transitional pages, are set forth in the Record at 527-540.
A full copy of the Preliminary Hearing Transcript can be found in
one of the envelopes marked "Exhibits," as part of the Record.
26

In fact, the State seriously considered introducing the
document as a State's exhibit. R. at 492-497.
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the liability for future payments.

Certainly, there is no reason

to believe that the admission of this exhibit through Thornton
would

have

altered

the

outcome

of

the

trial.27

(This

is

particularly true in light of Thornton's testimony that the most
important inducement to his investing was Harry's misrepresentation
that both he and his father had invested already, an assertion that
is not at all affected by the Subscription Booklet.)
One final point concerning the Subscription Booklet:

If the

failure to introduce the Subscription Booklet through Thornton was
mere oversight, then the defendant is also personally responsible
for that oversight. Ron Harry clearly knew about the Subscription
Booklet, had heard the testimony concerning it at the preliminary
hearing, and knew that it pertained to Virl Thornton.

Ron Harry,

a particularly intelligent defendant, was also actively engaged in
his own defense.

Indeed, he regularly passed notes to Mr. Barber

throughout the trial, and Mr. Barber almost always checked with
Harry before leaving a witness.

He certainly could have pointed

out the deficiency at the end of Mr. Barber's cross exam or while
State's counsel was conducting redirect.

The Utah Supreme Court

has recognized that a knowledgeable defendant has some obligation
to request obvious assistance. See, Duran v. Turner, 516 P. 2d 353,

27

The defense's only hope to make good use of the exhibit was
to wait until Virl Thornton had left Utah, and then try to
introduce the exhibit through the defendant himself, so that Mr.
Thornton could not explain the circumstances surrounding his
signature of sor of the pages. That is precisely the strategy
that the defense
tempted. Naturally, the State objected, and the
court correctly refused to allow the exhibit to come in through the
defendant after Mr. Thornton had been excused.
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354, 30 Utah 2d 249 (1973) (defendant familiar with Utah procedure
had obligation to ask counsel to file an appeal).
D.

THERE WAS NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITH REGARD TO
ESTABLISHING THE SUITABILITY OF THE INVESTMENT.
The State has two responses to the defendant's claim that Mr.

Barber took inadequate steps to establish the suitability of Virl
Thornton, Seymour Isaacs, and Frank Brgoch.
First, as a matter of law, suitability28 is not a defense to
a securities fraud charge.

If a defendant employs a scheme to

defraud, makes misrepresentations or omission, or engages in a
course of business which would operate as a fraud, it is no defense
to argue that the investment is suitable for the defrauded victim.
In particular, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989)
does

not

allow

a

defendant

to

say,

in

essence,

"yes

I

misrepresented the facts, but the investment was actually suitable
for the defendant, so I am not guilty of securities fraud."

Even

if an investment in Red River Mountain was objectively reasonable
for Thornton, Isaacs, and Brgoch, that fact alone does not allow
the defendant to force the investment upon those individuals
through fraudulent means.
Second, as a matter of fact, Mr. Barber did establish evidence
of suitability with regards to Thornton, Isaacs, and Brgoch.
e.g., R. at 675, 842-846, 930-931.

See,

Mr. Barber explained his

decision not to explore suitability further as follows:

28

Stated simply, an investment is "suitable" for an investor
if it objectively meets that investor's requirements with respect
to risk, probable return, liquidity, and other factors.
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Q (Sonnenreich): Each of these exhibits, there is
a list of suitability questions or issues or points,
however you want to phrase them, one for Mr. Isaacs, one
for Mr. Brgoch, and one for Mr. Thornton.
Did you
address suitability in your cross examination of the
witnesses?
A (Barber): Yes. Well, using it in the plural, to
my recollection I addressed the issue of suitability with
considerable detail with Mr. Thornton.
And perhaps
somewhat less detail with the other two.
Q:
There are also lists of limited partnership
portfolios for each individual. You did not go in detail
on each one of those limited partnerships with each
individual, did you?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Why was that?
A: Well, a number of reasons. One is that most of
them are not real estate limited partnerships, and I
doubted that but for a reference to them they are very
likely admissible. But secondly, I was familiar with the
direct testimony of each of these investors, at least
Brgoch and Isaacs, that the two of them claimed to have
expressly instructed Mr Harry not to put them in any more
of those kinds of deals before the Red River Limited
Partnership was presented to them. And I knew that both
Mr. Brgoch and Mr. Isaacs were pretty much there to make
a speech and that every time I raised the issue, they
made their speech. And so I thought it was going to be
damaging to go through the detail of those and that the
return on that issue would not be very great.
Addendum C at 47-48; See, e.g.,

R. at 844-846. At most, Harry may

complain about the quantity of that evidence. There is absolutely
no proof, however, that more evidence of suitability, essentially
along the lines Mr. Barber explored, would have altered the outcome
of the trial, particularly in light of its legal irrelevance.29
29

The only possible legitimate use of suitability evidence
would be as a backhanded way of attempting to show materiality -in essence an argument that the underlying transaction was so
suitable that a reasonable investor would not have minded being
lied to. That argument is extremely weak in light of explicit
testimony from all three individuals to the effect that they
clearly felt that investments with future payments we -J not
suitable for them at this late juncture in their lives, e
that
the existence of an obligation to make future payments was material
to them because of their circumstances.
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E.

THERE WAS NO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WITH RESPECT
TO DONNA NAUSS' TESTIMONY
Harry argues that he did not receive effective assistance of

counsel because Donna Nauss, the Private Ledger compliance officer,
was allowed to opine that Harry's conduct violated internal Private
Ledger policies, and exposed Private Ledger to the risk of lawsuits
by disgruntled investors.

He argues that Nauss' opinions were

legally irrelevant, and were based upon improper evidence.
Ms. Nauss' opinion that Ron Harry was selling away in knowing
contravention of Private Ledger rules was relevant because it
showed Harry's state of mind.

Putting knowledge in Harry's head

that selling away was wrong is essential to showing that Harry
willfully

omitted to tell Private Ledger and his three investors

that he was selling away, and it is strongly probative of the point
that Harry knew his omission was

material.

Ms. Nauss' opinion was based upon much more than just the
procedures manual.

It was also based upon her review of Harry's

weekly sales reports, R. at 727-729, the memorandum Harry signed on
December 5, 1987 that states that selling away is prohibited,
Exhibit P-17, the Series 24 exam that Harry took only days before
he made

the

first Red River

sale, and many

other sources.

Furthermore, contrary to the bald assertion in the defendant's
brief, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Harry read the
procedures manual before the sales to Isaacs and Brgoch were
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consummated.30
With respect to Ms. Nauss' statement that Harry's conduct in
selling

away

could

expose

Private

Ledger

to

lawsuits, that

testimony was relevant and therefore properly admitted.

The jury

needed to know the ways in which selling away hurt Private Ledger
in order to assess the materiality of Harry's omission.
to legal liability is certainly a harm.

Exposure

Given the nearly strict

liability nature of civil securities laws with respect to the
broker-dealer's duty to supervise agents, this is a very real and
palpable harm. See, e.g., Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 651 F.2d 615 (1981).

The testimony was proper.

V. COUNT 4, CONCERNING PRIVATE LEDGER, WAS PROPERLY
PLED AS A SECURITIES FRAUD COUNT.
Harry has claimed that Count 4 does not constitute a public
offense because Harry did not commit fraud against Private Ledger
"in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security"
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989).

He further claims

that the State's theory of liability is so novel that it should not
be allowed under State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990).

30

This is why exact dates are important. The receipt for the
procedures manual, Exhibit P-18, states in part that the recipient
"has read and understood its contents." Harry's signature is dated
"date received 5/3/88," and the receipt was received back by
Private Ledger on May 10, 1988. The sale to Isaacs was consummated
on May 10th, Exhibit P-4, and the sale to Brgoch on May 9th.
Exhibit P-7. The jury could easily have believed that Harry read
the manual before May 9th, considering that the returned receipt
reached California on Ma} 10th. Thus the timing on the manual is
harmful to Harry; it she
that he was reading that selling away
was prohibited at the very moment that he was consummating the
Isaacs and Brgoch sales.
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I

A.

PRIVATE LEDGER WAS A DIRECT VICTIM OF HARRY'S FRAUD.

To reiterate the State's position in a nutshell, the evidence

i

established the following:
1.

Ron Harry was Private Ledger's agent, with fiduciary

duties toward his employer, upon whom he depended for his

(

legal ability to be a stockbroker;
2.

At all material times Ron Harry knew that "selling

away" without prior written authorization was a violation of
his agreement with Private Ledger, and was contrary to the
scheme of securities regulation generally;
3.

Ron Harry repeatedly represented to Private Ledger,

before, during, and after the Red River sales, that he would
not sell away, that he was not selling away, and that he did
not sell away;
4.

Ron

Harry

knew

that

Private

Ledger

had

not

authorized selling away of Red River Mountain;
5.

Ron

Harry

expected

to

receive

a

10

percent

commission from the sale of Red River Mountain units;
6.

Ron Harry was in constant contact with the main

office of Private Ledger, yet he deliberately hid his sales of
Red

River Mountain units

from the main office when he

submitted his weekly sales reports;
7•

At least part of Ron Harry's motive in selling away

Red River units to Thornton, Isaacs, and Brgoch was to conceal
the sales from Private Ledger, thereby defrauding Private
Ledger of its legitimate share of the commissions; and
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i

8.

Private Ledger suffered a number of collateral

harms, such as a risk of damage to its reputation or of civil
litigation with investors, as a result of Harry's fraud.
Thus, Private Ledger was a direct victim of Harry's fraudulent
scheme to sell Red River to Thornton, Isaacs, and Brgoch.

In

essence, Private Ledger was a third party to each securities
transaction because it had a right to receive commissions from
every sale made by Harry.

In a literal sense, there is a direct

connection between the offer, sale or purchase of these securities
and Harry's fraud against Private Ledger.
In particular, when Harry made a misleading offer of Red River
to Thornton, while concealing the fact that he was selling away and
planning to keep the commission for himself, he defrauded both
Thornton and Private Ledger at the same time.
B.

THE "IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT ONLY MANDATES THAT THE
FRAUD "TOUCH" A SECURITIES TRANSACTION.
The facts fit the statute exactly, even if they do not present

the more typical situation of a defrauded investor. Federal courts
have interpreted the nearly identical "in connection with" language
under

§ 10(b) of the Securities

Exchange Act

31

of

193431 and

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . • any manipulative
or deceptive device . . .
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). While federal law is not controlling of state
law, the Utah Uniform Securities Act "may be so construed as to .
. coordinate the interpretation and administration of this
chapter with the related federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 611-27 (1989).
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<

Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-532 to require only
that the fraud "touch" the sale:
The Supreme Court has said that section 10(b) is to
be read flexibly. When there is a sale of a security and
fraud "touches" the sale, there is redress under section
10(b). Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and
Casualty Co. , 404 U.S. 6 (1971). It does not matter that
the fraud is not of the "garden variety" associated with
securities sales. Id.
Arrinqton, 651 F.2d 615, 619 (1981).

See also

Alley v. Miramon,

614 F.2d 1372, 1378 n.ll (5th Cir. 1980). The "in connection with"
element prohibits claims based upon the extremely attenuated links
between

plaintiff's

injury and defendant's

conduct."

In re

Financial Corp. of America Shareholder Lit., 796 F.2d 1126, 1130
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that an accounting firm is not liable to
investors when it changed a client's accounting methods, thereby
causing the company to report bigger losses).

In this case there

is no attenuation between Private Ledger's injuries and Harry's
conduct; his conduct directly caused those injuries.
The

Alabama

Supreme

Court,

construing

the

32

anti-fraud

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly, . . .
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10B-5.
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provisions of the Alabama Uniform Securities Act33 in Buffo v.
State, 415 So. 2d 1158, 1164-1165 (Ala. 1982), demonstrated how
loose the "connection" between the fraud and the sale of securities
can be.

In Buffo, a criminal case, the defendant gave two

fraudulent real estate appraisals on some California land.

The

land covered by the appraisals was to be sold to an insurance
company in exchange for issuance of notes. The insurance company,
however, was in serious financial difficulty.

Without additional

capital, the Alabama Insurance Commissioner indicated that he would
declare the company insolvent.

The appraisals were given to the

Insurance Commissioner to persuade him not to take action against
the company and to allow the company to issue notes to acquire
additional capital.

The court found that the issuance of the

surplus notes was the sale of a security, and

it held that the

Alabama Insurance Commissioner had been defrauded by the false
appraisals prepared by the defendant.

The Alabama court stated

that:
When nexus is the issue to be determined, the
essence of the question becomes whether the fraud has a
sufficiently close relationship to the purchase of sale
of the security to make it actionable. The cases make it
apparent that the fraud does not have to be intrinsic to
the specific securities transaction."
415 So. at 1164.

The court concluded that the fraud on the

Insurance Commissioner had the necessary nexus with the sale of
notes to come within the anti-fraud provisions of the Alabama
33

Alabama's anti-fraud statute Ala. Code § 8-6-17 (1975) is
identical to Utah Code Ann. § 6 1 - 1 (1989). This Court should
construe Utah law in a uniform way. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27
(1989).
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Securities Act.
case

Certainly, the securities transactions in this

"touch" Private Ledger more closely than the securities

transactions in Buffo touched the Alabama Insurance Commissioner.
C.

THIS CASE IS NOT A NOVEL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF A MERE CIVIL
CONTRACT DISPUTE, LIKE THE CASE IN STATE V, BURTON.
The defendant argues that Count 4 is merely a civil contract

dispute. Not so. By definition, securities fraud, and most other
forms of commercial
relationships.

Count

fraud, almost always involve contractual
4, however,

focuses

on

the

defendant's

fraudulent behavior in connection with the sale of securities, and
not on the defendant's possible breach of contract per

se.

Harry

was convicted of defrauding Private Ledger by depriving it of
potential commissions and exposing it to liability.

Selling away,

which violated Harry's contract with Private Ledger, was merely a
device used by Harry to conduct the fraud.

The fact that selling

away violated Harry's contract with Private Ledger was relevant
because it showed that Harry knew selling away was wrong, knew that
concealment of selling away was a material omission, and had an
additional motive for hiding the selling away from Private Ledger.
The case of State v. Burton, 800 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1990),
can be easily distinguished.

In that case, this Court found that

a failure by a home seller (Burton) to forward payments from a home
buyer (Waldron) to the seller's creditor (Valley First Security,
who had a lien on the home) was not simple theft under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).

Theft under that statute requires the

unauthorized control over the property of another.

In order to

prevail, the State had

controlling

to show that Burton was
- 42 -
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Waldron's money in an unauthorized manner.

The Court expressly

found that Burton was under no contractual obligation to forward
Waldron's payments themselves, but had merely agreed to make
payments to Valley First Security with any money Burton chose to
use.

Thus, Burton had a right to use Waldron's money any way he

chose.

In essence, the theft charges in Burton could only have

been upheld if there had been an explicit contract regarding the
application of Waldron's money to pay Valley First Security.

If

anything, Burton supports the State's position in the case at bar
because Harry expressly violated his contract with Private Ledger
that

prohibited

selling

away

and

required

that

he

share

commissions.
Burton talks about the dangers of a "unique theory of criminal
liability."

Certainly, using a garden variety theft charge to

criminalize a failure to make a payment on a contract is a unique
theory of criminal liability.

There is no public policy in favor

of such a broad expansion of the concept of "theft."
Securities law, on the other hand, is designed to create an
environment of trust and fair dealing in the offer, purchase, and
sale of securities.

That environment is essential to the sound

functioning of our capital markets. It is not surprising that the
Supreme Court has taken a very expansive view of the scope of
federal anti-fraud provisions:
"[We do not] think it sound to dismiss a complaint
merely because the alleged scheme does not involve the
type of fraud that 'is usually associated with the sale
or purchase of securities.' We believe that §10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the
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artifices employed involve a garden type variety of
fraud, or present a unique form of deception. Novel or
atypical methods should not provide immunity from the
securities laws."
Superintendent of Insurance, 404 U.S. at 11, n.7 (quoting, A. T.
Brod

& Co. v. Per low, 375 F.2d

Furthermore,

"Congress

made

clear

393, 397
that

(2nd Cir. 1967)).

'disregard

of

trust

relationships by those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries,
are all a single seamless web' along with manipulation, investor's
ignorance, and the like."

404 U.S. at 11-12.

If the securities

laws are broad enough to encompass accounting firms (that neither
bought

nor sold

securities) as defendants, Roberts v. Peat,

Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988), they are
certainly broad enough to include a brokerage house as a victim
where the stockbroker schemed to defraud the brokerage house as
part of a securities transaction.
One final factor distinguishes this case from Burton.

If the

theft conviction in Burton had been allowed to stand, it would have
criminalized all sorts of routine breaches of contract, behavior
that is not normally thought of as criminal.
Harry's behavior

vis

a

vis

In contrast, if

Private Ledger had not been "in

connection with" a securities transaction, it would clearly have
been communications fraud, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-101801 (1990):
(1)
Any person who has devised any scheme or
artifice to defraud another or to obtain from another
money, property, or anything of value by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or
material omissions, and who communicates directly or
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is
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guilty of:
(d) a second degree felony when the value of
the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to
be obtained is more than 10,000 but does not exceed
100,000 . . .
Thus, Harry's conduct is clearly criminal, and if anything he has
benefited from being charged under the lesser penalties of the more
specific securities fraud statute.34

VI. COUNTS 2 AND 3, CONCERNING SEYMOUR ISAACS AND
FRANK BRGOCH, INVOLVE CONDUCT THAT IS IN CONNECTION
WITH" SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS.
Harry alleges that Counts 2 and 3, concerning Isaacs and
Brgoch,35 must fail because any fraud by Harry occurred after Harry
had

irrevocably

committed

those

investors

to

Red

River and

therefore the fraud is not "in connection with" the securities
transactions.

The State's view is that there are three separate

factual theories under which Harry's fraud predates the time that
Isaacs and Brgoch became irrevocably committed to Red River, and
that in any event the "in connection with" phrase should be read
3A

Under communications fraud, Harry would have been subjected
to a second degree felony charge because that statute aggregates
the total amount that the defendant sought to obtain from all
victims, whether the defendant intended to keep that money for
himself or not. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(2) (1990). Thus,
Harry sought to obtain at least the total initial investments of
$76,500 from the three investors. Securities fraud, by contrast is
always an undesignated felony with lower penalties, regardless of
the size of the fraud. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989).
35

Harry, in his brief, has treated the situations with Isaacs
and Brgoch as being the same and has not made any attempt to
differentiate the two counts. The State agrees that given the
similarity of their testimony, their longtime mutual friendship
which extended to meeting with Harry togethe
m occasion, and the
nature of the counts, no distinction should be made between Isaacs
and Brgoch.
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liberally enough to encompass some post-transaction frauds of a
i

lulling nature.
A. A SCHEME OR ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD, OR AN ACT, PRACTICE, OR
COURSE OF BUSINESS THAT OPERATES AS A FRAUD, IS "IN CONNECTION
WITH" THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF SECURITIES EVEN IF PARTS OF THE
SCHEME ARE NOT CARRIED OUT UNTIL AFTER THE SECURITIES TRANSACTION
IS COMPLETE.
The jury in this case was instructed on all three

<

possibilities under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989), namely (1). a
scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) a fraudulent misrepresentation

i

or omission, and (3) an act, practice, or course of business that
operates as a fraud. As a result, the jury could have relied upon
either theory (1) or theory (3) with respect to Isaacs and Brgoch.
A scheme or artifice, or an act, practice or course of business,
does not necessarily require a misrepresentation.

The jury could

lawfully have convicted Harry on Counts 2 and 3 without finding
that he made any misrepresentation or omission to Isaacs or Brgoch.
If the jury chose to believe that Harry devised a scheme or
artifice to defraud

Isaacs or Brgoch, or engaged in an act,

practice, or course of business that operated to defraud them, then
by definition Harry's wrongful acts must have been conceived of and
initiated no later than the moment when Harry purchased the Red
River units in the name of Isaacs and Brgoch.

Because Harry's

fraud under these two portions of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989)
does not postdate the securities transactions, it is actionable
even under the theory put forth in Harry's brief.

Indeed, the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (1986), while agreeing in general with Harry's
- 46 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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argument, established that even misrepresentations or omissions
that occur after a transaction is completed are "in connection
with" the transaction if they are part of a scheme that was devised
before the transaction began.

800 F.2d at 1046-1047.

B. BEFORE THE INVESTMENT WAS COMPLETED, HARRY OMITTED TO TELL
ISAACS AND BRGOCH THAT HE WAS INVESTING IN RED RIVER IN VIOLATION
OF THE LIMITS THEY PLACED UPON HIS DISCRETION.
Isaacs and Brgoch met frequently with Harry to discuss their
investments.

After

they

retired

in 1985, their

investment

strategies changed and they became more cautious investors•
1988

they

had

limited

Harry's

authority

by

requiring

By
that

investments be safe and liquid; they expressly prohibited Harry
from investing in any more limited partnerships or investments that
had potential future payments.

Harry agreed to these limits. At

the moment that Harry decided to invest in Red River for Isaacs and
Brgoch he knew that the investments would exceed his authority. At
that time, before the investments were made, Harry was under a duty
to contact the investors, inform them of the true nature of Red
River, and obtain from them permission to make the purchase, which
was beyond the scope of Harry's discretionary authority.

Instead

of contacting the investors, however, Harry (to paraphrase Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (1989)) omitted
true

nature

necessary
Brgoch

of

Red River

in order
(that

instructions),

he

and his

to state
intention

to make his previous
would

only

in the light

were made, not misleading.

invest

material
to

invest

statements
in

accordance

of the circumstances

facts

(the

in

it)

to Isaacs

and

with

their

under which

they

Under this theory, which was presented
- 47 -
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to the jury, Harry's omission precedes the consummation of the
securities transactions, and is therefore "in connection with"
those transactions even under the reasoning in Harry's brief,
C. HARRY MADE MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS TO ISAACS AND
BRGOCH AT A TIME BEFORE THEY BECAME "IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED" TO
THEIR RED RIVER INVESTMENTS.
Isaacs and Brgoch met with Harry on a number of occasions in
the two months following Harry's purchase of the Red River units.
Harry repeatedly mischaracterized the investment.

For example,

when Brgoch first met with Harry in May, around the time of the
investment, Harry left Brgoch with the impression that it was a
real estate development bond.

Even when Brgoch learned a month

later that Red River was a limited partnership, and confronted
Harry about the investment, Harry did not disclose the obligation
to make future payments. Neither Isaacs nor Brgoch learned of the
possibility of future payments until they received their first
dunning letters nearly a year later. R. at 838, 928; Exhibits P-6,
P-9.
These misrepresentations and omissions to both Isaacs and
Brgoch, made during the two months after Harry purchased the units,
were designed to lull Isaacs and Brgoch into accepting the Red
River investments. They were made before the purchases were truly
final.

Of course, from Red River's perspective the purchases

appeared final; the money had been received and the transactions
registered.

The transactions were not final, however, because

Harry made the purchases without any authority. It is axiomatic
that acts made by a purported agent without authority are subject
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to revocation by the principal. Such acts are not final until they
are ratified by the principal, either expressly or by implication.
Because Isaacs and Brgoch had at least a colorable right to rescind
the Red River purchases at the time when Harry lied to them
(shortly after the purchases had been made), the transactions were
not irrevocably complete, and his misrepresentations and omissions
were

in

connection

with

the

still

unratified

purchases

of

securities.
D. THE "IN CONNECTION WITH" REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED
LIBERALLY TO APPLY TO SOME TYPES OF POST - PURCHASE OR SALE
MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS.
As demonstrated by the foregoing arguments, the question
of

whether

the

phrase

"in

connection

with"

can

apply

to

misrepresentations or omissions made after exclusively a purchase
or sale should not be relevant to this case.

To the extent that

the issue may be deemed relevant, it is the State's position that
the requirement should be liberally construed to include the type
of conduct demonstrated in this case.
The general rule, as discussed at length in Point V.B.,
supra,

is that the "in connection with" language of securities

fraud statutes should be liberally construed to include cases where
the fraud

"touches" upon the offer, sale, or purchase of a

security.

There is some federal case law to the effect that a

misrepresentation or omission is only "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of a security if it occurs before the purchase or
sale is finalized.

See, e.g., Rudolph v. Arthur And

son & Co.,

800 F.2d 1040, 1046 (11th Cir. 1986) and cases cited tnerein. The
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specific

language

of

the

cases

shows,

however,

that

this

restriction is not as rigid as it may appear to be.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Student
Marketing, 457 F.Supp 682 (1978), a case relied upon by the
defendant, there is an excellent discussion of the rule, its
rationale, and its implications:
The rationale for using the moment of commitment as the
critical point in time derives from the underlying
purpose of the anti-fraud provisions to protect the
investment decision from inadequate disclosure and
misrepresentations. Once the decision is made and the
parties are irrevocably committed to the transaction,
there is little justification for penalizing alleged
omissions or misstatements which occur thereafter and
which have no effect on the decision.
Id., 457 F.Supp at 703 (emphasis added).

If this were a case where

the victims had been "irrevocably committed to the transaction,"
then the defendant might

have a legitimate point, if you do not

look carefully at the policy implications.

As it is, both Isaacs

and Brgoch could have taken steps to revoke or rescind the
transaction except for Harry's misrepresentations.

They were not

"irrevocably committed," if they have ever been, until after they
decided, based upon Mr. Harry's misrepresentations, to do nothing
for a year.
The facts behind the defendant's remaining three cases,
Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder, Peabody
& Co., 800 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1986), Braka v. Multibanco Comermex,
S.A. , 589 F.Supp 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), and Resource Investors v.
Natural Resource Investment Corp., 457 F.Supp 194 (E.D.Mich. 1978),
are readily distinguishable. The Congregation of the Passion case
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involved a defendant who had

"full discretion to develop and

implement a prudent portfolio strategy."

800 F.2d at 181.

In

Braka, the court found that "[t]he alleged misrepresentation and
nondisclosures could have had no effect on the plaintiff's decision
to

purchase

the

CDs."

589

F.Supp

at

805.

The

alleged

misrepresentations were made fully 10 months after the sales were
finalized.

Id.

In Resource Investors, the defendant "had no

relationship with any of the other parties in this lawsuit until
one year after plaintiff's purchase."

457 F.Supp at 197.

The policy behind the cases cited by the defendant is
designed

to limit the applicability of securities anti-fraud

provisions to situations in which the fraud affected the securities
transaction.

In each case, the fraud alleged did not affect the

transactions, either because the fraud occurred entirely after the
transactions were irrevocably consummated, or the person committing
the alleged fraud had the independent power and authority to enter
into the transactions regardless of the fraud.

This policy is in

no way furthered by prohibiting the application of Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-1 (1989) to a situation where the misrepresentations and
omissions (to take the case most favorable to Harry) occurred after
the transaction, but were part of a lulling technique designed to
hide the fact that the defendant violated his authority in making
the transactions. In that case, policy considerations should favor
application of the anti-fraud provisions because they are necessary
to ensure the integrity of the securities markets.

This is

particularly true wnere the defendant is a stockbroker, with
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fiduciary duties to his clients.

For our capital markets to

operate effectively, people need to know that their stockbrokers

(

are not trading their accounts without authority and then hiding
that fact.
language

Such fraudulent behavior falls within the plain

of Utah

Code Ann. § 61-1-1

(1989), and

should

be

prohibited under Utah law.

CONCLUSION
Only points I, II, III and IV of the defendant's brief
would constitute grounds for a new trial.

Because they do not

challenge the verdict with respect to Count 1, points V and VI are
only relevant to Counts 2 and 3 (point VI) and 4 (point V ) .
Points I (expert testimony) and II (specific intent) are
expressly resolved in favor of the State by the Larsen decision,
which also effectively defeats the defendant's argument in point
III

(good

faith

defense).

The

argument

that Mr.

Barber's

assistance was ineffective (point IV) is without merit, as the
alleged errors appear to have been tactical decisions, and even if
they represented actual errors the defendant has not shown with
demonstrable evidence that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the trial's outcome would have been different but for the errors.
Count 4, concerning Private Ledger (point V ) , was properly pled as
securities fraud because the statute by its language does not limit
the class of victims to investors, and because the scheme to
defraud Private Ledger of its commission was by definition in
connection with the sale of the securities that generated the right
to that commission.

Point VI (concerning Counts 2 and 3) fails to
- 52 -
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recognize that there was an ongoing scheme to defraud Seymour
Isaacs and Frank Brgoch which by definition must have predated the
actual purchase, and that Isaacs and Brgoch were in regular contact
with the defendant prior to the actual purchase during which time
the defendant omitted material facts. Point VI also argues for an
overly restrictive reading of the "in connection with" requirement,
particularly

in a case where the victims did not expressly

authorize the purchase, and could have reasonably attempted to
rescind the purchase but for the defendant's misrepresentations and
omissions shortly after the purchase.
The jury's verdict, and the trial court's ruling in this
case, should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this2^day of May, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

DAVID N. SONNENREICH
Assistant Attorney General
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PRE-OFFERING

SUMMARY

Red River Mountain Limited Partnership,
an Arizona Limited Partnersnip

1201 Soutn Alma School Road, Suite
Mesa, Arizona 35210

12950

(602) 834-7400

THIS PRE-OFFERING SUMMARY CONSISTS
NOR
A SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY
BUY SUCH SECURITIES CAN BE MADE ONLY BY
PLACEMENT
MEMORANDUM
AND
ONLY
TO
FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS AND WHO ARE BONA
IN WHICH THE OFFERING IS AUTHORIZED.

NEITHER AN OFFER TO
SELL
SECURITIES.
AN OFFER TO
THE CONFIDENTIAL
PRIVATE
PERSONS
MEETING
CERTAIN
FIDE RESIDENTS OF
STATES
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PARTNERSHIP

OBJECTIVE

The o b j e c t i v e of RED RIVER M O U N T A I N L I M I T E D
PARTNERSHIP
is
to
combine two d i v e r s i f i e d p r o p e r t i e s in the attempt to take a d v a n t a g e of a
young land m a r k e t (Red River 160 a c r e s ) ,
and
also
to
follow
the
dynamic g r o w t h and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o r r i d o r s (Red
M o u n t a i n E x p r e s s w a y 13.4 a c r e s ) witnin the P h o e n i x metro a r e a .
The 160 acres in S t a n f i e l d ,
A r i z o n a is located
within
the
fT
old John Wayne Ranch which he named "Red River .
The 13.4 acres
is situated in the Mesa a r e a along a f u t u r e freeway
referred
to
as the Red M o u n t a i n E x p r e s s w a y .
H e n c e , the p a r t n e r s h i p combined
the names Red River and Red M o u n t a i n E x p r e s s w a y to form Red River
Mountain Partners.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE EAST VALLEY
RED MOUNTAIN

The East Valley is growing at an
increasingly
greater
rate
than
any
other region in the Greater Phoenix Metropolitan
area and represents a major urban center in its own right.
One
reason
for
the
popularity
of the East Valley is the excellent
reputation of the school systems. Moreover,
six major east-west
transportation
corridors
are
separated
by
only
three miles.
University Drive, Main Street,
Broadway Road, Southern Avenue,
the Superstition Freeway and Baseline Road provide transportation
corridors throught the heart of the East Valley.
Mesa was founded in 1378 and incorporated in 1883. The
city grew an estimated 53% between 1980 and 1985 and is Arizona's
third
largest
city
with
a current population of approximately
233,000.
Mesa covers more than 90 square miles, and is located
approximately 4 miles east of Phoenix, the Arizona state capital.
Mesa
is considered the retail,
trade and medical center of the
East Valley which includes the cities of Mesa, Tempe, Chandler,
Gilbert
and Apache Junction.
The East Mesa area is expected to
become an attractive area for
families
and
businesses
in
the
future due to the completion of the Superstition and Red Mountain
Freeways
which
will
provide
residents
with
^uick
access to
downtown Mesa and Phoenix.

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE PROPERTY
RED MOUNTAIN
Th e P r o p e r t y is l o c a t e d at the no rthw est c or ne r or
L'nive r s i t y a n d
the
p r o p osed R ed Mo unt ai n Fr eewa y in t he r egion
c
e
n
t
1
which was re
y s t r ip a nne xed to t he so uthe as t part
Mesa ,
of
is th e t h i rd l a r g e s t and f as te st gr owin g ci t y in the State
which
It is l o ca te d i n t he ea stern par t of
of Ar i z o n a .
Pla nning
the
Area of the city of Me sa , a p p r o ximat ely 1 2 mi les from t he c enter
of do w n t o w n M e s a .
Co n t m ued an d s us taine d gr owth has m ade
Mesa
home
o f mor e tha n 14 0 comp an les m c l udin g Mc Donnel 1-Do uglas
the
Helic 0 p t e r C ompan y ("M c Don n e l l - D oug la S'?) W hich emp lo ys m or e
than
McDon nell -Dou g 1as ha s m o v ed s ome operat ions f rom
4, 500
peopl e .
to
Me sa ,
Cul ve r C i t y , Cal if or n la
c o n t r lbut m g
to e mp lo y m e n t
n
Me
sa
Al so I
Mesa .
in
so u t h w e st o f th e Prop er t y
g rowt h
is
Willi a m s A i r Fore e 3as e , one of t he l a r g e st j et
tra in m g
pilot
We stern
in
th e
base
fa cili t v a lso ad ds t o the
Thi s
wo r i d .
wt
h
of
nom
I
C
1
i
t
v
a
n
d
eco
gro
Mesa
s ta bi
Many n e w r e s I de nt la 1 a n d
developments
are
c o m m e r cial
c u r r e n t l y unde r w a y in the v ic i n 11 y o f t h e Property including Alta
Mesa
by Es t es H o m e s .
Wh en c o m p l e t e , th is 867 acre development
will n a v e over 3,400 h O U S 1 ng u n i t s ,
c o m p Iete w i t h a golf c o u r s e ,
lakes
a nd
To
gr e e n be 11 s
the
s o u t h w est of the Property are
se ve ra i other la r ge-sc ale de ve lo p m e n t s w h lch
have
substantially
impacted
a 600
i nc i u d i n g S un land Village East,
Sout h e a s t Me sa
acre ma s t e r p lan ned ret i r eme m c o m m u n i t v , and
the
Crossings,
a
d
e
ve
1,000
a ere
1 o pme nt be i n s ma s t e r p l a n n e a by American
p ro posed
Con t m e n t a l .
Fountain of the Sun
G o l d e n H i l l s,
L e i s u r e Wor Id',
and
Des e r t Sa n d s re p resen t fo u r a d d 11 l o n a 1 d e v e l o p e d residential
c omm unit le s to t a i i n g in ex c e s s of 2 , 0 0 0 ac re s •
Also impacting this r e g i o n will be
the
completion
of
Western
Savings'
1,680
acre
masterpianned
development,
S u p e r s t i t i o n Springs and the i . a s t Valley Town C e n t e r ,
which
are
in
the
primary
stages
of
development.
Included within the
p r o j e c t plans is a one m i l l i o n s q u a r e
foot
regional
mall
with
anchor
tenants
expected
to i n c l u d e major retail stores such as
G o l d w a t e r s , D i l l a r d s , S e a r s and J.C. P e n n e v ' s .
AD0T
(Arizona
Department
of
Transportation)
has
committed
the
funds
for
the
completion
of
the Superstition
F r e e w a y E x t e n s i o n as well as the Red Mountain Freewav and the San
Tan F r e e w a y.
The Superstition F r e e w a v c u r r e n t l y ends at Power
Road,
five
miles
southwest
of the P r o p e r t y .
Current plans call for
c o n s t r u c t i o n to begin at Power Road in early 1988 and end at U.S.
Highway
60 in 1991
with
an o f f - r a m p located at E l l s w o r t h Road,
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less than two and o n e - h a l f miles south
of
the
Property.
The
comoietion
of
the
Suoerstition
Freewav
w i l l connect the 1-10
F r e e w a v and the East V a l l e v with Apache J u n c t i o n and the
further
eastern
regions
of
Arizona.
Also being e n g i n e e r e d is a major
s t a c k e d interchange west of Ellsworth Road (2 m i l e s south or
the
site)
T h i s would serve as the c o n f l u e n c e of three freeways in
Maricopa County:
the S u p e r s t i t i o n F r e e w a y ,
the San Tan
Freeway
and the Red Mountain F r e e w a y .
The Red M o u n t a i n Freewav has a p r o p o s e d completion date
the year 2 0 0 0 ;
it will c o n n e c t Sky H a r b o r airport,
the
P h o e n i x with
Mesa's
industrial
core,
providing
easy
to
Falcon
Field
and
east
Mesa's
new
residential

set
for
downtown
access
de ve i o p m e n t s
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CASA

GRANDE/STANFIELD
RED

AREA

RIVER

The
Casa
Grande/Stanfield
area
is
a
midway
point
b e t w e e n P h o e n i x , 53 m i l e s to the N o r t h w e s t , and T u c s o n ,
59 miles
to the Southeast, A r i z o n a ' s two largest m e t r o p o l i t a n c i t i e s .
The
area
has
a
population
of
about
20,000
with
p r o j e c t i o n s indicating a g r o w t h of an a d d i t i o n a l 5 5 , 0 0 0 people by
the turn of the century.
Major l a b o r a t o r i e s have moved into the
Casa
Grande
area
in
recent
years and p l a n n e r s and developers
e x p e c t that this influx w i l l c o n t i n u e .
Landowners in the area are so c o n v i n c e d that
the
Casa
Grande/Stanfield
area
will
emerge as a bona fide suburb of the
g r e a t e r P h o e n i x area that
they
have
undertaken
a
cooperative
effort
to
formulate m a s t e r p l a n s for almost 5 0 , 0 0 0 acres of land
in the a r e a .
The result w i l l be known as
StanMar
Valley.
A
subsection
of
the
Stanmar
Valley a r e a is an 1 1 , 0 0 0 - a c r e selfc o n t a i n e d community known as Red R i v e r , which is on the site of a
r a n c h formerly owned by John W a y n e .

\
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THE

PROPERTY

RED

RIVER

The
property
is
an
easily
a c c e s s i b l e 160 acre site
located in the area known
as
Red
River.
Red
River
is
now
included in the StanMar Valley M a s t e r p l a n .
The site has f r o n t a g e
on both W h i t e Parker Road and H i g h w a y 84 and is c o n t i g u o u s to the
11,000
acre
Red
River
Masterplan,
but
is not subject to the
masterplan assessments.
The
southeast
quadrant
of
metropolitan
Phoenix
is
experiencing tremendous growth.
B o t h the N o r t h w e s t and S o u t h e a s t
Valley
have
excellent transportation r o u t e s .
The Black C a n y o n
F r e e w a y and I n t e r s t a t e 1-17 serve the N o r t h w e s t
Valley
and
the
S u p e r s t i t i o n F r e e w a y ( S t a t e Highway 3 6 0 ) and I n t e r s t a t e 1-10, the
Southeast
Valley.
An e x p a n s i v e new f r e e w a y s y s t e m funded by a
o n e - h a l f cent sales tax i n c r e a s e w i l l f u r t h e r e n h a n c e d e v e l o p m e n t
in the N o r t h w e s t and S o u t h e a s t V a l l e y .
in
An
a dditio nal
b oth
the
to
g rowt h
cont ribu tor
and
Nort h e a s t
of
has
major
the
Sou theas t
lo ca ti on
bee n
Th e S outh east
manu f a c t u ring c ompani es in t h e se a reas
Va lley,
ropo
v
e
r
,
l s erne rging as th e n e w ur ban hub of met
howe
lita n Ph oenix
hig h
tec hnolog y
with
The
pi a n t s bei ng t he m a j or c ontr ibut or .
Sout h e a s t V a l l e y has a com p e t i ti ve edg e over the Nor thwe st V alley
beca u s e o f
to
Harb or
Sky
its
Inte m a t ional
c los e
pr o x i m ity
Air p or t,
down t own Ph oen I X , A r izon a St a t e Un i ver sity , and Ar izona
Stat e R e s earch P a r k .
comp anie s
to
f or
Add it io nal indu c e m e n t s
in
loca te
ar e
Sout heast
vari t y o f re side ntial
a
Va lley
the
choi c e s ,
lower
qu alit y sc hool s f
re tai l a n d comrau ni t y ser vice s,
c o sts
a v a i l a b ilit y o f vat er .
powe r
The Sout heas t Va lley,
a nd
off er s both a
unli ke ot her a r eas o f me t r opol i tan Pho e n i x ,
place
to 1 ive a s wel 1 as wo rk.
Red
River,
23 m i n u t e s from the e d g e of d e v e l o p m e n t in
the S o u t h e a s t V a l l e y ,
is one of the few large p a r c e l s closest to
this area a v a i l a b l e for d e v e l o p m e n t .
T h e m a j o r i t y of the land in
between
Red
R i v e r and the southern e d g e of the S o u t h e a s t Valley
is Indian R e s e r v a t i o n or F e d e r a l l a n d s w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of
the
s m a l l town of M a r i c o p a .
Casa
G r a n d e has a l r e a d y been e x p e r i e n c i n g a t r e m e n d o u s
a m o u n t of " s p i n - o f f " g r o w t h from the S o u t h e a s t V a l l e y .
Because
of its s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n at the i n t e r s e c t i o n of I n t e r s t a t e s I-10
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and 1-8,
businesses are easily able to access the large Southern
California
and
Southwest
markets.
In a d d i t i o n ,
its location
a p p r o x i m a t e l y half-way b e t w e e n the S t a t e ' s two major m e t r o p o l i t a n
m a r k e t s , P h o e n i x ' a n d T u c s o n ; its r a i l a c c e s s ; and its c o o p e r a t i v e
growth-oriented
city
officials
all
will
continue
to
fuel
d e v e l o p m e n t in the Casa G r a n d e a r e a .
Red River, 10 m i l e s closer to Phoenix than C a s a G r a n d e ,
offers
an
attractive
a l t e r n a t i v e l i f e s t y l e to the S o u t h e a s t e r n
Valley as w e l l as n u m e r o u s
residential,
retail
and
employment
opportunities.
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PROPERTY DATA SHEET

RED MOUNTAIN

RED RIVER

TYPE OF PROPERTY:

Unimproved

Farm land

LOCATION:

NWC 90th St, (Red
Mountain Freeway)
and University Dr
Mesa, Arizona

SW 1/4 of
Section 24
T6S f R3E of
the G&SRB&M
Stanfield,AZ

13.437 acres

160.3313
gross acres

ZONING:

Rural

Agriculture

PRICE:

$1,300,000

$1,037,874

TERMS:

$260,000 down
$870,658 first
deed of trust
interest only
payable at 10Z
for first 10
years, thereafter
3 annual installments beginning in
1999 of $350,104

SIZE:

$169,342 second
deed of trust,
interest at 10Z
payable in 5 annual
installments of
$44,672
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$175,000 down
$479,874 first
deed of trust,
interest at
101, payable
interest only
in 1988 and 89
thereafter in
10 annual
installments
of $83,326
$168,000 second deed of
trust, 10Z
interest, no
payments until
1991, thereafter in 9
annual installments of
$35,006
$220,000-101
interest payable in 5
annual installments of
$58,035

THE PROPOSED OFFERING
The Par tnersh^p w ill offe r 110 un its of lim ited partnership
interest wi th an 1 nitial capi tal cont ri bution o £ $5,100 per unit
(minimum 3 u nits).
U pon succ essful c ompletion of the offering,
$561,000 in initial capital contribu tions will be raised.
The
schedule
chart below shows
the
pr oposed
of
additional
contribution s an inv estor w ould be required t o make should the
Property be held throu gh the f ull amor tization o f the acquisition
financing.
WHILE THE PARTNE RSHIP 0 BJECTIVE IS TO SELL THE
PROPERTY WI THIN THREE TO FIVE YEARS, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT
THIS OBJECTI VE CAN BE ACHIEVED AND THE PARTNERSH IP MAY HOLD THE
PROPERTY FOR THIRTEEN YEARS OR LONGER.
LIMITED PARTNER'S CONTRIBUTION SCHEDULE
Initial Capital Contribution:
(Per unit - minimum 3 units)
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
April
April

25,
25,
25,
25,
25,
25,
25,
25,
25,
25,
25,
25,
25,

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

$5,100

$ 2,885
2,885
2,885
2,885
2,885
2,885
2,235
2,235
2,235
2,235
2,875
2,875
2,875
$39,975

The maximum p o t e n t i a l
contribution
per u n i t
i s $39,975
p a y a b l e in 13 i n s t a l l m e n t s
through
April
25,
2001.
If,
as
anticipated,
the Property i s s o l d a t a p r o f i t p r i o r t o t h e f i f t h
year from c l o s i n g , then no a d d i t i o n a l c a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s would
be due a f t e r the date of s a l e .
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PARTNERSHIP

CAPITALIZATION

Initial Capital Contribution
from Limited Partners

$

561,000

Term Financing

$3,836,250

Total Capitalization

$4,397,250

USES OF PROCEEDS
Selling Expenses
Organization and syndication fees
Purchase price of property
Interest expense
Syndication costs
Net operating expenses
Reserves

$

Total Application of Funds

$4,397,250

PARTNERSHIP

59,500
25,000
2,337,874
1,590,023
31,500
308,680
44,673

OBJECTIVES

Red
River
Mountain
Limited
Partnership
will be a
private
placement
limited
partnership
designed
to offer the
sophisticated investor the potential for capital appreciation
as
part
of a diversified
investment portfolio.
To achieve this
objective, the Partnership has acquired for investment a 160 acre
parcel in the Stanfield,
Arizona area and
a
13.4 acre
parcel
along
a proposed
freeway
referred
to as
the
Red
Mountain
Expressway, in Mesa, Arizona.
The Partnership's objectives are
to:
*

Provide capital

appreciation

*

Preserve and protect investor's invested

*

Provide build-up of Partnership equity through the
reduction of mortgage indebtedness
encumbering
the
property•
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capital

DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS
Net proceeds from refinancing or sale of the Properties
shall be at the discretion of the General Partners until such
time as both Properties have sold.
Upon
the sale of the
Properties, proceeds shall be distributed 100Z to the Limited
Partners until they have received all of their
invested capital
and thereafter 80Z to the Limited Partners and 20Z to the General
Partners.
PROJECTED CASH RETURN FOR A ONE-UNIT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
FOR THE PERIOD MAY 1, 1988 THROUGH THE HYPOTHETICAL DISSOLUTION
OF THE PARTNERSHIP ON MAY
1, 1993 ASSUMING
A SALE OF THE
PROPERTIES AT MARKET VALUE.
HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT
THE PROPERTIES WILL SELL DURING THE SAME YEAR. IF THE PROPERTIES
ARE SOLD IN DIFFERENT YEARS, THE CASH INVESTMENT AND PROCEEDS
WILL DIFFER FROM THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE PRESENTED BELOW.

CASH
INVESTMENT

CUMULATIVE
CASH
INVESTMENT

$5,100

$ 5,100

1989

2,885

7,985

1990

2,885

10,870

1991

2,885

13,755

1992

2,885

16,640

1993 sale

n/a

16,640

YEAR

Subscription

ESTIMATED
NET SALE
PROCEEDS

CASH
RETURN

$25,192

$23,481

The projected amounts do not reflect any income tax consequences.
i
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THE MANAGING

ROSS

GENERAL

PARTNERS

N. F A R N S W O R T H ,

JR.

One of the G e n e r a l P a r t n e r s of Red
River
Mountain
Limited
P a r t n e r s h i p is Ross N. F a r n s w o r t h , J r . who is 31 years o l d .
Ross
graduated
from
Brigham
Young
University
with
a
B a c h e l o r of
Science degree.
Ross s u p e r v i s e d the e n t i r e c o m m e r c i a l d e p a r t m e n t
of F a r n s w o r t h
Realty
and
Development
from
1980
untii
1984.
During
this time he invested client f u n d s in v a r i o u s real e s t a t e
p r o j e c t s r a n g i n g from s y n d i c a t e d land,
commercial and i n d u s t r i a l
property
and
the
development
and
management
of m u l t i - f a m i l y
projects.
'
From 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 6 M r .
F a r n s w o r t h was President of
Farnsworth,
Perkinson
&
Smith,
Inc.,
a c o m m e r c i a l real estate c o m p a n y who
a c q u i r e d n e a r l y 1000 acres of m u l t i - u s e land, closed 4 of its own
syndicated offerings,
c o n s t r u c t e d two m u l t i - f a m i l y
projects,
a
retail
shopping
center,
m e d i c a l o f f i c e building,
entered into
s e v e r a l raw land joint v e n t u r e s and i n i t i a t e d the d e v e l o p m e n t
of
the largest deed restricted m e d i c a l p a r k in A r i z o n a .
In
1986
Mr.
F a r n s w o r t h o p e n e d h i s own o f f i c e ,
Farnsworth
H o l d i n g s , I n c . which s p e c i a l i z e s in the a c q u i s i t i o n ,
develo praent
and
syndication
of
raw
land.
In N o v e m b e r 1986,
Farnsworth
H o l d i n g s moved into the
largest
office
complex
in
Mesa,
the
sixteen-story Western Savings Financial Center.

CREGG

CANNON

Cregg
Cannon,
also
a
General
Partner,
has worked as in
I n v e s t m e n t B a n k e r with the
Wall
Street
firm
of
Smith
Barney
H a r r i s Upham, I n c . a New York Stock E x c h a n g e m e m b e r .
Mr. C a n n o n ,
during
his time at Smith Barney,
m a n a g e d funds in areas such as
c o m m e r c i a l real estate located in
the
sunbelt
area,
tax
free
m u n i c i p a l b o n d s , oil and gas and other fixed income i n v e s t m e n t s .

Mr

Cannon
served
as
Vice
President
of I n v e s t m e n t s for
P r u d e n t i a l B a c h e S e c u r i t i e s from 1984 u n t i l
1987.
He
managed
individual
and
institutional
a c c o u n t s in fixed income and real
estate.
Some of the large real e s t a t e s y n d i c a t o r s with which he
worked
were
First
Capital,
The
Related
Companies,
Century
P r o p e r t i e s and C o n s o l i d a t e d C a p i t a l , I n c .
In 1987, M r .
C a n n o n opened his own o f f i c e ,
Cannon C a p i t a l ,
I n c . , located in Salt Lake C i t y , U t a h .
He also is the m a n a g e r of
a m a j o r New York Stock Exchange firm in Salt Lake City, Utah
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THE INFORMATION HEREIN WAS OBTAINED BY THE GENERAL PARTNER
FROM SOURCES DEEMED TO BE RELIABLE.
NO ASSURANCE MAY BE GIVEN
WITH RESPECT TO THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF INFORMATION
OBTAINED
FROM PERSONS WHO ARE NOT AFFILIATES OF THE GENERAL PARTNER.
THIS PRE-OFFERING SUMMARY IS, THEREFORE, QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO THE CONFIDENTIAL PRIVATE PLACEMENT
MEMORANDUM,
A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED AND RECEIPT
ACKNOWLEDGED BY EACH PERSON WHO SUBSCRIBES FOR SECURITIES OF RED
RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (THE PARTNERSHIP) BEFORE SUCH
SUBSCRIPTION.
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RCSS N FfiRNSHCRTH JR AND AFFILIATED COTANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS
PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF LAND

GROSS
PURCHASE
PRICE

GROSS
SALES
PRICE

5R0SS
AMOUNT
OF SAIN

DATE OF
FtfiCHASE

MONTHS
HELD

POWER ROAD 1

03/01/83

16

$864,013

51,365,485

$501,472

POWER ROAD 2

06/01/33

13

775,000

1,073,777

298,777

QUEEN CREEK

10/31/84

i

2,200,000

2,504,000

304,000

ARIZONA AVENUE 1

01/03/85

11

3,585,504

5,712,562

2,127,058

ARIZONA AVENUE 2

01/03/85

3

3,676,590

J , 4v6,

/•>/

1,730,347

SILA BUTTE ESTATES

05/31/85

7

2,320,000

3,191,563

871,563

CASA GRANDE
QUARTER SECTION

03/15/85

3

800,000

1,230,000

430,000

SOSSAMAN 40

05/19/85

1

450,000

535,000

35,000

CRISHCN XARTER SECTION

03/15/55

13

4,050,000

5,30,000

1,330,000

FCAX HAWES RD LTD PTSHP

08/07/84

27

1,453,000

2,880,343

1,427,343

ATC STAfflELD LTD PTSHP

01/14/88

N/A

1,744,000

PROPERTY

N/A

N/A

NOTE: The inforaation contained in the table should not be
considereo indicative of the possible results froa the
operation of the partnership. This intoroation in no aanner
ltpiies or indicates that investors in the offering M i l l
experience returns or cash d i s t r i b u t i o n s , if any, ccmparable
to those experienced by the owners ot the projects specified
in the table.
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Rincil recommends
ite forfreewayleg
open the area to industrial commercial and
high-density development, while the homeowners
Ity Council Monday recommended a route would prefer it to remain as natural desert and
n leg of the Red Mountain Freeway that
low-density housing.
northeast side of the Central Arizona
David Udall, attorney for Bellamah Community
I and the Spook Hill flood control dike,
Development Co., which is planning a three>
leted, the Red Mountain Freeway will run square-mile community northeast of Bush Highway
ft northern boundary and will connect
and McDowell Road, supported the B-l alignment.
th Tempe and Scottsdale. It also will hook
"Freeways exist to serve people, and this route will
rotitioo Freeway near Ellsworth Road,
open up land to be served," he said.
nendation, numbered B~l from a series of
The council voted unanimously for the B-l corridor,
iutes proposed by Tempe consulting firm
saying the alternative on the southwest side of the canal
Jterfcoff, Quade and Douglas, will go to the would have a greater impact on existing and future
urtment of Transportation, which will
developments, including a city water treatment plant;
I determination of the route.
city park and proposed community college
. ~:il rejected the arguments of a
^ In other action, the council approved annexation of
t of the Spook Hill Homeowners'
1,570 acres of state-owned land along McKellips Road
rho asked that the freeway follow an
east of the C A P canal, which would be crossed by the
rig the southwest side of the canal
Red Mountain Freeway and could become the site of a
a , 1220 N. S2nd S t , said the southwest
large planned community in the future.
uld have less of an impact on the area
The state plans td auction off the property alter a
d be built below ground level like parts of master plan is drawn up for the area.
* Freeway.
""The council also approved an ordinance that would
m the northeast side of U * canal would
provide for removal of abandoned vehicles on private
rated because it crosses a flood plain, he
property, and approved joining the Arizona Moncipal
Finance Pool which will provide cities and school
lid a freeway in the northeast side would
districts with a |450 million fund to borrow from. " '..
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CASA GRANDE DISPATCH
11-19-87

County Panel OKs
Red River Proposal
By LINDA COULSON
Stiff Writer
FLORENCE - A plin that one
day could convert 20,0X10 acres
surroundinc the late John
Wayne's Red River Ranch Into a
bustling self-contained community received approval from a county planning and zoniag commislion Wednesday.
The Pinal County Planning and
Zoning Commission voted unanimously to send the Red River
Area Plan to the county board of
supervisors with a favorable
recommendation.
Red River is part of the 46,000acre StanMar ValWy, a series of
area plans in the Startfield/Maricofia area scheduled to complete a
tchwork quilt of development
tween Casa Grande and southeast Phoenix.
Planners from A. Wayne Smith
It Associates have been workina
with county planning staff and
Slanfield area landowners since
last February, following the commission! initiation of the Red
River Area Plan.
The land use guide Includes approximately 12,050 acres owned
by Karl Eller, chief executive officer of the Circle K Corp., and his
partner In the joint venture, Timothy R. Olson, of Paragon Homes.
Also included are 2,$0 acres of
state-leased land.
Eller bought the land from
Wayne's former partner, Louis
Johnson of Stanfield, In 1979, and
sold a portion to Olson last year.

G

Since then, approximately 5,000
acres have been sold, said Christin Laraway, Red River vice
president
The majority of the proposed
area plan lies west of Stanfield between White Parker and Maricopa Roads.
Beginning a half-mile north of
Interstate 8, the property extends
approximately 3V4 miles north to
the southern boundary of the Maricopa Indian Reservation. The remaining portion, approximately
20 percent of the total area development, lies east of Stanfield, between Highway M and Interstate
1
County officials Intend the land
use plan to serve as a blueprint for
development in the Standfield
area, approximately 23 miiea
south of Phoenix.
The area Is scheduled to Include
residential, commercial, Industrial, recreational and community
uses, including seven public
schools sites and inter-connecting
parkway boulevards.
However, several developers
during the planning process expressed concern about odor produced by a cattle feed lot In the
middle of the plan.
Michael B. Withey, Phoenix attorney representing Red River,
said Bennedict Feed Lot now Is
highlighted In red to alert prospective land buyers they may be
In an "odor" zone.
Meanwhile, Withey said plan-

ners added four sections to the
plans narrative to protect Bennedicta by spelling out "In no uncertain terms they have a right to
remain, in operation and anyone
who wants to develop around
them should be aware of that.'9
Withey said In the future, a 2'imile odor zone will be drawn
around the lot
Timothy Kaehr, Red River Resources, Inc., said another feed lot
within the plan owned by his company is scheduled to be phased out
once development In the area
begins!
"it may not be viable 1015
years from now," he said said of
the Red River Feed Lot. "Over
the last 10-15 years there has been
a drastic reduction in the number
of feed Iota in the United States."
In other business Wednesday,
the commission:
— Unanimously favored a proposal U> rezone the Town of San
Manuel from general rural to 334
acres of residential, one acre mulfiift,n«
•"*•«•» acres of ml
bile home park.
The remainder of the town
would remain general rural to acs
commodate churches and schools
San Manuel formerly was
owned by Magma Copper Co., and
his been zoned general rural

MS. 9 8 2 ,

Mld Gwge , M

° *. S

O'Brien said now that the come l i t e business, it Is trying to set

-inTEr?"-1—»"•»-

. ~ pbled a request from Ell M .
beth Bryant of Maricopa to retone
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
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Red River Mountain Limited Partnership

\M EXHIBIT

2855 East Brown Road, Suite 14
Mesa, Arizona 65213
(602) 832-4114

P-3

August 29, 1989
BY FAX

Mr. Virl Thornton
c/o Ron Harry
Private Ledger
139 E. South Temple, No, 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Mr. Thornton:
Pursuant to my conversation with Ron Harry, as General
Partner of Red River Mountain Limited Partnership, I hereby
consent to the following terms regarding your interests in the
above referenced partnership:
1. You will maintain your 3 units in the Partnership and
will continue to make the yearly contributions for the 3 units for
the years 1989 and 1990 in the amount of $2,885 per unit, per
year •

2.
After the 1990 payment to the Partnership on your 3
units, you will have no further obligation on these units although
you will maintain your interest in the Partnership.
3.
These aforementioned
receive a check in the amount of
your 3 units by Federal Express,
my office the morning of Friday,

items are agreed to providing I
$8,655.00 as the 1989 payment on
overnight mail, to be received in
September lf 1989.

Please call me should you have any questions.
Sincerely,

^

jljr^Zq
qA '
"I
Accepted & Agreed to:

Virl Thornton, TrusLee
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Virl W. Thornton Trust
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FIRST NATIONAL
BANK^i^1?7
OF ONAGA, KANSAS

PAGE

ACCT 341001358

301 Leonard, Onaga, KS 66521
913-889-4211

SEYMOUR W ISAACS
IRA DTD 04-11-88
TRANSACTION HISTORY

INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT A£C0IMN"PERIOD ENDING

6/30/88

SEYMOUR W ISAACS
300 EVERGREEN AVE
SUMMIT ?AR<
tANS.
^TE

UT

54060-Q00C
CASH

DESCRIPTION CF TRANSACTION

;/01/Si eALANCE FORWARD
:/0?/?,3 ROLLOVER

INCOME
PRINCIPAL
WITHHOLDING
1n

30600.00-

3/13/33 ASSET =URCHASSD
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP

6/30/S8 CUSTODIAL FEE

NEW BALANCES

.00

31000.00

CONTRIBUTION

6/30/82 SAVINGS INTEREST
FIRST NATIONAL 3ANK OF ONAGA
IRA CASH ACCOUNT
5.5% INTEREST

.00

INVESTMENTS
BOOK VALUE
PAR/SHARES/UNIT

30600.00
6.000000

3.31

12.00-

.00
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.00

30991.31

FIRST NATIONAL BANK
OF ONAGA, KANSAS

ACCT a

301 Leonard, Onaga, KS 66521
913-889-4211

«iooi358 P . S E

SEYMOUR W ISAACS
04-11-88
0TD

IRA

INVESTMENT REVIEW
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT
OF
6/30/88
AS
! VALUE/
lES/UNITS

TOTAL
COST

TOTAL
MARKET

UNIT
ESTIMATED
MARKET ANNUAL INCOME

YIELD ON
COST MARKET

REAL ESTATE
HVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED
IERSHIP
6.000000
30/600.00
,L 2EAL ESTATE
30600.CO

.00

.000

.CO.

.00 *

.00

.00

.00

.00

.00

21.52

5.50

5.50

21.52

5.50

5.50

SAVINGS
' NATIONAL SANK OF ONAGA
ASH ACCOUNT
INTEREST
91.310000
391.31
L SAVINGS
391.31
E CASH
IPAL CASH
TOTAL

391.31
391.31

.00
.00

.30
.00

30991.31

391.31

1.000

21.52

i
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FIRST NATIONAL BANK
ONAGA, KANSAS BSSZI
Phon* 913 889-4211

CUSTODIAL IRA TRADING AUTHORIZATION
The undersigned accountholder hereby acknowledges that he/she has retained

Ron A Harry

_ _ of

Account Representative
as Account Representative
Firm
for the IRA custodial account referenced below, under the following conditions:

Ron A Harry

is hereby appointed my

Representative with authority to buy, sell and trade in securities for cash for my account in accordance with your terms and conditions to receive duplicated confirmations and statements
covering transactions for my account and to do all acts and give orders and instructions necessary or incidental thereto. I hereby confirm a l l transactions in my account made on my behalf.
I indemnify the custodian against any loss sustained as the result of transactions by my agent
for my account.
2. tAy Representative will not place a trade for my account before the initial seven day period after the establishment of my IRA has passed. This will allow for my right to revoke my IRA.

3. This Authorization is not transferable without my consent and may be terminated by written notification from me. I acknowledge responsibility for any transaction initiated prior to receipt of
a termination letter.
4. The account will be established as follows:
First National Bank of Onaga Custodian
FBO

Seymour W I s a a c s

_, IRA

301 Leonard Street
O n a g a , KS 66521
Tax ID N o . 48-0974280

Accbynt Representative's Signature

Date of Acceptance

Rep's Mailing Address

SfiLx
City

LAKJL

[jn

UTAHStote

<gOI- S 3 7 - ? k O P
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Rollover Certification
AfUwniofi**^

K<r/r«r i'iu

A 10 IKA ROIXOVI:R

lax> ft

PART 1.

TIMELINESS * 60 Days Tlie funds you receixtd from the distributing IkA must be depuiitci wjtfiih 60 days after you teceive than.
Date ymi received funds or property from the distributing IKA:
_ J ij ZV '
'
,
.
t J YES D NO U the date of deposit within 60 days* // YES, you tow mrt /fre fi*it ttquimnenl% plane continue.

PART I.

ONE YEAR RESTRICTION You may mukc only one IRA f o l l o w every « month*, pec iRA.
Dale you received fund* or property from the distributing IRA (date listed under MiW 1): _ _ _ _ _ . _
Data you received your last rollover distribution (prkyr to thin rollmm distribution) from the dltftributinft mA?
LJ YES II NO Have 12 months or more passed between the above two dates?
"O Not Applicable If YIX or mrf §rphcMhtrf yrai aswr m«f iht mmd tt^uittmrnt. Piete mr<f §nd cvmnkk the Htpmtutt wcthm (*tom

UALIHED F I H K E M f c N I PLAN OK tAX S H H T L R M ) ANNUITY IO IRA KOI LOVbR

PART I.

ELIGIBLE PERSON lb certify you were an alfpble participant in a plan, pktfae check one of the items bcknv.
Rcgaitiing file plan from which you received tbt money or property you Intend tu roll over, are or wen? you (check the one th*t Millies):
U A participant in the plan,

TART Z.

PART\
Option A.

Option 6.

r/,,iv f t a w //u- / « y HJ,

H The surviving spouse beneficiary of a deceased participant, or

H Thf alternate payee identified in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
// ym* hax* mkiad mt cf iht items atot*, pittite continue.
f
ELIGIBLE PLAN To crrtify thnt your employer muinlained the prvper kind of }4an to allow a ntilover to an iRA, pirate the%k one or »KW
of th Item bekm
The plan from which you received the money or property you intend to mil over won a:
U IVnsion Plan
luaaar jut. Moi(a))
H Profit Sharing Plan or fctock Bonus flan
[under IKC S40l(a), including iroy MOI<k) jibn)
Q lax Sheltered Annuity
|vnder IKC §401)
Caution: if you are a participant in mof« than one o/ the same kind of pin". h« t*m»m|4i* yi»uf tutipkiyiT uitiuUincd Inoi i^twiun plaro,
iptdal aggregation wk$ may apply. tou should consult your t#* advi** *<> *** if (!»**« ml** apply u> you.
// you tumr teitettd one of tht §hwc Hem*, pi(**r exmiint*.
ELICIDLE DlSlRlDLrriON Fkusc miirw tmh vf the dittributuni QfHiws outlined find choose the one that §ppli<* to this rtlowt.
I 1 JVrttal Diatribution The dlatribution iu a Rntial Diaiributkm it the following axjuircments are met:
1. a. The distribution is at least 50% of the balance to the credit of your account determii\ed immediately Won? the dl^hihutioiv
b, The distribution was made berauaa of the participant'* Nitpamtkm from service, death, or disability. AND
c. Vbu at* electing to rr^at thin an a partial distribution rollover (under IRC fM2(ti)(S)(l»l OR
2. Th# afwbal Employee Stock Ownenihip Han rule in IRCfr401(a)(28)(B)(u)applies,
r

Qualified Ibtal Dlabibution l"hU distributiort is a Qualified Total Distribution if the following reiuiiren\ema are met:
1. "AJU received (or will recoil) the entire balance to tl^e cnxiit of your account In one tax year. (Note tlutt the entire htthmrr
ofttt lux uhcltcred annuities punhuscd while yuu wurked fur yuvr Emptiw must I* pitd to you in one tax yeatj AND
2. YOU have received the distribution because of one of the following reasons (plcttBC chevk);
D The participant's dcatti.

I l Attainment of afte 59V*.

fl 'firminaticm of employment or separation from KTvicu. 77>i* dw* nut upply tu wtif-ivr^yed individuals*
I ) Pliability /as defined in IRK %7Hm)(7)L Vm only upplie* to netf-tfnjdayed vviivid*al».
O The plan wus ternuiuited. Thh doe$ not i\yiy to ta% sheltered annuities flRC $40$).
Cautiaa Atmut ce«wiUa§iing of ftiiuU: If i)w dMrilmtUHi you ractlved OH thla cti^gory and you roil iha funds over to an iRA and mi* regular
p*yii*»iift or hiTtdfi fa** mht^ w.u^n yi»u wiik not br able to mil tlir funds back U» •mitiirf qualified Mti»#m«ni plan oi iiu thcltcrrd annuity.
Option C.

U Distribution Uf Voluntary Deductible Emplovti Contributions this is a rollover that Consist* only of accumulated voluntary
o^ductible employee contributions fm. dvfined m IRC i7Z(oH5HB)J.

Option D.

O Qualified Dumeatic Rclationa Order Diitributlufi Thlb is a rollover that eonsi»t» of funds or ^fopertv recvived front a qualified
pension Or profit aiiaring ylu\ oursuaiit to a Qualified Dumestii; Relations Order las defined in IRC §4l4(l>)l.
U $u\ please pnivide the Luiitouian or Trustee with a ivpy of the relevant portions of the Qualified Dumestk Relations Outer.
ff yuN flair thmtod urn vf the /uwr yytwns iisitd *UAt. p/*Mr timttfUit

PART 4.

EUOIBLU DEPOSIT
G YES D NO Does the rollover deposit consist only of the amount of cash or the property distributed, or the proceeds
from the sale of the distributed property?
IJ YES (J NO Poc* the rollover deposit consist only of Employer contributions, Voluntary Deductible Rmplnytt

Contrlbutions. ta* dofcrrcd earningSr or any combination thereof?
PARTS.

IJ 7L$ to both Of Ow thmx itot*, y\cair vmtkm**
TIMELINESS • 60 Days Thrjund* i*r pntpetiy you mnt*d mutt be dieted
info tm IRA within 60 r/ays after yvu mxhxd them.
Date Votl Rccciwd the Plan Ptmda or Prof^rty;
*
...
U YES O NO h tlte date of this deposit within 60 days? If YES. you Ha\x met the last vf the five reauimrKfd* for making a

qualified wttment plan or tat sheltered annuity to IRA rollowr, Please ttad and complete the Signature section behmx
;NATUKI:

I'U.iyi' lioul

A'ut

«_i>ift/*Vfr

Due to the ioiporlant t^x ^»I»SWUK'IKV> rvlatina •« roiling ovvf funds to m» lRA,.lhra,bevn iulvivvd h> sec a tiuc profvKsk>na).
I certify that I satiafy
thpbyrpquiremeniii
forHunter
making
a Library,
rollover J.into
my Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized
the Howard W.
Law
Reuben
a value
rem*. of
v» $* 'Of
,
1Machine-generated
hereby inwocablyOCR,
designate
tltat this
contribution is to be treated an «i rullover eontributi<m.
may contain
errors.
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0NA6A, KANSAS MS2t

tmj iiMiii

COUNTY/('MOW!

IRA
KrCOUNTHOLDER
INFORMATION

STMPLMER
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT APPLICATION
art *Wf»ld»»»™( ffj *»i

ACttXfNTNO

rjie,fi*$ IRA

^IW

\35L8

....

DAM

_

.

MAlJt.ftM JAXVHAKW

PI infill AMOUNT $ .

[.} Arntndmtnt
Typt of IKA
Contribution:
H

Regular

l)()MK AIWRISS J S . O D . ^ P e X < f l & £ . E V _ / * 0 ^ _

G

SpOUtll

CITY

n

SEP

STATE

-UTA'tt

^

fl

-

/ll'ltJJ*

"65 Ruiiovff
1.1 Tranirei
DESIGNATION Or
RFNLTlClARYflFS)

M.X lAl.SECl'KITVNO.

fij2.-/»=ja^^V"

_

//ir/iV..

DATEOIIIIKIH

J designate the individual^) named below as my pritnfiry and continue?!! hVnWtciary(to) »>Mhk IRA. I ri'vuke all prliw »KA
Beneficiary dtftignatior*. if any. made bv mf. I undertfanH thai I may dump* or add Bcwliriarics at any lime by tumplrting ami
dclivcrdifji th* proper iorm to the Cu*tooi«»n.
It any primary or contingent Bcnduiary d»f* before ma. his or her intend And the uiteirtt o( his o* hn heir* shall lenniiwucompletely, and the perrrntaKc >iwre o l a n y remaining Benriiuaiy(iKl *hall be imre*4fd on a pro i.tt* basis.

iYima/y

l3cntficiary(lff»)

The b l o w i n g i*^ividu.iJ(0 *ha)l be my I'rlwary Henrficlarydcs):

C LAUQlk

MAMP

«5,j5/to££_

saciAi..«cuwiiYNi>.

ADDRFM

-,

.. _ .
NAME

...
5MARlV^r!

IJATFOIWKTH

Q>.rOU*£jSi

KMAUONSHIP

.scKIAt JiKllRITYNO .

...

MfARI.

D A M U i DIKIli

AlJUfttSS

RFIATKJNSHU'

NAMr. .

.

APDRISS..
.
Contingent
fteittficUrylira)

r.

MXIAlSUVklTYNO
SilAkL

IMTt'OI W i l l .
.

kMAIKJNSiltl' .._.

If none of <he Primary pejirfifiarii* survive n * \ the following individual!*) khall l>e my B c m r t w M k * ) :
NAMC

soc;iAi.stcuon'NK>.

..

ADDRWS

MlARl

DATFOrHIKlM
R| IA HONSHU'

NAMF_...

......

ADL)KIS>

ttxiAI.St'CUKiiYNM.
|)A!IOlMKUl
kllAUONWH*

Spousal Content

SIIAWI-. .

1 am theftpmjficof the IKA a/rounthoider nami-d above. 1 a«rw t«» my spot** A naming ot a pi-iuury iknefk-wiy ot)>cr lhan myM'if. I
acknowledge that I have received a fair and reasonable di»lo*unr o* my spouse* property and fiananoaJ »Migatkw J «I'N*> aeknowl
edge that i ihiill liav* not claim whatsoever against thcCuvtiNJian ii» .my payment to mv «.poinen named licnefidMiyta*)
r

SIGNATURES

. *
.

>J*C>U5t.'6M*^AHjH»-

hATI

/mporimif: P/easr rra/f f^/u/r >.^K'^>'K
I unckTiUrKi the fltRibility ruquirviwnl* f»i ll>f tynr of IKA depict I *tm nuking jind i sUttv iki( I do qualify ««• nuki* the de|Kw».
1 have received ,i copy ol the Application, f . W - A Plan ARrevnu'id and Distlonyrv St.tirrncm. I under.i.md that the len«% and
condition* which anply to thiv Individual Ktfirtmrnt Account iue n>nt.nnrd in tfiiw Applu.uion ami IIK* 5A0.S-A Plan Ajwrmrni.
I agree to b# bound by thowe i\:wv> ond rendition*. Within si'ven (7) days IKUI' ihe KU\C I open \h\* IKA I may revoke it without
pm<dty by mailing or delivering ,i wntirn nctlcr to the (.'u'.toiliiili.
t assume complete re^p«'>is»biliiy lor;
0, )>l*rmininfi that I am eli^itle \e>r i n IKA <NKII yiMt I make a contribution
2. Insuring thiil iill contributions I rmike an- within the limits sel Inflh by thi- \ A \ laws.
3. The tax ronv^urneeft of any ennhibution <inrhjdm|( rollover I'liottilMiliuns^ and <l^l/lbutions.
I ixpre%^lywriify that I tike <.ytnplHH M<,ponsihiIity tor the tvj"1 »>i mvenment mstiumtntU) 1 cl»fu»se tn l\md my IRA.
itnd that L«WA>todiHii \s?^Mk
of Any liability re^ardintt tn# prrlonnatue «»i <«ny investment cl\niraj make.
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T O IRA ROIXOVI K
PART 1.

TIMELINESS - 60 Days The fund$ you received fntrn the distributing IRA miiaf be rf<p*if< in 60 day* after ytm mv««r tftrtrt.
Pat* ytm received fund* or property from the distributing IRA:
,4

FART 2.

ONE YEAR RESTRICTION Yhu may make only one IRA rollovt r every 12 month*, per IK A.

I)< YBS U NO h the date oi deport within 60 days? if YES, you ton* mef fhf fhtl requirement, p/m* cimftfiiaf.
Date you r e r e a d funds ur property from the distributing IRA (date H**td under Part lh
Date you received your iant rollover distribution (prior to thin rvlloxw distribution) hum the distributing lKAi_ ..
Q YES n N O Have 12 month* or more passed between thf •bow two date*?
9? Not Applirahlft If YES or net apfWiaWe. you tot* rot <** warna4 requirement. P/m* 'tYidarid comrto* <k Symturr stLtttilMcw.
J A U R I - i ) RETIRF.Ml N T FLAN Ol< TAX S t i l l Tt-RFD ANNUITY T O IK A ROLIOVI K

PARTI,

\\ttf K . T W tin hrc l\i'k H.

ELIGIBLE PERSON 'lb certifv you were an eligible participant in a plan, plea** check o i * of the items below.

Regarding the plan from which you received the money or property you intend to roU over, are or www you <chn* the <w Mai aftrfw*):
D A participant in the plan,

H The surviving apousc beneficiary of a deceased participant, or

D The alternate payee Identified in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
// yw AiW attested vw cj 0* items afcuw, fi/at* wnlmue.
PART 2.

ELIGIBLE PLAN To certify that your employer maintained the proper k\t\d rf }Man to ullow a tvllmrr to an IRA, filmic t h a i w or mew
of the item M(W
The plan from which you raceived the money or property you intend to toil over wan a:
D rVnaton Plan
(under mc: W\{*)\
U Profit Sharing Plan or 5tock Bonua Tlan

[unkt IRC HOl(a), includes »KC h401(k) pUni

D TAX Sheltered Annuity

[undtr IKC ftftQl

CiutlOAl 1/ )vu «r<« » y«nk'lpitit in more than \\n* of the same kind o\ plan, ftw example vour employer maintained two pviwiun plans,
special aajpeganon rulM any appiy. ftu ihut»W on mult your tax advivor to *«e if these rvVt apply to you,
// yow ^i#ur iWartM mv» «tf r hf atwr ir«w, pl«^ cmnniif.
PARI 3.
Option A.

ELIGIBLE DISTRIBUTION View rrvieu* m'h tj the diMtibution options outlined and chw*e the one ihai allies tv thi* nrthwr.
U hftial Diatribution The dlitrituuion is a Puxtiil Distribution if the followii\g requinrnienta are met:
1, a. The distribution is at leciit 50% of the balance to the credit of your account determined immediately brktev the distribution,
b, The distribution was n\ade because of the participant'a aeparation from service, death, or diMnilitv. AND
C. You are electing to treat thif as a partial distribution rollover fwrtder IRC %402(a)($)(T»l OK
2, The special Employee Stock Ownership Plan ruie in IRC M01(a)(28)(BXII) applien.

Option B.

L' Qualified Total Distribution thta distribution 19 a Qualified Ibtal Distribution if the following reouwemente arc met;
1, \bu received (or will receive) the entire balance to the credit of your Account in one tax year. (Note that the entire tohmct
of nil tax iiieltctd annuities purrhwd white y w worked for your Employer mu$t be paid to yov in one tax ,vrurj AND
2. Y w hm* received the distribution because of one of the foNnwine/reawn* (plane dtuck):
C The participant** death.

LI Attainment U age 59V!,

I 1 Jermination Of employment or separation from service This r/c*> n\H apply to scif-employcd indilnttual*.
IJ Disability (a» defined in IRC %72(mH7)l This only a\ylin h sclf-nnyluyed individuals.
G T1K plan was terminated. This does not apply to tax uhelterad annuities IIRC §403J.
Ciotion About <Jommia§Hng of Pundst if the dMHbutkm yourectivedlib this lAtpgory <od you mil the hind* mw to an 1KA and titU r%K\ik*i
t* ur hit'd* fmm othtr sourcci, yuv will net b* ibif torollthe fundi bxk <u muKhtr qualiiied rvtK-m^nt fttn or tax rhHtfnnl annuity.

Option C
Option a

I I PistriboHoxi Of Voluntary Deductible Employee ContrlbuUonn Thla is a rolktvei \\\*t consisu only of accomtjiated voiuntary

deductible employee contribution? (an defined in IRC i72(o)(5HB)L
n Qualified Domestic Relation* Order Distribution TluS Is a rollover that consists of fund* or property received fmm a qualified
tiainn or profit sharing plan cumuant to a Qualified Domeatir Relatiuns Order iat defined m IRC tfl4(p)h
i a Please pmvidc the Luitoalan or TruMae with a copy of the relevant portimi» uf the Qualified Domestic Relations Ordet.
If yav now r+mixd imr vf th* four ciHKw lifted at***, plane ivnlinHt.

P
PART 4.

RLIGIBLE DETOSIT
H YES D NO Does the rollover deposit wi\%isi only of the amount of cash or the property distributed, or tha proceeds
from the sale of the distributed proparty?
Q YES U NO Doe* the n)lli>ver deposit COnsi* only uf Employer contribution A, X^luntary Dcdttctible r.mpkiyee
Conrributioni, tax deferred earning*, or any combination thereof?
If rf.5 tu U*h tf ihf abote Hem, pk** *>nii*u*

mKT5.

TIMEtlNLbS - 60 Days The fundi or pnjperty you received mwsf be de}xxited into an IRA within 6(1 day* after you mriwd them.
Oabc )AMI Received the Han Funds or Property; _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - . . — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- - _ _ — _ _ ^ .
L) YFS (1 NO k the date of this deprmit within 60 days? If Yr$. you hut* met the last Of the five requirements fvr nuiktn^ u
qualified retirement plan or tax sheltered annuity to IRA nAlover. Please read and eomplttr. the Signature u\Hon beim\

SIGNATURE
advmtd to »cc a i&* professional.
Due to the important I** consequences rvkititiy, tc» mlllnc; over funds to an IRA^ J Jv4 v /vl»»«n
4
..in cash* and other fropeny with
1 certify that 1 satia/y the rpqulrements for mating a mllover inh> my IRA uf $ 3 L £ S L 2 .
a value of $ ^ O&O
, _ | hereby irrevcxiably designate that IhU contributkin is to be treated a* a rollover cotirribution.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
*n%« #*ii«inriian AT Trustoi m »Q(ilkd to n»ly fully tm my ccrttftcation. i exprewiv awume the responsibility for any adwnte wnscqucntvv tvl\lu%
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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CUSTODIAL IRA T R A D I N G A U T H O R I Z A T I O N
The undersigned accowntholder hereby a c k n o w l e d g e that he/she has retained

Ron A Harry

of

Account Roproitntatlve
as Account Representative
Firm
for the IRA custodial occount referenced below, under the following conditions?

Ron
- - A H&rry
~^-,

Is hereby appointed my

Representative with authority to buy, sell and trade In securities for cash for my account in accordance with your terms ond conditions !o receive duplicated confirmations a n d statements
covering transactions for my account a n d to do all acts a n d give orders a n d instructions necessary or incidental thereto. I hereby confirm ail transactions in my account made on my behalf.
I indemnify the custodian against any loss sustained as the result of transactions by my agent
for my account
2. M y Representative will not place a trade for my account before the Initial seven day period after the establishment of my IRA has passed. This will allow for my right to revoke my IRA.
3. This Authorization is not transferable without my consent a n d may be terminated by written notification from me, I acknowledge responsibility for any transaction initiated prior to receipt of
a termination letter.
4. The account will be established as follows:
First National Bank of O n a g a Custodian

FBO

Seymour V? Ieaace

IRA

301 Leonard Street
O n a g a , KS 66521
Tax ID N o . 48-0974280

k

AccountTi&lder'i Signature

Dote of A«e»ptone«

LX4^

r*>

'» Slgi
Signature
Account Repreientative's

i l l £.. P° Is^f^..

ort

Rep's Mailing Addftfti

SALT (AKI On
at/

(AAHStat*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Telephone (area code)
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zip

W'l

^m

<f

(c) Estimated
yean

adjusted gross

t4*.i+\

income during ourrent

L689 than $50,000
$200,000 - $300,000
' $ 50,000 - $100,000
,^___» $300,000 - $400,000
,
$100,000 - $200,000
.
over $400,000
(d) Estimated highest tax rate at which federal income
taxes will be paid during the current year
(without giving effect to an investment in the
Partnership) will be twenty-eight percent (28%)
(thirty-four percent (34%) for corporations):
—___» yeB

8.

n0

.___•

NET WORTH.
(a) Current net worth is not less thant $.
(b) Current net worth (exclusive of home, home
furnishings and automobiles) is not less than:
$

.

(c) The current value of my liquid assets (cash,
freely marketable securities, cash surrender value
of life insurance and other items easily convertible into cash) is sufficient to provide for my
current needs and possible personal contingencies!
yes
_.. no
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS TO BE PROVIDED BY OFFEREES WHO
ARE INDIVIDUALS, OR BY TiJE PERSON MAKING THE INVESTMENT
DECISION ON BEHALF"ti? CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS. TRUSTSOR
OTHER ENTITIES.
1#

Mamet

HRM NATIONAL BANK UF0NAGA<^

B u s i n e s s Addresj&l Leonard Street
OHAGA, KANSAS bbb^l
HIUIW (813) 889411V

Business Telephone Number:
2.

(

(c) Nature of Duties:

—"

)

_ _

—_______

(d) Period Employed:

..

5

c^'.^s^ctl
__

(a) Current Occupation or Profession',
(b) Current Position or Title:

fy****

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Business or professional education:
School or
License

Field of
study

Dates of
Attendance

Degree
(if any)

Prior employment, positions, business affiliations or
occupations:
(Please set forth employment history
during at least the past five
years, indicating
employerr title, principal responsibilities and years
of service*)

Details of any training or experience in financial or
business matters not disclosed in Items 3 and 4:

6.

Z have made the following investments which reflect my
Knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters:

7.

I have previously purchased securities which were sold
in reliance on the limited offering or private offering
exemptions from registration under the Act and state
securities laws:
yes

PPRCHASER REPRESENTATIVE.

no
Does the purchaser intend

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to use

inrni nv mr™™""- OFFEREES

FOR

>k

signature!8) o£ Prospective
Investor(a)

Signature^) o£ prospective
Investor(s)

Executed at
on t h i s

•c

Iclty)
_^ <**Y

o£

»-• >.

please

Please Vtuil lum

. 19.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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FOR EXECUTION BY CORPORATE,
PARTNERSHIP OR TRDST OFFEREE
FIRST WAI iONAL BMNK Or v/iwuA &fi

gey*'*'-

UJ, JZ***rf

301 Leonard Street
QNAGA, KANSAS 66521

z&*
****W.

Name of Corporation, ^ ^ ^ S ^ I p I S j 5 j u s t (Pleas* Print)

"Sk,

By*

By;i

^.T^inwirai

U

WfeUt
Byt

..

_..

Title:

Signature of
the entity.

mmmtmm^^mmmm^u$tmmmmmmm^mmmmmmmmmatmmm

person(a) making

investment decision

Executed at
&W*jfr
. *tC(city)
on this 9
day of
}7tA^

'

,
~ ~
19 tf

on behalf of

/£S
(State)
.

56•QUEERED.79

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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LIMITED PARTNER'S SIGNATURE PACE
frOR TRUST INVESTORS
TOITTHE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT OF
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITEP PARTNERSHIP,
CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
•
of
RED RIVER MOUNTAINTlMITED PARTNERSHIP
•
AND
SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT
By execution of this signature page, the undersigned intends
to subscribe for and, upon acceptance by the General Partners, to
beoome a Limited Partner in RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Arizona limited partnership. The undersigned intends
that this signature page be attached to the master copies of the
Subscription Agreement, the LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT OF RED
RIVER, M O U N T A I N L I M I T E D PARTNERSHIP, and the Certificate of
Limited partnership of R E D R I V E R M O U N T A I N L I M I T E D P A R T N E R S H I P ,
which may be filed by the General Partners in order to evidence
the admission of the undersigned as a Limited Partner of the
Partnership* Said master copies shall be., -kept- i.n. fthfiusejotral
files of the Partnership, together with th* signature pages
executed by all other Limited Partners, and the master copies,
together with the attached signature pages, shall each become
fully signed documents with the same effect as if all parties had*
Bigned the same document*

Name of Trust (please print or type) '

J

Name of Trustee (please print or type)

v- // // .
Date Trust was formed
By:
Trustee's signature
Trust Addresst

.?<?/

^ ^ < u » W ^

<$A/AJ A xrs 6Csrz/
•Wnilf'WWVMIWVMMWV*

Attention!

fir
J*J>^
f/.-fo. I*
7U

17
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EXECUTED at .
this <?*,' day of

*£.,,

£££.
ty)
Mity

4*

iM.

(State)

STATE OF >^f
County of raJhuJaJomte.

) ss.
)

19{£, before
On this, the f ^ day of
..^*7
state/
roe, the undersigned^ a Notary P u b l i c o t •a
»o*u »*«w«, duly
v.w*j
commissioned and sworn, personally appeared Ak/,M Z.S&HA-m*.
Ts£/4- QSZ/Z-/C&L
, known to me to be Trustee of
the trust that executed the within instrument, and acknowledged
that he and the said trust were duly authorized to, and did,
execute the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above
written.
(MTHEfflNCLWARD
Jtie*.

State of Kansas
My A.ppt Exp. April 2G, i?9?

nd-'for said
c in an

My Commission Expires:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSCRIPTION:
RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Arizona
limited partnership

9/fio/rf

Data i

Dtt*i

/jib** N. Fatfisworth, Jr.
^Ita General Partner

tifopfe'

56.SUB RED.81

19
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Red River Mountain Limited Partnership
2855 East Brown Road, Suite 14
Mesa, Arizona 85213
(602) 832-4114

March

1 5 , 1989

Seymour Isaacs Trust
300 Evergreen Drive
Summit Park, UT 84060
Dear Seymour:
As you are aware, according to the Offering Memorandum, the
first annual payment on Red River Mountain Limited Partnership is
due and payable on April 25, 1989. Therefore, we are requesting
your contribution be in our office no later than April 15, 1989
in order to have all checks clear the bank prior to the payment
due date.
Your check should be made payable
Limited Partnership and sent to:

to

Red

River

Mountain

Red River Mountain Limited Partnership
2855 E. Brown Road, Suite 14
Mesa, Arizona 85203
You own 6 units so the total amount you need to send is
$17,310.00.
Please be sure to send it no later than April 15,
1989.
If you have any questions please don't hesitate to call.
It's a pleasure to have you as part of this project.

4UUM

>A^
oss

Farns

Cre&fe/Cannon

RF:FB/paz

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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HANK

1 , 1 - r t "
0030

>F ONAGA, KANSAS

ACCT

301 Leonard, Onaga, KS 66521
913-889-4211

= A;

SO0C1357

FRANK 2RGCCH '
IRA OTD 0 4 - 0 4 - S S

T R A N S A C T I O N HISTORY
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENTAQCOUNTERIOD ENDING
6/3Q/SS
i< 5 R G 0 C H
) SO 1 5 Q G E
JTIFUL

UT

34010-OGCO
CASH

DESCRIPTION

OF T R A N S A C T I O N

'33

B A L A N C E FORWARD

'S3

ROLLOVER

.00

.00
- ^ <1 o

CONTRIBUTION

'S3 S A V I N G S I N T E R E S T
F I R S T N A T I O N A L SANK
IRA CASH A C C O U N T
5.5% INTEREST

;

_ 1 •- J • I

30600.COLIMITED

3Q60C.OG
6.GC3000

.S3
OF CNA3A

12.00-

'S3 C U S T O D I A L FEE
NEW

INCOME
PRINCIPAL
WITHHOLDING

.00

'88 A S S E T P U R C H A S E D
RED RIVER M O U N T A I N
PARTNERSHIP

INVESTMENTS
20CK V A L U E
PAR/SHARES/UNITS

.00

BALANCES

I'll

Digitized
r • by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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U EXHIBIT
i n n

* I M fIS UU1U

o: '00001

CUSTODIAL IRA TRADING A U T H O R I Z A T I O N
The undersigned ateountholder hereby acknowledge, that h . / . h e hat fotalned

Ron A Harry

_ of

_^___^_____. . _ . _
Account Representative

. . a» Account R»pre<entative
Firm
for the IRA custodial account referenced below, under the following condition,,

Ron A Harry

» hereby appointed my

I.
Representative with authority to buy sell and .rod. in —

^

J

"

^

^

!

sary or incidental thereto. I hereby confirm all transact™, m my J * * * * ^ ?
^
~
[indemnify the cu,todian ogoimt any lot, su,tain.d a, the result of tramod.on, by my agent
for my account*
2. My Representative will not place a trade for my account before the ^
™
%
£
"
ter the e,tabli,hm.nt of my IRA ha, patted. Thh will allow for my nght to revoke my IRA.

3. Thi, Authorization i , not transferable without my consent a n d may * < ^ *
* J ^
tiflcotion from me. I acknowledge responsibility for any t r a n s a c t s Initialed pr.or to rece.pt
a

termination

loiler.

4. The account will be established as followu
First National Bank of O n a g a Custodian
pjQ

Frank

ftrgoch

_ _ _ _ _

IRA

301 Leonard Street
O n a g a , KS 66S21
Tax ID N o . 48*0974260

/
Mfe&tT

jAccpvnthold/r'i Signature

e of Acceptance

atlve'i ^fSrature

Rep's Molting Address

City

'

State

.%OJ.-.A*.3?:?4?6:
Telephone
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law School,(aroe
BYU. code)
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Up

*

^

(SlsyaiMiu

C'fKwtir^htnm.

IA
JNTHOLUK1I
PORMATrON

02700002

STMPLIE1EK
INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNT APPLICATION
Chrtk
nmtnttmtmi to <m

ACCOUNT NO

4!

(ID

_

/3S7

IWIb

MAhfKXUAXVFAKW

DU1JSITAMOUNT.5 3 Q j 7 Q Q

1.3 Amendment

Typt of IRA

Contribution*

^NATION OF
HCIARYUfcSi

NAMP.

!.] RvjtuUr

|IC>MEAI)OHU»S

iiSpOVMd

CI1Y

GSti'
P ftollom

MATI:

(M Triniftt

SOCIAL.SEC UK! I Y N O

*irmi>i:
___.

. . . . . UilSlNISM'HONU

J

|

lUJAH

I U c v k A l t f t h t Individual!*) named below , n m y primary and contingent Hrorittlaryhe*) «»t this U<A. I tewtfc* all prior J K A
Bcnrttrlnry d t i i i t n i t i u n v if i n y . made l»\' m r . 1 uruler>t.ind thai J m a y i t a n g r o r a d d VeWi'lf U r t o at a n y time b y completing a n d
delivering t h i proper f o r m to ihc C u v i u d w i v
II ii\y p r i m a r y o r c o n t i n e n t tlencfKiarv d«f% before me, h i * o r h r r Intern! u»*d flit interest t4 his o r her heirs J«ull U-rmisute
U»fll|if#l#rv, and the percentage share of a n y remaining JJertetfttiarydef) th<iU be increased m i »i p m rata h u t * .

Primary
BcncticiaryOti)

The Mlnwungindividualfc) Ouh be ro^i'mnary 8cndkijry(tf4);
NAME

J&Jrfj*„ _£

ADDRESS

lSVO._lMa

&£& PCM.

\S0QJE.

.SUCIAI si* tram- y o « S L 2 2 - * ? 4 V * ^ K . :

.

l U T E C V W K I r V i y ^ ^ / f c t L M I A K t y D P '*
KlUTIONSlUT
&PtH<a>jL/

NAM*
ADOKFSS

SCMIA! SliCUKJIVNO
UAIMX K1KIH

Ml AW

RFI.Allf.aNM III' .
NAMP.

_..

ADUKLSS
.

Contingent
ft»ft*fMasy(ica)

SOClAtSiniKITYNO
..-~~

....

-....—..

DAlMirlllRlll

tflAUl

KIIAHONSHIP

If none uf the Primary Benefittorie* turvivc m r , thr following JndivinSia>l(a) ihail k - tuy H«'ne{iciary<ie*>.
NlAkty

g*2£tfrlt-

. .

^..

ADOflESS.

S(XIAI..Sr.C.UHnVNO
LWitOI'HIKlM

flfAKI.

KIJAIIONSIHT

NAMIv.

SOnAI.SUUKIIYNU.

AUUKIttf.

DAII.OI MIRTH

fJlAUL

kfcl.AMON.SI III*
MMJUI Content

I Am thiftpouseof the IUA arcouniholder IMIUMJ above I agiw to my H H , M * * K naming W a pnnury Heneiii tory other than ntytfii I
ftrknowiedgc that I liave received i lair 4irid returnable tiikclvHue ni my ^pouv'< prtqtTty ,ind fianamiul «*li)i«*Ui»rv. 1 al><» «itimtH'i«
Ki|tft that I ihaU haye not riaim uhatRiewrr against the Qittvdkin h« any payment to my .pouv* naiiK\i IW»ncfiriary(ie»K
slOtlSISSKJSAIUXH

IGNATURES

hnpt*tit*ni: Pit*** lead brfnrv *ix*wifi.
1 undentand the fligibllity requtrcmeni> hx* thr typt of 1I(A deposit 1 «IHI nukim; and I sdite ih.it I do qualify in m.iki< tin- itefHMl.
1 have tttffivfd a copv oi the A|»j»l»vaUon. 5 My A Plan A^revmrnt ^nd Di;»cio»urv Statrmrnt. 1 undeintAnd thai the leftnv anil
condition* which apply to this Individual Retirement Acuntitt <»»e rontained in this Application and ihe* 5 . W A I'Inn A K I H W I H I .
1 i&tt to bt bound by thove ierm$ and condition*. Wilhin i/vfn <7) days if urn the date ! o|n.*n ihit IK A I may icvttU it without
penalty by mailing vt delivrritiK A wnucn nvlitv tu (lie Ciutodian.
I iiiumc complete responsibility lor:
]. tVttrmining that I am eligible lor an IRA ed»h yiMt I make a itwtrtUitioo
7. In^urini? that all <oitird>«ilion* i maki jre williin ihr llmilx M*4 lorlh 1>V the t.vc bw».
i . The Ux w(»n»ecp»en)h« ok any conlribi^ion (iin ludiliH tolloVIt coMlrthufmm) jiul dr^tnhotionK.
I cvpavvKi^ertify trjftt I j/ke eomplete f'M>r>n*iblhty lor the tvi«c oi invrsiment instiuovnitsj I CIKHIM* |i%futul my IKA.
^Habiltty rexardlny. in* |»erlormance of yiiy investment tlnA* lAnakr.

. . - - _
WITNLii

,B1

« & & * - .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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TO IRA ROI l.OVtR
ft\RT 1.

TIMBUNIHK .WDfJhefunbyou
received fmm ike distntmiing IRA must be debited within M days afltr you itcfise tnfnt*
Date yuu received hind* or property from the distributing IRA: ..
«
" —
^ YES O N O It the date erf deposit within 60 days? // YE& you have met Ihe fimt 1*4*1*1*01*, pfcijt eoMrimir.

PART 2.

O N * YEAR RESTRICTION >tui may mate only une IRA rollover every 12 montits, par IRA.
Date you received funds or property hum the distnbutu* IRA (dale listed undei Art V.
Date you received your last rollover distribution (prior to (hit nrtkm distribution) from the distributing IRA;.
M YH» n N O Hav« 12 months or num.- passed between the ehow two dated
f t Not Applicable i / Y t t « * i i i * i ^ M M . y t * k ^

,LIFIFD KKHRIMIM II AN OK M X SHI 111 RID ANNUITY TO IKA KOM-OXfcK
PART 1.

.1.. K.'.,..l

1/

EUOIBLB PERSON Tb certify yuu were an eligible participani in a plan, please chock ont of the llama^Mt>W

l ^ i i ^ the plan tamtwhtt
U A participant tn the plan.

n The surviving spouse betwfvaiy ol a dcceaned participant, or

I1 The alternate payvc identified in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
If you sewasks**ear•/ine <»rm> as** ptameeammm.
PART 2.
BUCIBIE FLAN % crmfr Mai your employer maintained ihe proper kind of pUm m etfrw • 10JJ0IW to an !RA. sfaar ehttk one m mm
of the items belom
The plan from which you mtlvwi tf *e money or property ymi intend to roll ov«f was a:
U IVnsian Plan
funder IKC HOKeH
* n Profit Sharing nan or Stuck Bonus Man
[under"Itcc nous), tnctudim m c ltot<k) p M
C U x Sheltered Annuity
iundcf 4ftC 1403)
CsutftMM M you eiv i participant m imm tJun one «tf the i*m» kind of |4a», k* stamp* vuor etnpUyar mMfiiAtwd ttm pension etswv
ipaciai i v i a a i M rulM may «ppiy. lou should c v m u yuui tax advisor at MM a these mW# apply to you.
// ym ham tmcki one ei the it*** *«*«, yUmmconimut.
PART 3. EUGIBLC DISTRIBUTION Ptow review etch of Ihe distribution vytions OHilwed and thOOH l#* one thai ap\dm to thk ndh**%
Option A.
n Partial Dlitribllttoi The distribution is a Partial l)isirihutton tf the W»o^-lng i w u l r c m e w anj met:
1. a. The distribution i* at least 5U% erf the balance to the credit of your account determined immediately before the duxribuuon.
bt I h e distribution wa$ made because uf the participantfa separation from service, death, wdisabilKy. AND
c. *>u are electing to treat thU aa a partial distribution rollover iunder IRC UOUiHSml
OR
7. The special fimpkiyve Stock Ownership Plan rule in IRC S401(a)<2B)(B){ii) applk*.
Option B.

O Qualified Ibtsl UlatrttHiUon Thts distribution is a Qualified TuUl Distribution if the following reouuuncnts ate mat:
1. %u rrceivtd (ur wiil receive) the entire balance to the credit t* yotir eaamnt in ont tax year. (Note that Ihe eniim balance
of all to sheltered tnnwtta purciiosed uMt you worked fnr your Empbyef mind bc paid to you in out to ymr.) AND
2. \bu have reottvtd the distribution because of one of the foUowing reason! (pitdk (Htck):
I) The partictpinn daath.

Q Attainment of age 59%.

U lermmahttn uf employment or separation from service. Thit does not o^y to self^midenfed mdividunl».
Q Disability (as dcfimsl in IRC $72(mH7)l. Thi$ only aypites to aelf*mphytd tWiWuais.
H The plan wai terminated. This does not appiy k> Mir sheltered annuities HRC 6403/.
Ciutien Abeet UAmiaaiina of Fundi: U U* dtstiibutkw you auwad fiu UUl catctxicy «nd ynu roU the funds tnrr a» «n IRA and tni\ n>y%dm
p*ymcn» or hind* (mm othtt (outcrt. ytfu wtU not bc *bic to rvW Hit iwods hack to snothrv i{u«ltfitd ivurcmrrU jtm or u« thtiteied snmNty
Option C.

U Distribution Of VblunUry Deductible bmpluyee Contributions This is a rollover that cunaisb unly of acrumuiatcd vuhintary
deductible mmpkymm cimtributions /ai defined in IRC %72(oH5>(R)l

Option D.

U Qualified Domestic Retattons Order Dlttrtbution This is a roikiwr that cunilstt of funds ur property recstved from a qualititil
pension or profit sharing olan Pursuant hi a Qualified Dofnentk Relations Order Ian defined m IRC MWpti.
If s a please provide the Custodian or TVustee with a copy of the relevant portions of Ihv Qualified Domestic Rriatkmh Order.
If yo* hawikmmdmt of ike fattr 9t*K** Ivtd about pieateemlinm

PART a.

EUG1BLE DEPOSIT
U YES H NO Duct the rollover deposit consist only of the amuunt of caih or the property distributed, or the pnnwvds
twm the tale of the distributed property?
U Yfch H NO Doei the roduver deposit consisi only of Cmpitftvr cuntributions, Uiluntory Deductible hmpkiycc
GuAtribuliona, Ux dchrned earnings, or any combination thereof?
tf Y19 to k*k yf the atecetorn*,etas* &*«Um

PARI I.

TIMELINESS - 60 Dayi Vnfund* or pvprrry you remved must be deposited into an IRA within 60 days e/fc>» y*M ttxehxd them.
Date Vbu Received the Plan Funds ur Property:
, — . —
...-___—M«-^_..
Li YES II NO Is the date of thu deposit within 60 days? tf YES, wu haw met Ihe last of the five mniintneni$ fin making a
qualified reitremrnl plan or tat SheiUred annuity to IRA rvihw. I'lmse read and eompiete Ihe Signature section bdu\

Dua to tha important tax confluence* n*U«ioA Ki roiUnc over fund* to ai% IKA. Lhivr Jhcen advised to SCO S Uk pftW«mmm«l.
I onttfy that I satisfy the r^uuvmcru* ior making a ruilover into my IKA of $ ^ D r rPO • |p cash| and othai prwpvrty with
a value of $ S P / l O P
J hereby irrevocably designate that this ivfttributinn ia to be treated as a rollover contribution.
The Uniodian or Truutvc is entitled to rely fully/n my centhfatton. i expresviy luiunve the rttponsibffiry fur any adw^ne cw^ouenccs rektus^
to this rollover contribution
fist tMLCustodian
ft Library,
Inistae J.
sksJl
in noClark
way be
fesrjoaoble
kir thusc cwttquenre*. It this rolUvr u
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n?~ 00004
(c) Estimated
year t

mdjusted

gross

income during current

Less than $50,000
$200,000 - $300,000
~ ~ ~ $ 50,000 - $100,000
$300,000 - $400,000
ovet
" ~ ~ " $100,000 - $200,000
_
$400,000
(d) Estimated highest tax rate at which federal income
taxes will
be paid during the current year
(without giving effect to an Investment in the
Partnership) will be twenty-eight percent (28%)
(thirty-four percent (34%) for corporations)!
_,

8.

yes

n0

«___•

WET WORTH,
(a) Current net worth is not less than: $
(b) Current net worth (exclusive
of home, home
furnishings and automobiles) is not less thant
$

.

(c) The current value of my liquid assets (cash,
freely marketable securities, cash surrender value
of life insurance and other items easily convertible into cash) is sufficient to provide for my
current needs and possible personal contingencies:

___ v e s

_

n0

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS TO BE PROVIDED BY OFFEREES WHO
ARE INDIVIDUALS, OR BY THE PERSON MAKING THE INVESTMENT
DECISION ON BEHALF OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, TRPSTS"OR
OTHER ENTITIES.
~
1.

Name:

'

.
a
MJM
Business
Address:

FIRST NATIONAL
BANK OF O N A G A ^&fmA
^ ^ M*
M
<nn-I*-* e^m
t

ftNAEA KlH*t**M9\

Business Telephone Numberi (
2.

Phone «13) 889-4211

(a) Current Occupation or Profession: T4A CUtUett***
(b) Current Position or Title:
(c) Nature of Duties:
(d)

Period Employed:

'

__________—^_—'
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

«4lC>0t*r>

02700005

3.

Business or professional education:
School or
License

4.

Field of
Study

Dates of
Attendance

Degree
(if any]

Prior employment, positions, business affiliations or
occupations:
(Please set forth employment history
during at least the past five
years, indicating
employerf title, principal responsibilities and years
of service*)

5. Details of any training or experience in financial or
business matters not disclosed in Items 3 and 4:

6.

I have made the following investments which reflect my
knowledge and experience in financial and business
mattersx

I have previously purchased securities which were sold
in reliance on the limited offering or private offering
exemptions from registration under the Act and state
securities laws:
—
c

*

—

veB

_

PURCHASER REPRESENTATIVE.

no

Does the purchaser intend
6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to use

02700006
FOR EXECOTION BY INDIVIDQAL OFFEREES

Signature*s) of Prospective
Investor(s)

Please frint .Www

Signaturess) of" prospective
Investor(s)

Please Print Waroe

Executed at
on this

f_l_

-r _
t *•

day of

9

^ZtT
•
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FOR EXECUTION BY CORPORATE,
PARTNERSHIP" 6R TftUST 6F>BREE'

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ONAGA 4 ^ £**»* ^ " ^ , -&**
301 Leonard Street
"^
*itoo its?
ONAQA, KANSAS 66521
Name o r Corporationf E
or Trust ( P l e a s e P r i n t )
Byi
Title:

Byt
Titlet

Signature of person(s) making
the entity*

investment decision

Executed at
(Ots/lQA
-^
(ClEy)
on t h i s 7** day of
/TO*

,

on behalf of

/^ST
(State)
19 a?/ .

56.QU£_RED.79
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»

FOR THE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 'AGREEMENT OF
RED RlVER MOUNTAIN Llritffip PAkTOEKSHIP,
CERFIMCATE 6 F LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP

OF
RED RIVER M Q O N T A I N T I M I T E D PARTNERSHIP
AND
SOBSCRIPTYOT?

AGREEMENT

By execution of this signature page* the undersigned intends
to subscribe for and, upon acceptance by the General Partners* to
become a Limited Partner in RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Afitona limited partnership* The undersigned intends
that this signature page be attached to the master copies of the
Subscription Agreement, the LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT OF RED
RIVER, MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, and the Certificate of
Limited Partnership of RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP/

which may be filed by the General Partners in order to evidence
the admission of the undersigned as a Limited Partner of the
Partnership* Said master copies shall be kept in the central
files of the Partnership, together with the signature-pages
executed by all other Limited Partners, and the master copies,
together with the attached signature pages, shall each become
fully signed documents with the same effect"as^tf I'll parties had
signed the same document.

r,«h

'

Name of Trust (please print or 'type)
/y*A»;k

&*.&•«c/•* Z/L*

c/f

*-V/6Q /ST

7

Name or Trustee (please print or type)

f/w

Date Trust was formed
Byt

rj^^&e.
By: Anrti fl

Trustee's signature

Trust Addressi

3Q/

/^KW

&*S*QA

. /rr

Attentloni

b&ru

/ & / / 7 * *< J&L~^

17
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EXECUTED at
t h i s f**

day of

STATS OF

VS

—*

IClty)

County of rA/huuJAir?*'*

(State)

19££.

T"
)

ss<

, I9ftf,
On this, the 9
day of
/ffifr/
_ before
ma, the underaigneHT a Notary Public or" said<T.. states
staje^ duly
dul
commissioned and sworn, personally appeared //AStmS.SM+Jr^

, known to me to be Trustee of
the
within
instrument, and acknowledged
the t r u s t t h a t executed
that he and the said trust were duly authorised to, and did,
execute the same*

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above
written.

ts;

CMMtMNELWAftD
SUte of Kansas
tt>A*L£i»A*i2MKZ

HoEHyy Public in and for said
State

My Commission Expires:

t
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ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSCRIPTION t

y

RED RIVER MOUNTAIN LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, an Arizona
limited partntrshi;
Byt
Date j

'9/t*M
*

S6.8UB_JRS0.8X

•
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£ FIRST NATIONAL SANK
^OFONAGA,KANSAS, BGSZI.
'.---^i

T^m-'^^'I-R.A:;DEEARIMENT^"H^'- •
ONAGA, KANSAS 66521;

l
NAMEJ-7^/7
.'.; /> .

^74/ltlk-<
••«>>..

:

ADDRESS

I --'v-syi

CURRENCY-^
1
CHECKS N ^ ' ^ t ^ y ^ ^ ^ ^ ' - - - ' ^ "

:-^:y<^,^^..-V^ : :.-:^;:

~

^£g)0;p^M

yy. />Q , / 3 5 ^ FDiC 10 iv d

ACCOUNT NO.
i : '

COIN

' ; 4 J $ @ G ^ l l ^ - « •; •

•^•^i-H**:*?,!

£ W £ ££ IFV.

r / V ! ' ./7£

^£4^

Jffi-*:"/.«tV..

:-£ : \|.

LESS CASH
CITY

'

* - ' r.^u*.&$&**•;; . - - ^ ; V r v . . .

£v:-'i ;-

* ' . ^ W „ ^.- *?£ ."J^*** Tri-'-:

. *»***.£•

i7^:-;*>l

TOTAL DEPOSIT

i?S)-,--.j,.'-v«?t^j'
v,^?-^i2-;i^?y-

•:i-i;v-^ :-,•,»'
*.«» 7 •-—#?•;'
;•::.«!?>••

L
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00500006
Red River Mountain Limited Partnership
2855 East Brown Road, Suite 14
Mesa, Arizona 85213

*

(602) 832-4114
March 15,

1989

Mr. Frank Brgoch
1580 S. 1500 East
Bountiful, UT 84010
Dear Frank:

V.

As you are aware,
according to the Offering Memorandum, the
first annual payment on Red River Mountain Limited
Partnership is
due and payable on April 25, 1989. Therefore, we are requesting
your contribution be in our office no later than April 15, 1989 in
order to have all checks clear the bank prior to the payment due
date.
Your check should
be made
Limited Partnership and sent to:

payable

to

Red

River Mountain

Red River Mountain Limited Partnership
2855 East Brown Road, Suite 14
Mesa, Arizona 85203
You own 3 unit(s) so the
$17,310.00.
Please be sure to
1989.

total amount
you need to send is
send it no later
than April 15,

If
you have
any questions
please don't hesitate to call.
It's a pleasure to have you as part of this project.
Sincerely,

Ross N. Farnsworth, Jr.

RNF/paz
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ARNSWORTH HOLDINGS, INC.

ROM N. Ftntsworth jr.
President-Broker

January

16, 1990

Mr. Ron Harry
c/o Private Ledger
139 East South Temple, No. 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Ron:
Pursuant
to our
conversation, I'm submitting the following
alternatives
for
final
resolution
of
the
limited partnership
situation pertaining
to the interests of Frank Brgoch and Seymour
Issacs.
1.

Mr. Brgoch and
Mr.
Issacs
will
each
release
to the
Partnership
4 units
of
the
6 units
they
own. In
exchange for their release of
the
4 units,
they will
each
retain
2 units which will be considered paid in
full until disposition of partnership assets. They will
have no
further obligation
to the Partnership but will
retain their partnership interest in the two units.

2.

Mr. Brgoch and Mr. Issacs will release 3 units of
the 6
units they
own. In exchange for their release of the 3
units, thev will have no annual
payments
for
5 years
(1989,
1990,
1991,
1992,
1993) on
their 3 units of
partnership
interest
they
will
retain.
If
the
partnership property
is not
sold by
the time the 1994
payment is due, Mr. Brgoch
and
Mr. Issacs
will again
begin
paying
the
partnership
annual
payments
as
indicated in the Private Placement Memorandum.

Ron, as you are aware,
the
time
is drawing
near
for the
annual payment on the partnership and my goal is to have these two
releases
finalized
by January
31. I don't
feel
this
is an
unrealistic goal. The alternative is not pleasant.
Please
cooperation.

pursue

this

expeditiously.

Thank

you

Sincerely,

N.J. Reuben
Farnsworth,
Jr.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Ross
Law Library,
Clark Law School, BYU.
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for

your

Representative ID # J>U 662
Office ID # 3 7&<?

REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT - 90% Commission Schedule
This Agrttrpspt is entered into berween Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc. ("Private Ledger")
and
iLoyAcdLcL A.
fuk^fc/
, ("Representative"),
who has been accepted as a Registered Representative and agent for the limited purposes set fonh
below. This agreement is effective
J^2}^f^u^c^ty
//
, 19JSLX
1. Privnte Ledger's Oblieations. Private Ledger:
(A)

Hereby appoints the Representative as its agent to solicit purchases of securities
and investments offered through Private Ledger.

(B)

Shall pay the Representative 90% of the commissions from transactions
generated by him/her as such commissions are set forth in Schedule A attached.
Payments hereunder shall be made only with respect to commissions Private
Ledger actually receives while Representative is registered with Private Ledger.
No payments shall be made to the Representative unless he/she is registered
with Private Ledger on the date the commission is received.

(C)

Is not obligated to provide any services to Representative (such as clerical
assistance, office expense, postage, telephone costs, or other expenses) unless
Private Ledger and the Representative agree on such services and Representative
pays for such services.

2. The Representative's Obligations. The Representative:
(A)

Shall pay all fees per Schedule B attached.

(B)

Shall pay each calendar month in advance a Monthly Contract Fee as specified in
Schedule B to this Agreement. The fee for the first and last month of the term
hereof, if less than a full month, shall be prorated on the basis of a 30 day
month.

(C)

Shall pay any balance owing to Private Ledger within 10 business days of
receipt of Private Ledger's statement unless other arrangements are made in
writing with the Controller of Private Ledger.

(D)

Shall provide to prospective purchasers a current prospectus or other offering
materials when required by the federal and/or state securities laws, shall explain
fully the terms of any security or investment offering for sale to a customer,
shall make no untrue or misleading statements or representations, shall not omit
any material information or facts pertaining to any aspect of the transaction or
sale, and shall comply with all laws respecting offers and sales of securities and
advising persons on such matters.
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I

(2)

(E)

Shall pay all expenses of the Representative's business and conduct such
business in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), the National Futures Association (NFA), the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC), any state agencies regulating the Representative's
activities and the policies of Private Ledger, and shall not conduct business or
receive funds until fully licensed as required by such.laws.

(F)

Shall pay Private Ledger an annual compliance fee in the amount of $ ^ ^ . 0 0 .
This fee is S50 for all Representatives located within 1,000 miles of Private
Lediiers principal office, SI00 for all Representatives located from 1,000 to
2,000 miles and $150 for all others.

(G)

Shall not mail any correspondence, make any communication or cause any
advertising to be made respecting investments or the investment business unless
said correspondence, communication or advertising is approved in advance by
Private Ledger, and the Representative shall provide copies of such
correspondence, communication and advertising to Private Ledger in accordance
with SEC regulations.

(H)

Shall accept payments from customers by check or money order only. All
checks shall be made payable to the underwriter, investment company or
insurance company designated by Private Ledger in connection with the
offering.

(I)

Agrees to indemnify Private Ledger and hold it harmless from any loss, cost or
liability, including attorney's fees and costs, which result from the
Representatives negligence, violation of securities rules or regulations, or other
misconduct. Attorney's fees, adverse settlements and/or judgement imposed on
the Representative and/or Private Ledger where fault is determined by a court of
proper jurisdiction, shall be shared by Private Ledger and the Representative in
the same proportion as the commissions on transactions such as the one in
dispute were shared.

(J)

Agrees to conmbute monies, on a basis proportional to his/her earned
commissions, to any effort by Private Ledger to recover unpaid (delinquent)
commissions from issuer/general partners for the benefit of the Representative.

(K)

Shall not act in any manner whatsoever as an agent for any individual or
company competiuve in any respect with Private Ledger.

(L)

Shall represent to all customers and prospective customers, whenever he/she is
soliciting purchases or interviewing customers or otherwise, that he/she is acting
as a Representative of Private Ledger and that orders for securities will be placed
through Private Ledger.

(M)

Shall pay all costs of client reneges, failures to comply with margin calls and all
other losses resulting from the failure of a client to meet his financial
responsibility; and pay all attorney's fees and other fees and costs incurred by
Private Ledger in dispute(s) involving the Representative's clients in which the
dispute(s) arose from actions by the Representative and not from actions by
Private Ledger.
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(3)
3. Independent Contractor Relationship.
(A)

The Representative shall maintain his/Tier own offices and conduct his/her business in
such manner as he/she shall see fit, consistent with all regulatory requirements and
his/her jbligations hereunder. The Representative is an agent only, and has no
authority to bind Private Ledger in any way except to communicate to clients materials
supplied by Private Ledger and to accept purchases of securities offered through
Private Ledger.

(B)

For the purposes o( the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Federal
Unemployment Contributions Act, and the laws respecting the collection of state and
federal income tax at the source of wages, the relationship between Private Ledger and
the Representative is that of a company and an independent contractor. The
Representative shall pay his/her own expenses, is not required to work a set number of
hours, is not required to attend meetings, shall control the manner of doing his/her
business within the framework outlined herein, and may pursue other non-securities
related business opportunities. The Representative is paid on a commission basis only.

(C)

The Representative is required to conform to the rules and regulations of the NASD,
SEC, NFA, CFTC and the various states, to the applicable federal and state laws, and
to conform to the established customs and procedures of the securities industry. In
complying with such laws, rules and regulations, Representative shall accept such
supervision and control by his/her branch manager and officers of Private Ledger as is
necessary to enforce such laws, regulations and rules.

4. Termination of Agreement.
(A)

This Agreement shall be effective on the date of execution set forth below and shall
automatically renew the April 15 next following and each April 15 thereafter until
terminated.

(B)

In any event this Agreement may be terminated by either party at any time, without
cause, by giving thn -.y (30) days written notice to the other party.

(C)

This Agreement is automatically terminated by cancellation of Representative's
coverage by the surety company or upon cancellation or non-renewal of any required
license. This Agreement may be terminated by Private Ledger at any time without
notice for a breach of this Agreement by the Representative.

(D)

Death of the Representative shall terminate this Agreement but the date of termination
shall be considered to be sixty (60) days after the date of death.

5. Rights on Termination.
Representative acknowledges that Private Ledger is not required to pay any commissions on
termination except as specified herein, and that Private Ledger may elect to pay other
terminated representatives bonuses in a manner inconsistent with these provisions and that
such shall not give the Representative any right whatsoever to similar treatment. Private
Ledger will offer to a representative in good standing a Terminated Representative Agreement
(TRA). A TRA must be requested in writing within thirty (30) days after the effective date of
termination.
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(4)
In the event that death causes the termination o( this Representative Agreement (paragraph 4
(D)], Private Ledger will offer a Back End Participation Agreement (BEP Agreement) to the
estate or designated beneficiary o( the deceased Representative. This offer will be subject to
all laws, regulations, terms, and practices governing such an offer, and Private Ledger will
have no responsibility to make BEP payments if such payments would be in violation of any
such laws, regulations, terms, or practices.
Any branch manager agreements and override commission agreements entered into between
the Representative and his^er Branch Office Manager also terminate upon the termination of
this Agreement.
Upon termination, the Representative shall cease using the name Private Ledger, shall no
longer hold himselfVherself out as a representative and shall return all materials bearing the
Private Ledger name to Private Ledger.
6. Miscellaneous.
The schedules attached arc subject to change on thirty (30) days written notice. Unless
Representative notifies Private Ledger in writing prior to the effective date of the changed
schedule(s) that he/she is officially terminating his/her registration with Private Ledger,
he/she will be bound by the terms of the changed schedule(s).
This agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California. If
any legal action is necessary, to enforce any of the terms o( this Agreement, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to reasoi.able attorney's fees in addition to any other relief to which
he/she may be entitled.
Any disputes under this Agreement, including interpretation o( us terms and conditions, and
any rights and obligations o( tie p;inies hereunder shall be arbitrated in accordance with the
Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers with such arbitration to occur in San
Diego, California, or alternatively in Los Angeles, California, if Private Ledger so elects.
A waiver by Private Ledgu* ot any breach of this Agreement shall not be construed to be a
waiver of any subsequent or oilier breach, and no waiver shall be deemed made, unless the
same is so acknowledged by the Corporation in writing.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed their agreement in duplicate on
this
day of
. , 19
, in
CaliftjfnitU
DATE

wk« 7

NAME PRINTED

PRIVATE LEDGER'FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.

By:

<

ATE

J . A . £fcl(lAdw. , \J'&L- The* °
TITLE
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REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT - Schedule A- Commissions
Payments to Representative. In Section 1 (B) of the Representative Agreement Private Ledger is
obligated to pay the Representative 90% of the commissions generated from sales by the
Representative and received by Private Ledger during the term of the Representative Agreement
annexed hereto. The commissions received by Private Ledger to be multiplied by 90% to determine
the payment due the Representative are:
(A)

100% of commissions from the sale of mutual funds and variable annuities.

(B)

100% of commissions from the sale of "public offerings" which are the subject of a
registration statement filed with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act").

(C)

100% of commissions from the sale of public offerings qualified for sale in only one state
pursuant to Rule 147 promulgated by the SEC under Section 3(a) (11) of the 1933 Act
("intrastate offering").

(D)

85%'of commissions from the sale of securities offered pursuant to the provision of
Regulation D promulgated by the SEC under the 1933 Act ("private placements").
Commissions on private placements are also subject to the following:
(i)

* In the event the Representative of Private Ledger generates more than $50,000 in
commissions from private placements in one calendar year, in January of the following
year the Representative shall be paid a bonus of 3% of commissions over $50,000,
and an additional bonus of 3% of commissions over $100,000.

(ii)

In the event Private Ledger receives a portion of the general partner's profit or gain in a
program as a result o( the sales generated by Representative, the 85% rate set forth
above shall apply to the ponion of such amounts received by Private Ledger
attributable to the Representative's sales ("back end participations"), if the
Representative is registered with Private Ledger on the date Private Ledger is paid such
installment.

(iii)

The 85% rate set forth shall apply to commissions from private placements paid to
Private Ledger in installments, if the Representative is registered with Private Ledger
on the date Private Ledger is paid such installment.

(E)

50% of basis points received on client cash management accounts in excess of $10 per
quarter (this commission amount will not be subject to the 90% multiplier).

(F)

85% of commissions earned on sales of gems, precious metals, and collectables.

(G)

85% of commissions from sales of general securities (stocks, bonds, options, government
agency obligations, and similar securities) and commodities in routine broker transactions.
Clearing costs and variable charges according to Schedule C attached shall be deducted as a
general adjustment.
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(i)

Gross commission from general securities and commodities sales shall be subject
to a special bonus as follows:

Gross Commissions/Month

Computed Amount

$
0- 2,500
$ 2,500- 6,250
$ 6,250- 10,000
$ 10,000 - 20,000
$ 20,000 - 30,000
$ 30,000 - 40,000
$ 40,000 - +++++

$
0
$ 3,750
$ 3,750
$ 10,000
$ 10,000
$ 10,000
Unlimited

(ii)

Bonus

Maximum Amount

0.00%
2.50%
3.25%
5.00%
7.50%
10.00%
12.00%

0
93.75
140.63
500.00
750.00
1,000.00
Unlimited

The Representative may negotiate commission rates with clients as dictated by market
requirements, but in no event shall discounts of more than 50% from the Private
Ledger base commission (pre-May, 1975, fixed commission rates plus 30%) be
allowed except by prior arrangement with the Head Trader or a Private Ledger officer.
In any event, the commission retained by Private Ledger on any discounted transaction
shall not be less than the retention Private Ledger would earn for the same trade with a
50% discount in commission.

Paragraphs A through G are subject to change upon thirty (30) days notice.
Private Ledger's determination of the type of securities being offered or the type of program shall
be conclusive. Private Ledger shall establish the percentage rate, to be multiplied by 90%, for
programs or securities not specifically described above. Payments to the Representative (including
Production Bonuses) will be reduced by Private Ledger by the amounts owed to Private Ledger.
Production Bonuses
Production bonuses will be paid in addition to the basic 90% commission referred to in Section
1(B) of the Representative Agreement.
1.

The production bonuses apply to the gross commissions paid to Private Ledger during the
period January 1 to December 31. Gross commissions from one calendar year may not be
deferred to the succeeding calendar year for purposes of determining production bonuses.
Gross commissions do not include any bonuses paid by Private Ledger. Private Ledger shall
make final determination of gross commissions to be used as the basis for computing
production bonuses.

2.

The production bonuses are as follows.
A bonus of 1.% of gross commissions between $100,000 and $250,000.*
§

A bonus of 2.% of gross commissions in excess of $250,000. *
*Production bonuses are computed on incremental dollars only. There is no
production bonus for gross commissions of less than $100,000.

3.

Production bonuses will be paid at the time gross commissions exceed the thresholds cited
in paragraph 2 above (i.e. $100,000 and $250,000).
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REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT - Schedule B - Fees
The Representative shall be required to pay:
MONTHLY FFFS

BRANCH MANAGER

REG1STFRFD R F P R F S F N T A T l V F

$125

$125

NASD Renewal

$50

$ 50

Branch Renewal

$60

90% Contract Fee
ANNUAL RFNFWALS

State Renewals

$00-$132

$ 00-$132

Compliance Inspection

$50-$150

$ 50-$150

State Branch Renewal

$ 0 0 - $ 50

(Where applicable)
$100

Administrative Assistant Fee
(Initial and annual)
MISCELLANFOUSFFFS
NASD Examinations
S1PC Branch Certification
Commodities Associated Person

$ 50
$ 4-$6
$40

$ 50

$40

(Initial and annual)
Commodities Associated Person Grancn

$16

$16

(Initial and annual)

START-UP FFFS
A deposit of $350 will be required for initial registration. (This deposit is non-refundable once application is made
to the NASD.)
Registration Fee

$150

$100

NASD Registration

$ 64

$ 64

State Registration

$

$

NASD Branch Fee

$ 60

0-$132

0-$132

Bonding

$ 10 per month

$ 10 per month

Compliance Inspection

$ 50 - $150

$ 50 - $150

Establish Branch Office in State

$

0 - $ 50

(Where applicable)

PLFS31987RA
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REPRESENTATIVE AGREEMENT - Schedule C - Fully Disclosed Business
This Schedule sets fonh the clearing charges and brokerage charges for transactions executed
through a Private Ledger clearing broker.
This Schedule is subject to change upon thiny (30) days notice.
CLEARING AND BROKERAGE CHARGES
PERSHING
Order

Variable Charge

Stocks

$23.50

+ $0.025/share (1-4999 shares) or
+ $0.015/share (5000 & over)

Bonds

$25.00

Options

$18.00

Listed:

+$1.35-$1.50/contract

OTC Agency:
Stocks

$23.00

Bonds

$25.00

OTC Principal:
Stocks

$35.00

GNMA,
Muni,
Corporate,
Treasury

$35.00

Unit Trusts

$35.00

Option Exercise

$ 23.50 Equitv
$300.00 Currency

Syndicate

$35.00
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Name
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June 1 1 , 1987

MEMORANDUM
TO:

All P r i v a t e

FROM:

J o n a t h a n A. Boynton
Vice P r e s i d e n t - L e g a l

SUBJECT:

Ledger

Private Securities

Registered

Representatives

& Regulatory

Affairs

Transactions/Selling

Away

The NASD h a s r e c e n t l y r e v i s e d and a d o p t e d
a new A r t i c l e I I I ,
S e c t i o n MO of t h e Rules of F a i r P r a c t i c e which f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e s
the
responsibilities
of
members
and
their
registered
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ir. d e a l i n g w i t h p r i v a t e s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n s .
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g
deserve special a t t e n t i o n :

private

securities

transactions

. The d e f i n i t i o n of a " s e c u r i t y 1 1 i s very b r o a d .
Private
Ledger
must make t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n on e v e r y t r a n s a c t i o n
as t o w h e t h e r cr n o t a s e c u r i t y i s i n v o l v e d .
. Participation
by a r e g i s t e r e d
representative
in
a
private
securities
transaction
requires
written
n o t i f i c a t i o n t o and w r i t t e n a p p r o v a l by P r i v a t e
Ledger,
regardless
of w h e t h e r or n o t t h e r e i s any c o m p e n s a t i o n
i n v o l v e d in t h e t r a n s a c t i o n .
What f o l l o w s i s a copy of t h e new r u l e i n i t s e n t i r e t y .
Please
read
the material
very
c a r e f u l l y and r e t u r n a s i g n e d copy of
t h i s memorandum t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e C o m p l i a n c e
Department.
T h i s w i l l become a p e r m a n e n t p a r t of our f i l e s .
A d d i t i o n a l l y , p l e a s e p l a c e a copy i n t h e f r o n t of your
Private
Ledger
P r o c e d u r e s Manual.
You w i l l be h e l d a c c o u n t a b l e f o r i t s
contents.
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Memorandum
June 11 , 1 9 8 7
'age 2

SECTION UP:

PSTVATE SECURITIES

(A)
Applicability
No
.member
shall
participate
in
securities
transaction
except
r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h i s s e c t i o n .

^PANSJ

person
associated
with
a
any
manner
in
a
private
in
accordance
with
the

o t i c„..
e - 4P.r i*w.
o r ~~
to
,.. ^ ww^,. tlNww^
participating
*„
(v ~,
B)
" n U1-/
any
private
s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n , an a s s o c i a t e d p e r s o n shall
p r o v i d e w r i t t e n n o t i c e to t h e m e m b e r
with
which
he is
associated
describing
in d e t a i l the p r o p o s e d t r a n s a c t i o n
and the p e r s o n ' s p r o p o s e d r o l e t h e r e i n and s t a t i n g
whether
he
has r e c e i v e d
or may - r e c e i v e s e l l i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n in
c o n n e c t i o n with the t r a n s a c t i o n ; p r o v i d e d h o w e v e r that,
in
the
case
of a s e r i e s of r e l a t e d t r a n s a c t i o n s in w h i c h no
s e l l i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n has been
or
will
be
received,
an
a s s o c i a t e d person may p r o v i d e a s i n g l e w r i t t e n n o t i c e .
(C )

Transactions
(1)

(b)

(3)

-

In the case of a t r a n s a c t i o n in w h i c h
an
associated
person
has received
or m a y
receive selling
compensation,
a member
which
has r e c e i v e d
notice
p u r s u a n t to
Subsection
(b)
shall
advise
the
associated
person
in w r i t i n g
stating
w h e t h e r the m e m b e r :
(a)

(2)

for C o m p e n s a t i o n

the

pe r s o n ' s
proposed

the
in t h e

person's
proposed

approves
the
participation
in
t r a n s a c t i o n ; or
d i sapproves
participation
transaction.

If
the
member
approves
a
person's
participation
in
a transaction
pursuant
to
Subsection
(c)(1),
the
transaction
shall
be
recorded
on
the
books
3nd
r e c o r d s of
the
member
and
the
member
shall
supervise
the
person's
participation
i n the
transaction
as
if
the
transaction
were e x e c u t e d on b e h a l f
of the member.

If
the
member
disapproves
a
person's
participation
pursuant
to
Subsection
( c ) ( 1 ) , the p e r s o n s h a l l not
participate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
i n Machine-generated
the
t rOCR,
a n may
s a contain
ction
in
any
manner,
errors.

Memorandum
June 1 1 , 1987
Page 3
(D) T r a n s a c t i o n s Mot For C o m p e n s a t i o n - In
the
case
of
a transaction
or
a s e r i e s of r e l a t e d t r a n s a c t i o n s in
which an a s s o c i a t e d p e r s o n h a s n o t and w i l l not r e c e i v e any
selling
compensation,
a member which has r e c e i v e d n o t i c e
p u r s u a n t to S u b s e c t i o n ( b )
shall
p r o v i d e th.e
associated
person
prompt w r i t t e n
acknowledgment
of s a i d n o t i c e and
may, a t i t s d i s c r e t i o n , r e q u i r e t h e
person to adhere
to
specified
c o n d i t i o n s in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n
in the t r a n s a c t i o n .
(E) D e f i n i t i ons - For p u r p o s e s of t h i s
section,
f o l l o w i n g t e r m s s h a l l have t h e s t a t e d m e a n i n g s :
(1)

"Private
securities
transaction"
shall
mean
any
s e c u r i t i e s transaction outside
the
regular
course
or
scope
of
an
associated
person's
employment w i t h
a
member, i n c l u d i n g , t h o u g h n o t l i m i t e d t o ,
new o f f e r i n g s of s e c u r i t i e s which a r e n o t
r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e Commission,
provided
however
t h a t t r a n s a c t i o n s subject to the
n o t i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t s of A r t i c l e I I I ,
S e c t i o n 28 of t h e R u l e s of F a i r P r a c t i c e ,
transactions
among
immediate
family
members ( a s d e f i n e d in t h e I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of t h e Board of G o v e r n o r s on
Free-Riding
and W i t h h o l d i n g ) for which no a s s o c i a t e d
p e r s o n r e c e i v e s any s e l l i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n ,
and
personal
t r a n s a c t i o n s in investment
company and v a r i a b l e a n n u i t y
securities,
s h a l l be e x c l u d e d .

(2)

"Selling
compensation"
shall
mean any
compensation
p a i d d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y
from w h a t e v e r s o u r c e in
connection
with
or as a r e s u l t of t h e p u r c h a s e or s a l e of
a s e c u r i t y , i n c l u d i n g , though not l i m i t e d
to,
commissions;
finder's
fees;
securities
or
rights
to
acquire
securities;
rights
of
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in
profits,
tax
benefits,
or
dissolution
proceeds,
as
a
general
partner
or
o t h e r w i s e ; or e x p e n s e r e i m b u r s e m e n t s .

D3te

: QkJi2.
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If EXHIBIT 1

II.

Compliance

A.

Prohibited

Transactions

B.

Rules of F a i r

Practice

C.

Branch Office

Organization

and

1.

Supervisory

2.

Records R e t e n t i on

3*.

Summary of R e q u i r e d Branch

Responsibilities

Responsibilities

D.

Customer

E.

Regulatory

F.

Violati ons

G.

Compliance

H.

Outside Business

I.

Compliance

J.

Office

K.

Advertising

L.

B u s i n e s s Cards and

M.

Correspondence

N.

Private Securities

0.

Options Trading

P.

Recommending

Q.

Blue Sky

R.

S a l e of R e s t r i c t e d

S.

Discretionary

T.

Employee Accounts

U.

Representative S t a t e

Files

Complaints
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Visits
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Securities

Accounts

Registration
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W.
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Sales

X.

Registered Investment

Y.

Money Managers and Market T i m e r s
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Prohibited

Transactions

Registered Representatives are
from:

specifically

prohibited

1.

Accepting or receiving, directly or indirectly, from
any
person,
firm, c o r p o r a t i o n or association other
than the Company, compensation of any
nature
as a
bonus,
commission,
fee,
gratuity,
or
other
consideration, in c o n n e c t i o n with
any
transaction,
in the
investment field or what might be c o n s t r u e d
to be an investment, except with the
prior
written
consent
of
the Company.
Sales of n o n - s e c u r i t i e s
'made under state l i c e n s e s , such as real
estate
or
insurance
licenses,
are excluded.
Many i n v e s t m e n t
vehicles in the real estate and insurance areas
are
securities.
(Please
note
"Private
Securities
Transactions' 1 ,
Section
L.)
A
definition
of
investment
for
purposes
of this rule includes any
security, as defined in Section 2 of the
Securities
Act
of 1933, real or personal property which can be
construed in commonly
used
terminology
to be
an
investment
(an
outlay
of
money
for
income
or
profit),
e.g.
gold,
silver,
diamonds,
painting,
antiques.

2.

Taking or receiving, directly or indirectly, a share
in the profits or losses of any c u s t o m e r ' s a c c o u n t .

3.

Rebating, directly or
indirectly,
to
any
person,
firm or corporation, any part of the c o m p e n s a t i o n he
receives
as a Registered
Representative.
The
Registered
Representative
will
not
pay
such
compensation or any
part
thereof
to
any
person,
firm,
or corporation as a bonus, commission, fee or
other consideration for business sought or p r o c u r e d .

4.

Accepting orders from a third party for a c u s t o m e r ' s
account
without
the prior written a u t h o r i z a t i o n of
the customer.

5.

Opening a securities account or commodities
account
with
another
firm for the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e or spouse
without prior written approval of the Company.

6.

Warranting or g u a r a n t e e i n g
the
present
or
future
value
or price of any security, or that any company
or issuer will meet its promises or o b l i g a t i o n s .

7.

Agreeing
security

to repurchase
at
some
future
time
a
from a client for the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s own
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account, for the account
other account.

of the Company,

or for

8.

Acting as.personal c u s t o d i a n
of
securities,
power,
nrbney,
or
other
property
belonging
client.

9.

Borrowing money

or s e c u r i t i e s

from

any

stock
to a

a client.

10. Forwarding or agreeing to forward
confirmations
or
statements
of
accounts
other than to the official
Post Office address of the c l i e n t .
11. Distributing to c l i e n t s research material marked for
"internal use only" or "for b r o k e r / d e a l e r use only".
12. Settling errors
d i r e c t l y with a client
approval of the C o m p l i a n c e D e p a r t m e n t .

without

13. "Trafficking" or trading mutual
Funds ) .

funds.

(See

14. Holding a d i s c r e t i o n a r y
client's account.

of

power

the

Mutual

attorney

for

a

15. Soliciting or selling p r o d u c t s w h i c h have
not
been
approved by Private L e d g e r Financial S e r v i c e s , Inc.
16. Soliciting or selling a security which has not
"Blue Skyed" in the state of sale.

been

17. Soliciting or selling p r o d u c t s in a state
in
which
the
Registered
Representative
is not
properly
licensed.
18. 'Recommending
investments
to
thoroughly
understanding
their
and investment o b j e c t i v e s .

clients
financial

19. Maintaining a joint s e c u r i t i e s account with
or
sharing
in
any
benefit
resulting
securities t r a n s a c t i o n .

without
situation

a client
from
a

2 0 . Accepting a check from a client made
payable
to a
representative
rather
than
to
the
appropriate
investment.
2 1 . Opening a trust
custodial "gift

a c c o u n t for a minor
to minors 1 ' a c c o u n t .

other

than
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Correspondence
1.

Statement

Guidelines

Statements
those:

2.

to

be

avoided

a.

That
may
exaggerated

b.

That forecast

c.

That give a s s u r a n c e

Outgoing

in

correspondence

be
construed
as
or based on r u m o r .
specific

are

unreasonable,

performance,

3gainst

losses.

Correspondence

All
outgoing
correspondence,
including
letters,
memos
and hand
written
notes
pertaining
to the
solicitation or e x e c u t i o n of s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s a c t i o n s
must
be r e v i e w e d and a p p r o v e d in a d v a n c e of mailing
by the branch office m a n a g e r
unless
such
material
(e.g.
form
l e t t e r s ) , have p r e v i o u s l y been approved
by the Compliance D e p a r t m e n t .
3.

Incoming

Correspondence

All incoming
correspondence,
other
than
personal
letters
not related to s e c u r i t i e s b u s i n e s s , must be
reviewed by the Branch
Office
Manager
prior
to
distribution,
«.

Correspondence

Retenti on

Copies
of o u t g o i n g
correspondence
are
to
be
initialed
by the Branch M a n a g e r and retained in the
Branch Office C o r r e s p o n d e n c e F i l e .
5. ' Company

Notification

Any incoming item w h i c h
might
be c o n s t r u e d
as a
complaint
or a proposed a g r e e m e n t , a s s i g n m e n t , lien
or s e t t l e m e n t
must
be b r o u g h t
to the immediate
attention of the C o m p l i a n c e D e p a r t m e n t .

Private Securities Transactions
I t has been the
NASD's
experience
that
a number
of
r e s p o n d e n t s i n d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o c e e d i n g s have argued t h a t
i f they engaged i n
selling
private
placements
exempt
from
registration
under
the
1933
Act,
they
had no
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to i n f o r m t h e member w i t h whom they
are
registered
of
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s or to become a s s o c i a t e d
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with another broker/dealer.
This is not the case in
that such
activity
must
be reported
to the member.
Extreme caution
should
be exercised
by members and
associated
persons
in determining
whether
a sales
activity involves a security and whether
that
security
should be registerd prior to sale.
Many individuals become involved in the sale of private
securities
without
first
notifying
the
member
broker-dealer because they mistakenly
believe or have
been advised that the products they are selling are not
securities.
This belief
may have
arisen
through
conversations
with
attorneys,
accountants,
issuers
and/or general partners who have taken a position
that
the product
to be offered
is not a security and can
therefore be sold without
first
notifying
the member
firm.
Most
people are aware of the fact that stocks,
bonds or debentures are considered
to be securities.
However,
somewhat
unfamiliar
is the term "investment
contract" which is also a security.
Viewed
in very
broad,
general
layman's
terms, an investment contract
can be defined as, where one or more individuals
invest
in a common venture with the expectation of receiving a
monetary return on their investment from or through
the
efforts
of a third party.
Examples of such investment
contracts are the sale of limited partnerships
in real
estate,
oil and gas, cattle
producing
and feeding,
airplanes, worm farms, second deeds of trust where funds
are pooled,
etc.
Therefore, if you are approached to
sell
a particular
investment
product
that
is
not
approved
by Private Ledger you must request in writing
that
you be permitted
to sell
the product
as
a
non-security.
Do not sell the product until you receive
written approval from Private Ledger.

Options Trading
The final review and approval of all options
accounts
remains
with
the firm's
Senior
Registered
Options
Principal. No trades are to be entered
until
final
approval is obtained from the Home Office.

1.

Qualifications
a.

The Registered Representative must be
registered.

b.

The Registered Representative must
successfully
pass the in-house administered NASD Options Exam
prior to entry of any option orders.
1)

The exam must be administered by
Registered Options Principal.

Series

a
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Company

Limited

Partnership^

Definitions
Private Securities

Transactions

S e l l i n g Away
Purchaser
Order

Representatives

Processing

Due D i l i g e n c e
1.

New O f f e r i n g

2.

Sponsor's

3.

Consideration

4.

Review Time

5.

Program

6.

Suitability

7.

Rejection

Private

Submission

Procedures

Procedures
Criteria

Approval

Programs

1.

Structure

2.

Disclosure

3.

Offering

4.

Advertising

5.

Determining

6.

Offer

7.

Offeree

8.

Warning

9.

Exemption-Intrastate

Marketing

Restrictions

Interest

Suitability
Questionnaire

Offering

Support

Summary
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Defini
Private L e d g e r
Approved
Program
partnership
for
which
Private
current s e l l i n g a g r e e m e n t .
Each
its own s e l l i n g a g r e e m e n t .

2.

- A
limited
Ledger
has a
program
needs

Example:
A signed s e l l i n g a g r e e m e n t
for
does
not
permit a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to sell
of X Y Z - 2 .

XYZ-1
units

Direct Parti cipation Program - Any program

that

provides
for
flow
through
tax
consequences
r e g a r d l e s s of the s t r u c t u r e of the legal
entity
or v e h i c l e
for
distribution.
(e.g. Oil & G a s
Partnerships,
Real
Estate
Partnerships,
C o n d o m i n i u m S e c u r i t i e s or C o r p o r a t e O f f e r i n g s ) .
3.

Private O f f e r i n g - Any
unregistered
or
exempt
from
registration
offering
which
may only be
offered to
a limited
number
of
specifically
qualified
investors.
No
advertising
is
permitted on a Private O f f e r i n g .

4.

Public O f f e r i n g

5.

-

a.

SEC
Registered:
This
is
a
registered
offering
which
is usually a v a i l a b l e to the
g e n e r a l public and may be a d v e r t i s e d .

b.

Intrastate:
This is a public
program
may
only
be sold to r e s i d e n t s of the
in w h i c h the program is r e g i s t e r e d .

that
state

P r o s p e c t u s - An
Offering
Memorandum,
Offering
Circular
or
other
descriptive
m a t e r i a l for a
partnership.
Specific
information
must
be
contained in this d o c u m e n t .
Due D i l i g e n c e - The p r o c e s s of
determining
the
accuracy,
validity
and
reasonableness
of the
economic and tax b e n e f i t s that a
"prudent
man"
would c o n s i d e r before i n v e s t i n g .

Priva.fc.g-S.ej

i ^-Transactions

It has been the N A S D f s e x p e r i e n c e that a number
of
respondents
in d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o c e e d i n g s have argued
that if they engaged in selling
private
placements
exempt
from
registration
under the 1933 Act, they
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to inform the m e m b e r with whom
they are registered of their a c t i v i t i e s or to become
associated with another b r o k e r / d e a l e r .
This is
not
the
case
in that such a c t i v i t y must be reported to
the m e m b e r .
Extreme c a u t i o n s h o u l d be exercised
by
members
and
associated
persons
in
determining
w h e t h e r a sales activity
involves
a security
and
whether
that security should be r e g i s t e r e d prior to
sale.
Many i n d i v i d u a l s become
involved
in
the
sale
of
private
securities
without
first
notifying
the
m e m b e r b r o k e r - d e a l e r because they m i s t a k e n l y believe
or
have
been
advised
that
the p r o d u c t s they are
selling are not s e c u r i t i e s .
This
belief
may
have
arisen
through
conversations
with
attorneys,
a c c o u n t a n t s , issuers
and/or
general
partners
who
have taken a position that the p r o d u c t to be offered
is not a security and can t h e r e f o r e be sold
without
first
notifying
the m e m b e r firm.
Most people are
aware of the fact that s t o c k s , bonds
or
debentures
are
considered to be s e c u r i t i e s .
H o w e v e r , somewhat
u n f a m i l i a r is the term " i n v e s t m e n t
contract"
which
is
also
a security.
Viewed in very broad, general
l a y m a n ' s t e r m s , an investment c o n t r a c t can be defind

as, where one or more individuals invest In a common
v e n t u r e with the e x p e c t a t i o n of r e c e i v i n g a monetary
r
return
on
their
Investment
rom
or
through the
efforts
of
a third i m n l X .
Examples
of
such
investment
contracts
are
the
sale
of
limited
p a r t n e r s h i p s in real e s t a t e ,
oil
and
gas,
cattle
producing and feeding, a i r p l a n e s , worm farms, second
deeds
of
trust
where
funds
are
pooled,
etc.
Therefore,
if
you
are
approached
to
sell
a
p a r t i c u l a r investment product that is
not
approved
by
Private
Ledger you must request in writing that
you
be
permitted
to
sell
the
product
as
a
non-security.
Do
not
sell the product until you
r e c e i v e w r i t t e n approval from P r i v a t e L e d g e r .

Selling Away

,

The sale of
securities
by
a
representative,
not
offered
through
and by P r i v a t e L e d g e r , may subject
the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to a s e r i o u s v i o l a t i o n of Federal
and
State S e c u r i t i e s Laws and R e g u l a t i o n s .
In some
i n s t a n c e s , s e r i o u s s a n c t i o n s have
been
imposed
on
representatives
for
engaging
in
securities
t r a n s a c t i o n s effected outside the scope of the
NASD
and not reflected on the books of the b r o k e r / d e a l e r .
The sale
reflected

of
securities
by
a
representative
not
on
our
books is p r o h i b i t e d .
Such sales
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will be grounds
D.

Purchaser

for

immediate

termination

for

cause.

Representative

There
is a clear
conflict
of
interest
when
a
Registered
Representative
acts
as
a
Purchaser
Representative on one of his own
sales,
therefore,
he
cannot
do
so under
2U,y
circumstancea.
A
Purchaser R e p r e s e n t a t i v e should be k n o w l e d g e a b l e
in
securities
matters,
chosen
by
the client and not
beholden in any m a n n e r to those having
an
interest
in the sale of the security concerned.

Order Processing
Prior to soliciting any sales in a private or public
limited
partnership
the
representative
should
contact the Private Ledger Due Diligence
Department
to ensure
that
the
product has been a p p r o v e d and
that a current selling a g r e e m e n t is on f i l e .
Do not

sell any program that has not been approved.
Branch Offices may submit
orders
directly
to
the
sponsor
or u n d e r w r i t e r provided the following steps
are taken:
1.

Investment application and
check
are
and
approved
by
the
branch
manager
being sent to the s p o n s o r .

reviewed
prior to

2.

A new account

client.

3.

A copy of the a p p l i c a t i o n , check and new a c c o u n t
form is filed in the branch office c l i e n t f i l e .

4.

A copy of the a p p l i c a t i o n , check and new a c c o u n t
form
is
forwarded
to the Home Office with the
Weekly Branch Sales R e p o r t .

Due

Diligence

form

is completed

for

the

The Due Diligence Division of
the
Company
reviews
private
and public limited p a r t n e r s h i p s w i t h a view
towards the following:
Ensuring adherence to a p p l i c a b l e laws, rules
and
regulations
of
the s e c u r i t i e s industry with regard
to all issues sold through the Company.
Protecting
representatives
and
and/or violations of

the
Company,
affiliated
clients
from
undue l i a b i l i t y
law.
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Broker

Services

Branch O f f i c e

Start-up

Kit

Becoming a Branch

Manager

Building

Office

a Branch

1.

Sponsoring

2.

Administrative

Recruiting
Financial
Special

a

Representative
Associate

Bonus
Institution

Services

Services

1.

P u b l i c a t i ons

2.

Research

3.

Automated

4.

Representative Employee Benefit

5.

Forms

Network

Product Marketing

Plan

Representatives

Corporate Brochures
Corporate Seminars
Cashflo
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Registration
NASD Registration and Approval
License Types and Limitations
Commodities

License

State Registration
1.

California

2.

Outside

California

Representative
Insurance

Contracts

Licensing
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IV.
A.

Mutual Funds
Order Processing
1.

Mail Orders

2.

Wire Orders

3.

Pershing Account

4.

Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Retirement Account

B.

Exchanges

C.

Change of Broker/Dealer

D.

Confirmations

E.

Rights of Accumulation

F.

Letter of Intent

G.

Liquidations and Transfers
1.

Required

Documents

2.

Event of Death

H.

Prohibited Selling Practices

I.

Marketing Support
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General Securities
Opening an Account
Account Registrations
Required

Documents

Account Transfers
Delivery

Instructions

Settlement

Requirements

Margi,n Requirements
Order Entry
1.

Types of Orders

2.

Order

3.

Cancellations

Execution

F i x e d Income

and

and

Reporting

Corrections

Securities

Options
Recommending
Restricted

Securities

Securities

Customer

Statements

Death

a

of

Commission

Client
Discounting

Managed A s s e t s

Plan
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A.

Opening an Account

B.

Required

C.

Record Retention

D.

Margin

E.

Order Entry

Documents

Requirements

1.

Order T i c k e t

Information

2.

Types of Orders

3.

General

4.

Cancellations,

Rules for Order

F.

Commodity

G.

Closing an Account

H.

Entry

Corrections and Order

Options

Advertising/Solicitation
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Errors

VIII.

Insurance

A.

Definitions

B.

Available Products

C.

Procedures

D.

Licensing
1.

First Time Application

2.

Existing License

3.

Appointment to Insurance

E.

Support Services

F.

Summary

Companies

j
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REPRESENTATIVE COMPLIANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

Representative: (Please Print)

: {%S^Vm_
Phone #:(*li)

Qffice IDt!

)Q

iW<*M

J^

<$dm> Reo ID.: S S f c ^ t . :

,-^c,

/O/H

R^-

1.

Have you read your copy of the Private Ledger Procedures Manual?
provide explanation).

(If no,

2.

To the best o i v o u r knowledge, are you complying with company practices as outlined i
this m a n u a l ? V £ > 2 _ (If no, provide explanation).

3.

Since joining PLFS, have you acted as an agent for a client.Individual or company
(including insurance, real estate, etc.) other than PLFS? N T ) (If yes, provide
explanation).

Have you received any compensation (including commissions, finder's fees, etc.) from
any person or company for the purchase or sale of non-securities investments which ar
not offered through PLFS? f^ftt (If yes, provide explanation).

5.

Have you offered any Investment (either a public or private offering) not approved b
PLFS that you have bdgn involved with in the last year as a representative, agent or
general partner?
r^U
(If yes, provide explanation).

6.

Please provide the information listed below for ANY private offering not approved by
PLFS that you have been involved with in the last year as a representative, agent or
general partner.

Date

Offering Name

Number of
Clients
Investing

Total $$
Clients
Invested
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» .*» 1 «% * M A •

Commissions
Paid to You

~* ii*Hiii + v tn PI PS Qianpd bv vou and all of your customers for the

Havi you ever warranted or guaranteed the present or future price of anv security?
rJQ
(If yes, provide explanation).

Have you ever warranted or guaranteed that any company or issuer of securities will me
its promises or obligations? /0(9
(If yes, provide explanation).

Have you ever agreed to repurchase atA some future time a security from a client for yc
own account, or any other account? kjQ
(If yes, provide explanation).

Have you ever executed orders for a customer without his knowledge?
(If yes, provide explanation).

ik

Have you ever used any clients' money or securities for your personal use?
(If yes, provide explanation).

Have you personally received money from a client or paid money to a client?
(If yes, provide explanation).

tionary accounts?
accounts?
Do you have any discretionary

r-^^

M O

(If yes, provide explanation)

/Jo.
( I f yes , provi<
any powers of attorney permitting yoi
Do you hold £\iy
you to perform transactions for a
customersr?
KJD'
(If yes, provide explanation).

Have you ever contribute^, as a loan or otherwise, to help a customer pay for
(if yes, provide explanation).
secu n t i e s purchase? A-A>

List any account in which your customer has received two or more Regulation T extensio
in the past six months. (Explain circumstances of each).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Are you maintaining a joint securities account with any client (other than a spouse or
immediate famil.yVember) or sharing any benefit witl
with a client involving a security
transaction?
KJ0
(If yes, provide explanation).

Have you ever entered into any business transaction jointly with a client?
yes, please explain the transaction and with whom it was conducted).

ave you ever held any customer funds or securities^vhich came into your possession?
%J?
If yes, were they transmitted immediately? Y ? L i ^ _

4

Have you acted^a^a. custodian of securities, stock powers, money or property belonging
to a client? M O
(If yes, provide explanation).

Do you individually, jointly, or through any interest hold stock accounts with any other
broker/dealer? pjT)
If so, do you have written permission from PLFS and have you
given full disclosure of your employment to the management of the office where the
account is held?
Is the account coded so that duplicate confirmations and
statements are sent to PLFS?

Have you in the past year caused any advertising /tfc be placed in newspapers, radio, TV
or other similar media (Including/yel low pages)? | *Z>*? If yes, did you have each
advertisement approved by PLFS? Y z L ^ ?

Have you ever mailed a fftrfa 1 ^ ^ e r o r printed mailer to ten or more persons without
prior approval ofDigitized
PLFS?
llJIi^jfjO (If yes, provide explanation).
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

27.

28,

Is a l l written correspondence transmitted by you concerning secur
approved in accordance with the Private Ledger Procedures Manual?
provide explanation).

and investments
_ (If no,

m.

e-all copies of outgoing correspondence, whether typed or handwritten,
*9^2
If yes, where is it located for inspection purposes?

«S

retained?
^

Co<&v> po^z&yz- ^ e

Are you acting as an Investment advisor and/or providing investment advice for a fee or
charge?
AJft
If no, you may proceed to Question 29. If yes, please complete the
additional questions listed below.

Are- you registered with the SEC, the appropriate regulatory agency in your state of
residence and any other states 1n which you charge a fee for Investment advisory
business?
If yes, under what name are you registered?

Do you utilize a written Investment advisory agreement or contract with clients?
If yes, please provide a copy of the contract. Additionally, please provide copies of*
any literature, agreements, forms, etc. that you utilize with your Investment advisory
customers.

Have you provided a copy of your Form ADV (parts I and II) as filed with the SEC and th
appropriate regulatory agency in each state In which you charge fees to the PLFS
Compliance Department?
If no, please provide a copy of your most current Form
ADV.
Do you, as an investment advisor, have direct or indirect control of any client's
assets?
(If yes, provide explanation).

29.

PLEASE PROVIDE ONE OF YOUR BUSINESS CARDS AND ONE PIECE OF STATIONERY WHICH YOU ARE
USING FOR SECURITIES BUSINESS, WHETHER OR NOT WE HAVE IT ON FILE.

I hereby certify that all answers arejjuje and correct to the best of my knowledge, and that
the statements and answers providpd^above) represent an accuratejdescnption of my present
business activities.

Date
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jjj EXHIBIT

II P-21

Rea River Mountain Limited Partnership

13

ho c^ri Srown Koad. .^Jite
' \e<z. -.nzona 85213

July

10,

1989

Mr, Virl W. Thornton
Virl W. Thornton Trust
1520 KenRey
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Dear Mr. Thornton:
This is a reminder of the critical nature of compliance with
your
payment
obligations
to
Red
River
Mountain
Limited
Partnership.
We previously
advised you of the amount and due date of the
required payment. The
partnership is under obligation
for this
year's
annual
payment
on
the
underlying
loans
which
is now
delinquent.
Your delay of payment is jeopardizing
the entire partnership
standing and
threatens to
throw our property into a foreclosure.
Therefore, please see to it
that
your
payment
is in my hands
within five (5) days from the date of this letter.
Sincerely,

RNF/paz
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 920114
Ct. Of App. No. 900473-CA

v.
C. DEAN LARSEN,

Category No. 14

Defendant-Petitioner.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON (4159)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
JOHN T. NIELSEN (2408)
DAVID L. ARRINGTON (4267)
JOEL G. MOMBERGER (4634)
JON E. WADDOUPS (5815)
MELYSSA D. DAVIDSON (5941)
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
LARRY R. KELLER
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff-Respondent, st
V.

1

C. DEAN LARSEN,

!t

Case No. 920114
Ct. Of App. No. 900473-CA
Category No. 14

Defendant-Petitioner, i
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals,

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the case under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Two issues are presented for review:
1.

Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that

"intent to defraud" is not an element of securities fraud under
Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-1(2) (1989) and properly uphold the trial
court's instructions on the requisite mental state for a criminal
violation of that statute?
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law
and is reviewed for correctness. Ward v. Richfield Citv. 798
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
2.

Did the court of appeals correctly conclude that

the trial court had reasonably exercised its discretion in
admitting expert testimony on the issue of "materiality"?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•'Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a
question of law, and [an appellate court] always review[s]
questions of law under a correctness standard," but when the rule
of evidence "vests a measure of discretion in the trial court,M
the appellate court reverses only if it concludes that the trial
court exercised its discretion unreasonably*

State v. Ramirez,

817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented for review is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with numerous offenses,
including eighteen counts of securities fraud under Utah Code
Ann. S 61-1-1(2) (1989) and Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1989)
(amended 1990, 1991, 1992) (R. 511-26).

After the trial court

granted defendant's motion to sever (R. 1023), he was tried on
the eighteen counts of securities fraud.

A jury found him guilty

on all counts (R. 1434-51).
The court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison
for a term of zero to three years on all eighteen counts, three
of the terms to run consecutively to the others, which are to run
concurrently, and ordered him to pay fines and restitution on
each count (R. 1474-91)*

The execution of the sentence was

stayed until resolution of the other counts charged in the
information (ibid.).

Defendant filed a petition for a
2
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certificate of probable cause which was eventually granted, and
defendant is currently free on bail.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed
defendant's convictions.
App. 1992).

State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487 (Utah

This Court granted certiorari.

State v. Larsen. 836

P.2d 1385 (Utah 1992).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Given the questions presented for review, a statement
of facts beyond that set forth in the Statement of the Case is
unnecessary.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Criminal liability for a violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 61-1-1(2) (1989) does net require proof of intent to defraud in
addition to proof of willfulness.

Therefore, the court of

appeals correctly upheld the trial court's instructions to the
jury which defined "willfully" as the culpable mental state for
the crime of securities fraud under section 61-1-1(2).
Additionally, because section 61-1-1(2) does not require proof of
an intent to defraud, the court of appeals correctly upheld the
trial court's refusal to give defendant's requested instruction
on the defense of "good faith."
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the court of
appeals, applying an abuse of discretion standard of review,
incorrectly upheld the trial court's admission of expert
testimony on the issue of "materiality."

In light of case law

from this court and the federal courts interpreting rules 702 and
3
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<

704 of the Rules of Evidence, the court of appeals properly
concluded that the trial court had reasonably exercised its
discretion in admitting the expert testimony.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
(

THE COURT OP APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE
MENTAL STATE POR A CRIMINAL VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. S 61-1-1(2) (1989) WERE PROPER; IT
ALSO CORRECTLY UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S
REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH
Defendant argues that the court of appeals erred in
holding that the trial court correctly refused to give two of his
requested jury instructions concerning the elements of and
defenses to securities fraud.

The first of those instructions

would have told the jury that, for purposes of Utah Code Ann,
S 61-1-1(2) (1989) and Utah Code Ann. S 61-1-21 (1989) (amended
1990, 1991, 1992)1, an act or omission -is done 'wilfully' if
done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent
to do something the law forbids; that is to say with bad purpose
either to disobey or disregard the law[,] . . . the bad purpose
• . . be[ing] the specific intent to defraud."

Defendant's

Requested Jury Instr. No. 5 (R. 1355) (Appendix B to Br. of
Pet.).

The second would have instructed the jury that Ma

representation made by the Defendant in good faith constitutes a
complete defense to a charge of Securities Fraud.-

1

Defendant's

Hereafter, all references to Title 61 provisions are to
the 1989 volume of the Code.

4
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<

Requested Jury Instr. No. 30 (R. 1381) (Appendix B to Br. of
Pet.).
The trial court purported to give defendant's
instruction no. 5 in substance, excising the references to bad
purpose and intent to defraud and simply instructing the jury
that the culpable mental state for securities fraud is
•willfully."

Jury Instr. Kos. 14, 17, 17A (R. 1309, 1312, 1313)

(Appendix C to Br. of Pet.).

The court refused to give

defendant's good faith instruction; however, it informed the jury
that "ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves the culpable
mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime."
Jury Instr. No. 17A (R. 1313).
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the trial
court's instructions.

Defendant asserts this was error.

In that

the court of appeals' holding is based on an interpretation of
statutes, that holding is reviewed for correctness.

See Ward v.

Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990) (interpretation of
statute involves question of law reviewed for correctness); State
v. Maouire. 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1992) (no deference accorded court
of appeals' conclusion on question of law).
Defendant claims that United States Supreme Court cases
interpreting federal securities laws dictate that section 61-11(2) be interpreted to require proof of "scienter" (i.e., intent
to defraud, manipulate, or deceive)2, and therefore the trial
2

Defendant uses the term "scienter" as it was defined in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976): "intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Hereafter, the State
5
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court and the court of appeals incorrectly concluded otherwise.
Furthermore, he claims that because a good faith defense goes
hand-in-hand with the intent to defraud element, the trial court
incorrectly refused to give the requested good faith instruction.
The court of appeals rejected defendant's arguments on
the ground that the "Utah Code specifies willfulness as the
culpable mental state for securities fraud" and the trial court's
"instruction on willfulness mirror[ed] the statutory definition."
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.), cert, granted,
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).

<

Although the court of appeals'

analysis might have been more thorough, its approval of the trial
Court's instructions is correct.
A.

<

Intent to Defraud

As defendant notes, in 1963 the legislature
substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act, calling it the
Utah Uniform Securities Act.

<

See § 61-1-1 et sea.: Unif.

Securities Act, 7B U.L.A. 515-680 (1985) (hereafter cited as
Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A.

). Section 61-1-1, which is at issue in

<

this case, is nearly identical to section 101 of the Uniform
Securities Act.

Section 101 contains the same language as

Federal Securities and Exchange Commission Rule X-10b-5 (rule
10b-5).

4

As the official comments to the Uniform Securities Act

make clear, section 101 "is substantially the Securities and
Exchange Commission's Rule X-10b-5, which in turn was modeled

4

upon § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a)."
generally will refer to "scienter" as "intent to defraud."

6
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i

Official Comment, Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. 516.
Section 61-1-27 provides that the Utah Uniform
Securities Act "may be so construed as to effect its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it
and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this
chapter with the related federal regulation" (emphasis added).
Relying on this section and the history of the Uniform Securities
Act, defendant argues that, because the United States Supreme
Court has held that a civil action under rule 10b-5 requires
proof of an intent to defraud, a criminal prosecution tinder
section 61-1-1(2) necessarily requires proof of intent to defraud
in addition to proof of willfulness.

However, this argument

ignores the plain language of the pertinent statutes and,
alternatively, misapplies the Supreme Court decisions.
1.

Plain Language

Defendant was convicted under section 61-1-1(2), which
makes it
unlawful for any person, in connection with
the offer, sale, or purchase of any security,
directly or indirectly to . • . make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading!.]
Criminal liability attaches when a person "willfully" violates
that provision.

S 61-1-21. Nothing in the plain language of

sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 gives rise to an intent to defraud
element.

Those sections are clear and unambiguous:

securities

fraud is committed when a person "willfully" makes a misstatement
7
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or an omission of a material fact.

"Willfully" is defined

elsewhere in the Code to mean the same thing as "intentionally"
or "with intent.-

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-103(1) (1990)3.

There

is no reference to the additional element of "intent to defraud."
Defendant reaches far beyond the plain language of the
statutes to construe section 61-1-1(2) as requiring an intent to
defraud in addition to the element of willfulness.

He ignores

the settled principle that, in determining legislative intent,
this Court begins with a statute's plain language and will resort
to other methods of statutory interpretation only if the language
of the statute is ambiguous.

See Shurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,

814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,
500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam).

He also fails to acknowledge that

when the terms of a statute are unambiguous, an appellate court
construes those terms in accord with their usual and accepted
meaning.

State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 15 n.27 (Utah

Mar. 11, 1992).

This Court has correctly rejected defendant's

approach in a similar case.
In State v. Delmotte. 665 P.2d 1314, 1325 (Utah 1983)
(per curiam), the defendant argued that the trial court "erred in
failing to instruct that intent to defraud is a necessary element
of a bad check charge."

The Court rejected this argument on the

ground that "the offense calls for no such element."
3

Ibid.

Section 76-2-103(1) provides: "A person engages in
conduct . . • [iIntentionally, or with intent or willfully
with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage
in the conduct or cause the result" (emphasis added).

8
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Indeed, the legislature had eliminated the "intent to defraud"
element from the statute, making it clear that "[t]he element of
'knowledge' of the overdraft is now sufficient to support a
conviction.11

Ibid.

See also State v. Berowerff. 777 P.2d 510,

511 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that intent to defraud an insurance
company is not an element of aggravated arson because such an
intent is not contained in the plain language of the statute).
The court of appeals correctly looked to the plain
language of sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 in concluding that the
culpable mental state for a criminal violation of section 61-11(2) is "willfully."

It properly rejected defendant's argument

that intent to defraud is a required, additional mental element
of the offense. ££. State v. Facer. 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah
1976) (identifying "intentionally" as the culpable mental state
for securities fraud).

Other courts interpreting similar

statutes have concluded that the plain language requires nothing
more than proof the defendant acted "willfully."

For instance,

the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, interpreting securities fraud
statutes nearly identical to sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21, held
that Wisconsin's false statement provision did not require an
intent to defraud because the statute "makes no reference to
intent to defraud."

State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 528, 322

N.W.2d 522, 526 (1982).

Relying on the principle that "[w]hen

statutory language is unambiguous, th[e] court will arrive at the
intent of the legislature by giving the language its ordinary and
accepted meaning," the court of appeals concluded that "had the

9
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legislature wanted to require specific intent to defraud, it
would have explicitly stated so.-

108 Wis.2d at 530, 322 N.W.2d

at 527. Rather, the legislature had identified -wilfully" as the
culpable mental state.

108 Wis.2d at 529-30, 322 N.W.2d at 526-

27.
In a similar context, the California Court of Appeal,
construing California's securities fraud laws, stated:
It is settled that the omission of
-knowingly" from a penal statute indicates
that guilty knowledge is not an element of
the offense. Had the Legislature intended to
require proof of guilty knowledge or scienter
under section 25540, it could have so stated
by using the word -knowingly.- Willfulness
does not require proof of evil motive or
intent to violate the law or knowledge of
illegality.
People v. Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366, 369
(1989).
Additionally, a survey of the Utah Code reveals that
when the legislature intended to make intent to defraud the
culpable mental state for an offense, it used the words -intent
to defraud.-

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. SS 23-20-27 (1991), 39-6-

104(4) (1988), 41-la-1319 (Supp. 1992), 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1992),
76-6-518 (1990), 76-10-706 (1990), 76-10-1006 (1990).

Compare

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(9)(c) (1992) (-The commission or court
need not find a bad motive or specific intent to defraud . . . to
establish willfulness under this section.-).

This further

supports the court of appeals' plain language approach and its
ultimate rejection of defendant's proposed construction of
section 61-1-1(2).
10
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2.

Beyond the Plain Language

Even if this Court were to accept defendant's
invitation to look beyond the plain language of the statutes, he
ignores pertinent language in the official comments to the
Uniform Securities Act and misapplies the United States Supreme
Court decisions he claims are controlling.
Defendant contends that because the source of section
61-1-1 —

section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act —

is

substantially rule 10b-5, Utah's statute must be interpreted in
the criminal context as the Supreme Court has construed rule 10b5 in civil actions.

He bases this contention on section 61-1-27,

which provides that Utah's securities fraud laws "may be so
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to . . .
coordinate the interpretation and administration of this chapter
with the related federal regulation91 (emphasis added).
An initial problem with this position is that section
61-1-27 says Utah's securities act "may," rather than "shall," be
construed to coordinate its interpretation with related federal
regulation.
provision:

The Uniform Securities Act contains a "shall"
"This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its

general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration
of this act with the related federal regulation."

Unif. Act

S 415, 7B U.L.A. 678. Defendant does not note or discuss this
significant difference between Utah's law and the Uniform
Securities Act.

Indeed, this distinction undermines the basic

11
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premise of his argument:

that "the Utah Act must be construed to

effectuate this 'general purpose' f'to coordinate the
interpretation of this chapter with the related federal
regulation'1/

Br. of Pet. at 9-10 (first emphasis added).

The

truth is the legislature preferred a more flexible approach which
does not bind Utah's courts to federal court interpretations of
federal securities laws.
But even beyond this defect in defendant's argument,
neither the Supreme Court cases nor the official comments to the
Uniform Securities Act dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be
interpreted to require an intent to defraud.
The Supreme Court Cases
Defendant relies principally on Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).

There, the issue was "whether

an action for civil damages may lie under S 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . • • and Securities and Exchange
Commission Rule 10b-5 . . . in the absence of an allegation of
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the part of the
defendant."

425 U.S. at 187-88.* Based on a review of the

4

Section 10b, from which rule 10b-5 derives, makes it
•"unlawful for any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security • • • any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.r" Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (quoting
15 U.S.C. S 78j). Rule 10b-5 provides!
It shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any

12
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plain language of section 10(b) and its legislative history, the
Court held that a private cause of action for damages will not
lie under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 "in the absence of any
allegation of 'scienter' —
defraud.-

intent to deceive, manipulate, or

2d, at 193.
Relying on this language from Hochfelder. defendant

asserts that criminal liability under section 61-1-1(2) will not
lie unless there is proof of intent to defraud in addition to
proof of willfulness.

Defendant erroneously views Hochfelder in

isolation and fails to give due consideration to at least one
other significant Supreme Court case.
When the Court decided Hochfelder. it "was primarily
concerned with rejecting Hochfelder'e contention that mere
negligent omissions sufficed to establish a claim under Rule 10b
5."

United States v. Chierella. 588 F.2d 1358, 1370 (2nd Cir.

1978), rev'd on other grounds. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

See also

national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security•
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

13
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Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197. In concluding that a private action
under S 10(b) and rule 10b-5 requires an allegation of
"scienter," Hochfelder did not thoroughly analyze the specific
language of rule 10b-5; rather, the Court focused primarily on
the language of S 10(b) and its legislative history.

See 425

U.S. at 212. The Court noted that rule 10b-5 "was a hastily
drafted response to a situation clearly involving intentional
misconduct • . . [and,] [a]lthough adopted pursuant to § 10(b),
the language of the Rule appears to have been derived in
significant part from § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77q."
425 U.S. at 212-13 n.32. Thus, if the language

of rule 10b-5,

which provided the model for section 101 of the Uniform
Securities Act, is to be fairly interpreted in light of all the
relevant Supreme Court case law, this Court must also examine
decisions interpreting section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.
Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails, directly or
indirectly -(1) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or
any omission to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or
14
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deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 17q(a).

The language of this statute is very similar

to that of rule 10b-5 and section 61-1-1. In fact, section 61-11(2) is a mirror image of section 17(a)(2).

The Supreme Court

determined what mental state is required for a violation of
section 17(a) in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
There, the Court held that under section 17(a),
"scienter" (i.e., intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud) is
required for subsection (1) but not subsections (2) and (3). 446
U.S. at 697. Focusing on the plain language of subsection (2),
the language at issue in the instant case (see 61-1-1(2)), the
Court said:
[T]he language of S 17(a)(2), which
prohibits any person from obtaining money or
property "by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a
material fact," is devoid of any suggestion
whatsoever of a scienter requirement. As a
well-known commentator has noted, "[t]here is
nothing on the face of Clause (2) itself
which smacks of scienter
or intent to
defraud." 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation
1442 (2d ed. 1961). In fact, this Court in
Hochfelder pointed out that the similar
language of Rule 10b-5(b) Mcould be read as
proscribing . . . any type of material
misstatement or omission . . • that has the
effect of defrauding investors, whether the
wrongdoing was intentional or not."
Id. at 696 (citation omitted).
In short, contrary to defendant's contention, the
Supreme Court case law interpreting related federal regulation
does not dictate that section 61-1-1(2) be construed to require
proof of an intent to defraud.

Aaron's analysis of section
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17(a), which through rule 10b-5 was a model for section 101 of
the Uniform Securities Act and therefore section 61-1-1, is at
least as instructive as Hochfelder when it comes to interpreting
section 61-1-1(2).

Thus, it is not surprising that several state

courts have relied on Aaron in holding that their 61-1-1(2)-type
provisions do not require an intent to defraud.

See, e.g., State

v. Tembv, 108 Wis. at 528-29, 322 N.W.2d at 526-27; People v.
Whitlow. 89 111.2d 322, 334-35, 433 N.E.2d 629, 634, cert,
denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982).
Official Comments to the Uniform Securities Act
An additional flaw in defendant's argument becomes
apparent when the official comments to pertinent provisions of
the Uniform Securities Act are examined.

Section 409 of the Act

provides that criminal liability attaches when a person
"willfully" violates a provision of the Act.

The Utah

Legislature adopted a similar provision in section 61-1-21 which,
as previously noted, sets forth the willfulness requirement for
criminal liability.
The official comment to section 409 refers the reader
to the comment under section 204(a)(2)(B) for "the meaning of
'willfully.'"

Official Comment, Unif. Act S 409, 7B U.L.A. 632.

That comment states in pertinent parti
As the federal courts and the SEC have
construed the term "willfully" in S 15(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. S 78o(b), all that is required is
proof that the person acted intentionally in
the sense that he was aware of what he was
doing. Proof of evil motive or intent to
violate the law, or knowledge that the law
16
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was being violated is not required.
Official Comment, Unif. Act S 204(a)(2)(B), 7B U.L.A. 545. This
passage expressly condemns the "specific intent to violate the
law/bad purpose" element of defendant's requested instruction no.
5 (R. 1355) (Appendix B to Br. of Pet.)*

It also seriously

undercuts defendant's argument that to establish a criminal
violation of section 61-1-1(2) there must be proof of intent to
defraud in addition to proof of willfulness.
Significant State and Federal Criminal Cases
Defendant also fails to give due weight to either the
substantial state case law holding that an intent to defraud is
not an element of 61-1-1(2)-type statutes or the handful of
federal securities fraud decisions that have addressed the
"scienter" question in the criminal context.
On the state level, numerous courts have held that
intent to defraud is not an element of the crime of securities
fraud under statutes similar to section 61-1-1(2); proof that the
defendant acted "willfully" is all that is required.

See, e.g.,

People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 306-08
(1989), appeal denied, 433 Mich. 895 (1990); People v. Johnson,
213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989), review denied
(Cal. Dec. 21, 1989); People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433
N.E.2d 629, 633-34, cert, denied. 459 U.S. 830 (1982); State v.
Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982); State v.
Fries. 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1983); State v.
Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M. App. 1986); State v.
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Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ariz. App. 1983).
See also Garvin v. Greenback, 856 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir.
1988) (construing Arizona statutes); Van Duvse v. Israel. 486 F.
Supp. 1382 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (construing Wisconsin statutes).
Except for Illinois, all of the states represented in these
decisions have, like Utah, substantially adopted the Uniform
Securities Act.

Unif. Act, 7B U.L.A. 509-14. Therefore, the

decisions are instructive, if not persuasive, authority.

See

State v. Swenson. 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (relying on
decision from Michigan, another Uniform Securities Act state,
when interpreting a provision of the Utah Uniform Securities
Act).
Although defendant criticizes these state cases as
inconsistent with Hochfelder, the previous discussion of
Hochfelder demonstrates that defendant's reliance on that case as
the controlling authority is not sound.

And, while defendant

finds some support for his position in State v. Puckett,
6 Kan.App.2d 688, 634 P.2d 144, 152 (1981), aff'd, 230 Kan. 296,
640 P.2d 1198 (1982), and People v. Terranova, 38 Colo.App. 476,
563 P.2d 363 (Colo. App. 1977) (but see People v. Blair. 579 P.2d
1133, 1138-39 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (which supports the State's
position)), those decisions appear to represent a minority view.
Furthermore, defendant's attempt to distinguish some of
the contrary state decisions on the ground that they do not
address statutory provisions similar to section 61-1-27, fails
because he misreads section 61-1-27 as setting forth a "specific
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legislative directive

to construe [the uniform securities]

laws In accordance with

related federal regulation."1

Pet, at 13 (emphasis added)

Br oi

As previously noted, under secLion

61-1-27 the courts "nay" construe Utah's laws to coordinate with
the r e l a u fil federal regi
that they do so.

-

not mandate

Therefore, as both the trial court and the

court of appeals were free to do, this Court may interpret
eecl if."1' 6 1 -1 - ' I ? I no' i J leqiiiit-1 t)\ lut.ei,1 ' ; defrai id , regardless
of what conclusions the federal courts may have reached with
respect to the related federal regulation.
Finally, defendant overlooks se era 1!

JJUB t

-Hochfelder

criminal 10b-5 cases that have upheld jury instructions similar
to those gi ven :i n defendant * s case

In United States v

Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2nd Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
445 U.S. 222 (1980

major issue was "the level of intent

necessary tn hi
10b-5.

1:ion for criminal, violations of Rule

588 F.2d at 1370. Under 15 U.S.C, § 78ff, criminal

liability attaches for "willful" violations of any securities
rule or regulation (thii
section 61-1-21)

federal .uunterpai i no in:an," h

The trial court had instructed the jury

that it could not convict Chiarella unless it
found that he had acted "knowingly" and
"willfully," and defined these terms to mean
that "the defendant must be aware of what he
was doing and what he was not doing" and that
he must be acting deliberately, and not as a
result of "innocent mistakes, negligence, or
inadvertence or other innocent conduct."
588

defendant does here, Chiare

not

dispute the trial court's instruction on willfulness but, citing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Hochfelder, contended "that when the substantive provisions are
$ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the Government must prove the additional
element of specific intent to defraud."

Ibid.

Observing that "Chiarella was convicted under a charge
requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he
engaged in 'knowingly wrongful' misconduct," the Second Circuit
held that Hochfelder did not require more than this and the trial
court "correctly refused to charge the jury that the Government
must prove specific intent to defraud."

Jjd. at 1371. The court

relied in part on United States v. Charnav, 537 F.2d 341 (7th
Cir.), cert, denied. 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), where in a similar
vein, the Seventh Circuit held that an indictment was not fatally
defective because it failed "to allege a specific intent to
defraud," 537 F.2d at 351-52.
Thus, the few reported decisions in criminal 10b-5
cases have rejected defendant's intent to defraud argument.
noted in United States v. Chestman. 704 F. Supp. 451, 459
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 947 4^** 551 (2nd Cir. 1991):
In a criminal case alleging violations of
SEC rules, § 78ff provides the level of
intent required for conviction. The
government must prove willful misconduct,
which is to say that the defendant was aware
of what he was doing, that his acts were done
intentionally and deliberately and not as a
result of an innocent mistake, negligence or
inadvertence. See United States v. Dixon.
536 F.2d 1388, 1395, 1397 (2nd Cir. 1976);
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358,
1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
445 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 63 L.Ed.2d 348
(1979).
20
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As

704 F

Supp. at 459.
Defendants Strict Liability Argument
Defendant suggests that if an intent to defraud element

is not read into section 61-1-1(2), this "would permit sweeping,
Bliict

•11at1I"J f y prosecutions

added)

This is simply wrong.

•+- *+ i* 'emphasis .
To convict under section 61 J
te;?

1(2) r the State must prove the defendant acted
S 61- ] • 23 i

:I gh 1 j culpable mental state

an offense is a

strict liability offense only when "the statute defining the
offense clearly indicates n

e

tu unpuiit1

criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited
by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental
state."

lit Ml

Code .ft i m i
B.

S ? 6« 2 - 1 0 2 (II 9 9 0)
Good Faith Defense

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court
i? JM" nuaeciiE Jl > i P lee led !"«:i f. instruction on a "good faith" defense.
The court of appeals did not explicitly address this point;
however, its holding concerning an intent tu rlefxaud eleiiif
sect Io) i 61- I • 1(2) effectively disposed of the issue.
As defendant notes, "[h]and-in-hand with the scienter
element is the consister
B,:i : ' i>f P e t . a t J 11

-dense*"

I! el: ., because intent to defraud is not an

element of section 61-1-1(2), a good faith defense is not
applicable.

See

, Sparrow v. United States.

.2d 826,

828-29 (10th Cir. 1968) (making clear that the good faith defense
does not apply to "the defendant's good faith as in > 1 .1 :ie ex i st .ei n ::e
21
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<

of any particular fact or situation," and cautioning that
although a good faith defense exists with regard to the plan or
scheme as a whole, "no matter how firmly the defendant may
believe in the plan, his belief will not justify baseless, false,
or reckless representations or promises"); United States v.
Bover. 694 F.2d 58, 60 (3rd Cir. 1982).
Therefore, the court of appeals correctly upheld the
trial court's refusal to give defendant's good faith instruction.
POINT

"

THE COURT OP APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
TRIAL COURT REASONABLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON
THE ISSUE OP "MATERIALITY"
Defendant asks this Court to reverse the court of
appeals' holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing the State's expert to give opinion
testimony concerning the "materiality" of information defendant
failed to disclose to investors.

(Materiality is an element of

securities fraud which the State must prove under section 61-11(2).

Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493.) Although the State conceded

below that the issue was a close one, defendant fails to show
that the court of appeals erred.
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's
evidentiary ruling on the expert testimony under an abuse of
discretion standard, noting that it would not reverse "in the
'absence of a clear abuse of discretion.'"

Larsen. 828 P.2d at

492 (quoting Lamb v. Banoart. 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974)).
See also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) ("As long
22
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BIB the testimony 'will assist the trier of fact
evidence or to determine a fact

understand w.u

issue,f Utai

,

admission is generally within the discretion of the trial court
even If such teptimor.y addresses an 'ultimate issue, "
State v. Ramirez. 817 P,2d at 781-82

£f.

[w]hether a piece of

evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we always review
questions oil law under a correctness standard," but when the rule
of evidence "vests a measure of discretion in the trial court,9*
the appellate court reverses only if it concludes that the trial
court exei: ci seel :I I: HE ::! :I sex el: I on '1" 121 11: easona bl y") •
Defendant does not challenge the court of appeals'
standard of review.

Moreover, he does not demonstrate that the

court of appeals incorrectly concluded that I: I
reasonably exercised its discretion.
was necessa

In fact, where the issue

court of appeals correctly

deferred to the trial court's decision which was reasonably
supported by the analysis in United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d
m o d i f i e d , 11 I i,. V ,YI I! 0II ;• ' !!:. I h C 1 r . ,1 9 H 7 j
the broad construction this Court recently gave to rules 702 and
704, Utah Rules of Evidence, in State v. Span, 819 P.2d at 33 2
"Case law supports

proposition that fin expert may render

an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime.

As long

as the testimony will 'assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence to determine a fact

issue,1 . . - itts admission
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-md

generally within the discretion of the trial court[.]").5
In short, the court of appeals would have been
justified in finding an abuse of discretion "only if there was no
reasonable basis for the [trial court's] decision."

Crookston v.

Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991) (applying
the "abuse of discretion" standard in reviewing trial court's
decision on motion for new trial) (footnote omitted).

Defendant

does not demonstrate that the court of appeals was compelled to
find an abuse of discretion on the ground that there was no
reasonable basis for the trial court's decision.
The court of appeals relied heavily on Lueben in
upholding the trial court's evidentiary ruling.

In that case,

the Fifth Circuit, reviewing a conviction for making materially
false statements to a federally insured savings and loan
institution, held that the trial court had erroneously excluded
the testimony of a defense expert witness regarding the
5

Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Rule 704 provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

24
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materiality of false statements allegedly made to the financial
institution.

The court rejected the claim that the expert's

opinions constituted legal conclusions and therefore were
inadmissible under rule 704, Federal Rules of Evidence.

It

reasoned that "Lueben sought fin ask | the export] the factual
question of whether false statements in this case would have 'the
capacity to influence' a loan officer of a savings and loan
j imp,!; i !' iii! i n n

n

were 'material.

q u e s t I n n nl v i h e l h c i

1 hie e t a I einenl, t

.2d at 184.*

The court of appeals likened the testimony of the
State' s exper t ::I i > • ilefendaii t: s case t

fact-oriented inquiry

on materiality discussed in Lueben:
[W]e are persuaded by Lueben that use <
term ••material11 may be admitted as
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon
review of the record, we conclude that the
expert in this case used the term "material 91
in a factual sense.
Larsen, 828 P.2d at 493.
D*11 a 11' J a n ! .«• \ 11 i i • 11 e i IJ i«• court
Lueben and focuses on three cases:

I appeals' reliance on

S C O P V . United States, 846

F.2d 135 (2nd C i r . ) , modified on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (1981
Marx & Co.. Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc.. 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir.
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); and Adalman v. Baker,

* The Fifth Circuit's modification of its original opinion
did not appear to disturb the substance of its analysis on this
point. Although in its modifying opinion the court held that the
question of "materiality* was a legal question for the judge,
rather than a fact question for the jury* it did not criticize
the original opinion's analysis of the rule 704 issue. Lueben,
816 F.2d at 1033.
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i

Watts S Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986).

The court of appeals

correctly distinguished these cases from Lueben on the ground

{

that they illustrate the inadmissibility of legal conclusions by
an expert under rule 704. For example, in SCOP, the court was
troubled because the expert "made no attempt to couch the opinion
testimony at issue in even conclusory factual statements but drew
directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying
regulations concerning 'manipulation' and 'fraud.'"
140.

846 F.2d at

The court commented that "[h]ad the expert merely testified

that controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here can
create artificial price levels to lure outside investors, no
sustainable objection could have been made."

Ibid.

In Marx, the court held that the trial court erred in
allowing an expert witness, who was qualified as an expert in
securities regulation, to give his opinion as to the legal
obligations of the parties under a contract.

The court first

noted that "[tjestimony concerning the ordinary practices of
those engaged in the securities business is admissible under the
same theory as testimony concerning the ordinary practices of
physicians or concerning other trade customs: to enable the jury
to evaluate the conduct of the parties against the standards of
ordinary practice in the industry."

550 F.2d at 509. However,

it concluded that the expert's testimony "did not concern only
the customary practices of a trade or business;" the expert had
improperly rendered legal opinions as to the meaning of the
contract terms at issue. Id. at 509-10.
26
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{

And, in Adalman, a party sought to have a exyei t
witness "testify as t o his conclusion that the applicable law did
not require Hie disclosure of
securities offering]."

omitted information [in a

807 P.2d at 365

In upholding t h e trial

court's exclusion of such testimony, the court, relying heavily
or Marx, observed tli/il

ml J h obviouw thai | the party] proffered

[the expert] t o testify in substantial part t< the meaning and
the applicability of the securities laws t o the transactions
here i givimj liLs expert opinion on the y 'iverri Lng law| ; "| thifii
flies squarely in the face of the precedent
precedent - set out in Marx.

and logic of that

Jd at 3 6 8 .

Reading S C O P , £tarx, A d a l m a n . and Lueben together
effort t o apply them t o t h e instant case is indeed a difficult
task

See Davidson v. Prince , 61! 3 1:: 2d 11 225, 1 231 (Utal App )

("There is n o bright line between permissible questions under
Rule 704 and those that call «

overbroad legal responses."),

cert, denied,

I), At 11, i" B t bins hi

it might-

appear that t h e trial court abused its discretion in admitting
the expert's opinions.

However, unlike the testimony in S C O P ,

Marx and Adalman, the expert's testimony here did not constitute
a legal opinion.

His testimony w a s more akin t o the opinion

testimony on 1 he factual question discussed i i i Luebens
the false statements h a d the capacity t o influence.

whether

While 11:

clearly would have been better for t h e expert t o steer away from
t h e term "mater, iall ," iw appealB to id iv< re used the term not In iLliit.;
legal sense but rather in t h e factual sense of what the ordinary
•i
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practice in the industry is, or what would be important to or
have the capacity to influence an investor.

In any event, the

testimony appears to be well within the limits of rule 704 as
defined in State v. Span. 819 P.2d at 332 n.l, where this Court
noted that M[c]ase law supports the proposition that an expert
may render an opinion that certain actions constitute a crime"
and then cited with apparent approval the following cases:
United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1986)
(officer of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was allowed
to testify that a device was a firearm subject to registration
with the Bureau); United States v. Loaan. 641 F.2d 860, 863 (10th
Cir. 1981) (expert properly testified that funds were improperly
taken from corporation); and United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d
187, 188 (6th Cir. 1975) (expert properly testified that certain
drugs come within a particular statutory classification).
In sum, in light of Lueben and this Court's expansive
interpretation of rules 702 and 704 in Span (relying on federal
cases), the court of appeals did not err in holding that the
trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in admitting the
expert testimony under rules 702 and 704. See State v. Banner,
717 P.2d 1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986) (the appellate courts of this
state look to the interpretation of the federal rules of evidence
by the federal courts to aid in interpreting Utah's rules of
evidence). As the court of appeals correctly observed, *[i]n
general, expert testimony is suitable in securities fraud cases
because the technical nature of securities is not within the
<
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knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common
experience and w<.
them."

ider stand the IPBVIPS be fine

Larsen, 828 P.2d at 492 (citing rule 702 and Dixon v.

Stewart. 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982)).7
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should
affirm the court of appeals' decision.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this (9-1

day of December,

1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
0
Assistant Attorney General

7

Defendant claims that the court of appeals "apparently
read Rule 704 to mean that opinion testimony is admissible if it
goes to an issue of ultimate fact because, by definition, it is
not a legal conclusion." Br. of Pet. at 24-25. However, this is
refuted by the court's clear statement that '[d]espite the
appropriateness of expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule
704 was not intended to allow experts to give legal conclusions."
Larsen. 828 P.2d at 493.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
* * * * *

4
STATE OF UTAH
5
6

Transcript of:

Plaintiff,

7
8
9

Mi.it 11 in

Herii L rifc'

vs.
RONALD ALAN HARRY

10

Defendant.

Case No. 901901580

11
12

The

above-entitled

-i •?•• :

action

came on

13

regularly for hearing before

14

Moffat, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the

15

State of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Friday,

16

April 10, 1992, at 2:25 p.m.
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1

FRIDAY. APRTT. 10. 199?
i ± M ij. E.h-lL

2
3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BUGDEN:

5

THE COURT:

6

2:25 P.M.

afternoon.

l_tL<i_S

Once again.
Good afternoon.
You are half right, it is

How are you, Mr. Bugden?

7

MR. BUGDEN:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. BUGDEN

I am good, I think.
All right.
nm -.-t positive.

We are

There >H'e >\\.iil(-: n

10

preparer! t. n pn forv -

v.

11

few motions that are before you

I would like to begin

12

by calling Mr. Brass •

13

1-

14

* •-• - itness stand.
c

-.

. M r . Brass, come

forward.

15

EDWARD K. BRASS

16

Cai . ert a? a witness on behalf of the defense, after

17

having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified

id

as follows:

19
20

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUGDEN:

21

Q

Will vou Eitatve vour name tor the i ecoi'd , til .

22

A

Edward K. Brass.

23

Q

And when did you graduate from law school, sir?

24

A

1977.

25

Q

Do you have any particular areas of expertise
1
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1

that are the focus of your practice?

2

A

Criminal defense.

3

Q

And can you tell me, sir, have you been a

4

presenter at various seminars over the years?

5

A

On numerous occasions.

6

Q

How many jury trials you think you have done

7

Most recently in March.

over the years since your graduation from law school?

8

A

It would be in the hundreds.

9

Q

How many jury trials do you think you do a

11

A

Now?

12

Q

Have you handled securities fraud trials in

10

13

year?
25 maybe.

your practice, sir?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

How many securities fraud trials have you

16

handled?

Trials, cases that have actually gone to trial?

17

A

That have gone to trial?

18

Q

Yes, sir.

19

A

More than ten.

20

Q

From your experience handling securities fraud

21

cases, sir, is a securities fraud charge a technical case

22

to defend?

23

A

They are more complicated than the average

24

criminal case, if that is what you mean by "technical.M

25

Yes, I would agree with that.
2
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1
2
3

A s a general r u l e , ,!:j i r , yr<"U give <cun o p e n i n g

Q

statement in jury t r i a l s ?
• MR. SONNENREICH:

Y o u r H o n o r , I don't see t h e
Li: I fact, Y our Honor,

4

r e l e v a n c e of Mi

5

at t h i s time it a p p e a r s that t h i s expert is going to b e

6'

B r a s s ' £3 p r a c t i c e

•' c a l l e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d i s c u s s i n g opening stater?- •

7

and it WT. r.ikes • n le that that i s t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r >r

8

n o t a n o p e n i n g statement is important to g i v e , is o n e

9."

w e l l w i t h i n t h e C o u r t ' s o w n ability u

10

determine v itliout

an expert witness, and also he hasn't been qualified.

11

THE COURT:

T h e S u p r e m e Court in the q u e s t i o n

12'"

o n t h i s issue nf the J.n"*k of »'ommudat ed r o u n s e ] at t h e

13

time of trial has made several pronunciations over the

14

y e a r s a n d o n e of them 1 hat i c l e a r l y recal

15

you * h Li" h east1 if W H H , WHB hhat —• W e 1 1

16

d i f f e r e n t i a t e d b e t w e e n "strategic a n d t a c t i c a l . "

17
18
19"' .

MR. BUGDEN:

"et s s-e

they

That is exact] y what I intei I ;:i to

form- (m.
THE COURT:

We J 1 , you can focus on "it but it

20

has always been my impression, Mr

Hn^ifer,, , 1 hat the

21

q u e s t i o n a s t o w h e t h e r or not you give an o p e n i n g

22

statement was one that counsel could —

23 '

within the preroRatu/p n| I'ounael rind jt depends upon

24

their view of a particular case.

25

make out a case of incompetence simply because they d:i ci

it was purely

I don't think you could

3
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1

or didn't do opening argument.

2

MR. BUGDEN:

Well, it is one of the factors

3

that we are bringing before the Court.

4

issues where we think there was a defect under Strickland

5

vs. Washington.

6

you some specific instances, specific conduct, which we

7

believe fell below an objective standard of

8

reasonableness.

9

It is one of the

The first prong requires that we give *

Rule 401 of the Rules of Evidence defines what

10

"relevant evidence" is. That apparently is the

11

objection.

12

under the rule as "Evidence having any tendency to make

13

the existence of any facts —

14

have representation by Mr. Barber which fell below an

15

objective standard of reasonableness?

16

that I believe is relevant.

17

decide in this law.

"Relevant evidence," Your Honor, is defined

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BUGDEN:

" let me stop there.

Do we

That is the fact

That is what you have to

I understand.
Therefore, as we keep reading, all

20

right.

So "relevant evidence means any evidence having

21

any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

22

consequence to the determination of the action," that is

23

what this motion is all about, "more probable or less

24

probable than it would be without the evidence."

25

Now, maybe you will decide —
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1
2
3
4

T H E COURT:
materiality, but —
v

:

That is r e l e v a n c e .

It js nmt

We] 1, I will 1 et h i m g e t into it.

- *- .ooking, I am sure, M r . Bugden, at t h e overall
.*•? formal ice 1: lere, some nf which mm,/ hn^v n -—

e- -

5

ma> oe relevant, some w h i c h m a y be m a t e r i a l , and some o f

6

w h i c h m a y not U P either, or o n e or the other.

7

g o i njy t 11 1 c t

8
9
10

12
13
14
15

_

M R . BUGDEN:
' 'Q '

(By Mi

B u t i am

in ii J g n i ] i}t. .i i i t ,
Thank you very m u c h .

B u g d e n ) G e n e r a l l y speaking i n a jury

t r i a l , do y o u give a n opening statement, Mi
A

G e n e r a l l y speaking, y e s .

Q

And what purposes

Brass?

a p-iahr arp aeeorop i ~t -tneu nv

giving a n opening statement?
A

C e r t a i n l y t h e most immediate purpose is to

outl i ne yen nr case t o the ji iry

16

•Q

W h y is that

important?

17

A

So that they u n d e r s t a n d what your defense i s .

18

Q

A F P there rtny rl LI; £erent, g.ials, Mi:"1 B r a s s , in a

19

securities fraud case than, for example, say in a

20

burglary case?

21
22
23

A

I think not other t h a n , a s I said b e f o r e , a

more complex case.
Q

In a more complex case, do von think

th

^ Iherp

24

is a greater need to give an opening statement i •:

25

familiarize t h e jury w i t h c e r t a i n issues?
5
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1

A

I am certain that that would be true.

2

Q

Can you think of a time, sir, that you would

3
4

not give an opening statement in a securities fraud case?
A

Sure.

If it was a multiple defendant case and

5

I represented a person who was culpable than other

6

defendants or the evidence was much weaker against them,

7

perhaps I wouldn't want to make one in that case.

8
9

Q

But what about in a situation where it is a

single-defendant case, not a multiple-defendant case?

10

One defendant, securities fraud, four counts, would you

11

give an opening statement in that situation?

12
13
14

A

Just on the facts as you have outlined for me,

I can't see any reason why not.
Q

If you thought, in your professional judgment,

15

sir, that the jury was impatient —

16

give you a different predicate.

17

giving of an opening statement and as the time approached

18

for the defense to open its case, you had an opinion or a

19

perception that the jury was impatient or bored with the

20

evidence that they had heard, would that be a reason, in

21

your opinion, to forego giving an opening statement in a

22

securities fraud case?

23

A

I have to actually

If you had reserved the

Again, limiting myself to the facts as you have

24

outlined, then it might be a reason to shorten it, but

25

might not be a reason not to give one.
6
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1

Q

From your experience doing hundreds of jury

2

trials

3

giving of an opening statement is an important part of

4

the criminal defense trial?

lio yuw hai'i" m\

ipHiiMit .ihout whet-lifj ut

ii

MIM

5

A'

It can be, certainly.

6

Q

In a securities fraud case, Mr. Brass, if one

7

of the State's arguments

to show a material

omission

8 ;

w'etiei 1 .-hat the defendant, a broker-dealer, failed to

9

disclose the possibility of future payments to an

10

investor

11

signed by the investor disclosing the possibility of

12

future payments, would you seek to introduce that signed

1^

Ibi it yen i ha d a (loci :i men t j i: I j our possess;] on

doc iiment thr ough the i i ive sto r ?

I-1

A

The answer to your hypothetical question, y e s .

lc«

Q •

W h y would you do that?

111
17

Why would yon «"'hoose to

introduce that document through the investor?
A

Because I would vi ew that document as something

18

that is poten11 a ] 3 y damaging to that w::i tness s

1H

credibility, and it is much more effective to introduce

20

it through that witness.

21
22

MR. BUGDENi

Thoee fire I f\a questions I have for

Mr Brass.

23

THE COURT:

24

HR" SONNENREICH"

25

one second.

You may cross.
Thank you, 'four Honor.

Just

(Pause)
7
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1
2
3
4

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. SONNENREICH:
Q

Mr. Brass, when did you graduate from law

school?

5

A

*77.

6

Q

And since that time, what type of legal work

7

have you done?

8

A

Primarily, criminal defense work.

9

Q

Have you ever been a prosecutor?

10

A

No.

11

Q

What percentage of your practice would you say

12

was criminal defense work?

13

A

90 percent.

14

Q

You would agree, based on your earlier

15

testimony, that there are certain types of cases in which

16

you might choose not to make an opening statement?

17

A

Sure, I said so.

18

Q

And would you agree that an expert trial lawyer

19

could reasonably choose not to give an opening statement

20

in other situations?

21

A

Sure.

22

Q

Let me also ask you a hypothetical question

23

about a signed Subscription Agreement.

Let us say that

24

you had learned through the preliminary hearing in a

25

matter that there was a document that was a signed
8
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1
2

Subscription Agreement that the investor who signed it,
arKi

thip lei -'I q u e s t i o n nt niat.en al i t.;v nt an onu sp-ion in a

3 ••

securities case, there is an investor who signed I t. bi it

4

the investor testifies that t he way that signature came

5

a b o u t 'WriB that, h i s bi: >ker „ w h o m he hful fi v^ry

6

longstanding relationship with, chose to call him and

7

say, "(Tome in and sign some papers."

Showed him a couple

8

o.1 Kjgnai.ure 1JIH*W nrnl that was • .

:

9'

signature lines.

]0
1: 1

language.

e signed only the

He did not read the disclaimer

He was not shown the page wi th t he da sol ai mer

language on it, and that his testimony was he had no

12

knowledge

14

circumstances, would you try to introduce that document

15

into evidence?

16

: che disclaimer.

MR

And that testimony all came

: lei 1

BI. -.

; e form,,

]7

of the question because •* assumes facts that are n< >t

18

only not in the record, but

19

preliminary hearing record.

20

that are absolutely a hundred and eighty degrees contrary

21

to the record from the preliminary heari ng

22

facts are not before you at this ti me, but that is i lot

23

what happened at the preliminary hearing, and I w. i 11

24

object for that i eason

25

false set of facts.

> contrary to the
The question assumes facts

Bi i t evex i " s

"The" hypothet ICH J in based or i a

9
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1

MR. SONNENREICH:

Your Honor, first of all, I

2

am more than willing to read from the preliminary hearing

3

transcript.

4

am happy to do it now.

5

even a better hypothetical.

I was going to save that till my case, but I
I mean, maybe that would make it

6

THE COURT: Well, if we are going to do this,

7

we might as well start this trial Monday morning and go

8

for the next couple, three weeks.

9

that, we can do that, gentlemen.

If you want to do
I will allow it. If,

10

Mr. Bugden, you find later what you say is correct and

11

the record doesn't back it up, you can bring it to the

12

Court's attention.

13

MR. BUGDEN:

Then I can ask you to strike it?

14

THE COURT: Sure.

15

MR. BUGDEN:

16

THE WITNESS:

All right.
Okay, that was a long

17

hypothetical.

And I am going to assume for the purpose

18

of the hypothetical, that the prior relationship between

19

the dealer and the customer was a favorable relationship.

20

MR. SONNENREICH:

21

THE WITNESS:

All right.

I am going to assume that.

In

22

assuming that and given the nature of the prosecution

23

that we are talking about, I would be much more concerned

24

about introducing the document because of the possibility

25

that it might have been altered after the time that this
10
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1

signed portion of the document was appended to the rest

2

of it.

3

certainly want to inquire into that.

4
5

Q

I would be concerned about that and I would

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) Might you be concerned

also that if the —

6

MR. BUGDEN:

Your Honor, may I interrupt for

7

just a moment?

I noticed that Mr. Barber was here, but

8

there was no cognitive process on my part and I missed

9

the point.

Mr. Barber may be a witness and I would ask

10

he be excluded and wait in the hall until we have reached

11

a determination as to whether or not you will hear from

12

him.

13

MR. SONNENREICH:

I also don't know if Mr.

14

Barber will or will not be a witness.

15

part on whether or not he had an affidavit of his in, but

16

I am also not sure whether the Exclusionary Rule would

17

apply at this point.

18

THE COURT:

19

or not.

20
21

That depends in

Well, I am not sure whether it does

Do you care one way or another?
MR. SONNENREICH:

I don't care one way or

another.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BARBER:

Mr. Barber, do you have —
Your Honor, I just came here

24

because actually Mr. Bugden asked me to.

25

any desire to be here at all.

I don't have

(Courtroom laughter) I
11
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1

was trying to accommodate counsel and not have to make

2

Mr. Hines come over and serve a subpoena on me.

3

perfectly happy to go home and leave all of you gentlemen

4

to your work.

5

MR. BUGDEN:

I am

So that you understand at least

6

why I perceived there was a need for Mr. Barber to be

7

here is this:

8

affidavit which was not objected to and which was

9

stipulated to.

at the earlier hearing we introduced an

In this instance, the government has

10

prepared an affidavit which I saw in the minutes before

11

you took the bench.

12

yesterday.

13

lunch time. When Mr. Barber telephoned me at lunch time,

14

he advised me as to what language he was willing to sign

15

and accept in an affidavit form, and some language that

16

he was not willing to sign or admit in an affidavit form.

17

The affidavit that has now been prepared, I believe, is

18

inconsistent with what Mr. Barber has discussed with me

19

on prior occasions, and so I am not prepared to stipulate

20

to the introduction of Mr. Barber's affidavit.

21

since I am not prepared to stipulate, it is hearsay and I

22

think it becomes necessary and incumbent upon the State's

23

attorney to call Mr. Barber.

24

going to be a witness, then I would invoke the

25

Exclusionary Rule.

Mr. Barber and I had a conversation

Mr. Barber and I then had a conversation at

And so

And so if Mr. Barber is

That is the procedural background.
12
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1

MR. SONNENREICH:

I intend to move the

2

introduction of the affidavit as a clarification of the

3

prior affidavit which was admitted without objection.

4

Furthermore, affidavits are regularly received in motion

5

practice outside of trial procedure.

6

hearsay rule or any of the evidence rules apply, or that

7

evidence should be taken in this particular proceeding,

8

as you correctly pointed out earlier.

9

frankly, it is the defendant who has the burden of proof

10

on the question of Mr. Barber and if the defendant wants

11

to establish what Mr. Barber knew or didn't know, he

12

probably should call Mr. Barber, if the affidavit isn't

13

admitted.

14

then Mr. Barber may be able to go home or whatever.

15

that would be okay, Your Honor.

16

and solve this problem.

I am not sure the

Furthermore,

Why don't we get a ruling on the affidavit and

17

THE COURT: Yeah.

18

MR. BARBER:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SONNENREICH:

If

If we can interrupt this

Do I sit down?
Yeah, go ahead.
Your Honor, I am going to

21

move for the admission of an affidavit of Mr. Barber that

22

flushes out and more fully explains some of the

23

situations concerning the prior affidavit and concerning

24

the issues raised in the case.

25

THE COURT: Where was the prior affidavit?
13
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1

MR. SONNENREICH:

The prior affidavit was

2

introduced on the first thing.

3

deal.

This gets into the question of —

4
5

It is about a three-page

THE COURT:

You have this in the form of

evidence?

6

MR, BUGDEN:

We have this in the form of an

7

affidavit that was not objected to on March 18th on the

8

first hearing.

9
10

THE COURT:

or did you put those in the file?

11
12

Did we set up an evidence envelope,

THE CLERK:

No, I have got evidence envelopes.

I don't see it listed (referring to the exhibit sheet.)

13

MR. SONNENREICH:

It was a two-page exhibit.

14

As I read that affidavit, there is actually one matter in

15

this other affidavit that isn't in the first one, and

16

that goes to the question of his not making an opening in

17

the case.

18

one that he had not made an opening.

19

I thought there was a statement in the first

THE COURT:

I have got it.

It is right here.

20

It is in the file, okay.

So now the document you want to

21

introduce now is an affidavit which supplements this

22

affidavit?

23

MR. SONNENREICH:

It says he didn't make an

24

opening statement and explains why.

25

a statement in the first affidavit that said, "I did not

I thought there was

14
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1

make an opening statement."

2

goes on to say why he didn't introduce that limited

3

partnership subscription booklet that we are discussing

4

right now.

5

as to the limited partnership portfolio lists, which were

6

those exhibits attached to the first affidavit and also

7

attached to the memorandum here.

8
9
10

There is not. But then it

Some more views as to suitability questions

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, let's get his problem

solved so he can get out of here.

You have any more

questions of him?

11

MR. SONNENREICH:

I think if I could finish

12

this one.

13

literally two minutes outside, I could finish the cross.

14

I think that we could get Mr. Brass off.

15

in another court.

16

whether you need to be a witness.

17
18
19
20

If you would be able to wait, Mr. Barber, for

He needs to be

Then we can address the issue of

MR. BARBER:

I will do whatever I am told to

do.
THE COURT: Why don't you wait in the hall for
three or four minutes.

21

(Mr. Barber left the courtroom.)

22

MR. SONNENREICH:

Let's go back onto this.

23

am going to ask this question correct, though.

24

Honor, I am going to introduce an exhibit.

25

preliminary hearing transcript.

I

Your

It is the

You told me it was not
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1

part of the record in the case as it sits before you now.

2

THE COURT:

I think that is true.

3

MR. SONNENREICH:

Your Honor, I move the

4

admission of the preliminary hearing transcript in this

5

matter.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. BUGDEN:

8

MR. SONNENREICH:

9

No. 8.

10

Q

Any objection?
No, sir.
This would be State's Exhibit

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) Mr. Brass, if you would

11

please turn to page 37 of that exhibit and read the

12

testimony from lines 17 of that page 37, through line 13

13

on page 39.

14

MR. BUGDEN:

For starters, Your Honor, before

15

he begins reading the testimony, I don't have any problem

16

with reading the testimony, but the testimony is not

17

helpful until counsel identifies what exhibit the witness

18

is testifying about.

19

MR. SONNENREICH:

Your Honor, Defense Exhibit

20

D-l is —

the question here, it was done and one exhibit

21

that was attached as an exhibit to this memorandum.

22

is the number?

23

MR. BUGDEN:

24

than you saying that?

25

What

Well, how do we know that other

MR. SONNENREICH:

First off, and if you want me
16
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1

to get under oath to say it, that is certainly a

2

collateral matter.

3

I can get under oath to say it.

MR. BUGDEN:

No, I wouldn't agree to that. I

4

wouldn't stipulate to that.

5

hearing.

6

MR. SONNENREICH:

I wasn't at the preliminary

I was and I can be a witness

7

on that point.

8

as to what Defense Exhibit No. 1 was at the preliminary

9

hearing.

10

I believe, Your Honor, I can be a witness

I was there.

It is a collateral matter to the

case.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SONNENREICH:

13
14

I suppose you can.
So likewise, Mr. Hines who

was also there.
MR. BUGDEN:

I would think that the best

15

evidence is whatever the record evidence is rather than

16

these people testifying because there is a genuine

17

question, Your Honor, as to whether or not the witness is

18

talking about the suitability questionnaire, or whether

19

or not the witness is instead talking about a

20

Subscription Agreement.

21

documents.

22

introduced to you and they were received into evidence by

23

way of the affidavit at the earlier hearing, and I don't

24

know what Exhibit 1 is that they are about to talk about.

25

They are two different

They are two different documents that I

MR. SONNENREICH:

Defense Exhibit 1, Your
17
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1

Honor, that was introduced as the complete group of those

2

documents that fall under the subscription booklet, and

3

they are listed as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 to Mr.

4

Bugden's motion:

5

New Trial or in the Alternative a Motion in Arrest of

6

Judgment. With all deference, Mr. Bugden, you know, if

7

you would like, I could maybe call Max Wheeler in here to

8

testify as to the nature of the exhibit.

9

Memorandum in Support of Motion for a

MR. BUGDEN:

Well, I don't know that it is

10

appropriate for him to be debating with me.

11

an objection, Your Honor.

12

I have made

My objection is —

THE COURT: Well, we have got a lot of other

13

objections.

14

that as being a true statement.

15

show that isn't true, we will have a problem about that

16

then.

17

Q

I will overrule the objection.

(By Mr. Sonnenreich)

We will take

If counsel can later on

Mr. Brass, as you read

18

that you can then take it into account that we are

19

talking about a complete Red River Mountain Limited

20

Partnership Subscription Agreement Booklet which

21

includes —

22

MR. BUGDEN:

Your Honor, if I could just

23

interrupt to say on page 18 of the document that has now

24

been introduced, which is the preliminary hearing

25

transcript, the item that they are talking about is
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1

something called a "Pre-Offering Summary." Mr.

2

Sonnenreich —

3

MR. SONNENREICH:

S-l or D-l.

4

Pre-Offering Summery, I believe.

5

Offering Summary.

6

Honor.

It is the maroon booklet.
THE COURT: Yeah.

8

MR. SONNENREICH:

10

case.

S-l is the Pre-

That was Exhibit 1 to our case, Your

7

9

D-l —

S-l, it was a

D-l was this exhibit in this

D-l was the Subscription Agreement they are

discussing here.

11

THE COURT: All right.

12

MR. SONNENREICH:

13

MR. BUGDEN:

Okay, may I proceed?

Well, I am at a loss to know how

14

we know that, Your Honor?

15

ruling, you have placed the burden on me to convince you

16

after we hear the testimony that he is wrong.

17

THE COURT:

And as I understand your

No, we are not going to do that,

18

Mr. Bugden.

19

Mr. Brass, you may leave and we are going to have some

20

discussions here as to what we are doing here today

21

because we are really not doing what I think we ought to

22

be doing.

23
24
25

I will tell you what we are going to do.

(Mr. Brass leaves the courtroom and Mr. Barber
comes in.)
THE COURT:

I am really confused as to what we
19
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1

are doing here and the way in which we are doing it.

2

Maybe that is my fault.

3

analyze this thing.

4

for a New Trial or In the Alternative for Arrest of

5

Judgment.

6

trial, I guess your Arrest of Judgment is so you can

7

appeal.

8
9

I haven't sat down and tried to

Mr. Bugden, you have made a Motion

Assuming that you don't have grounds for a new

MR. BUGDEN:

I am sorry.

The Arrest of

Judgment is not just a procedural step.

I am hoping to

10

present arguments to persuade you that that should be

11

granted, but it is one of the steps that we have to go

12

through to get to an appeal, if that was your question.

13

THE COURT:

That is what I am saying.

I am

14

saying, if I decide that you have no grounds for a new

15

trial and deny your motion, then I assume your Arrest of

16

Judgment Motion is so that

17

without the defendant being sentenced in this case.

18

MR. BUGDEN:

you can make your appeal

Well, I think the Arrest of

19

Judgment procedurally exists so that even if there is not

20

a basis for the granting of a new trial, so that the

21

trial judge can still correct a problem at the trial

22

stage if there is a legal reason to not enter judgment,

23

and I think that there is, and we will get to that, or I

24

assume we will.

25

THE COURT: Well, you see, I don't think —
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1

First of all, as far as I know, and again correct me

2

because you are the one that filed the motion, there is

3

no such thing as a Motion for a New Trial under the

4

criminal procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

5
6

MR. BUGDEN:
all due respect.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BUGDEN:

9

I think that is not right, with

Then tell me where it is.
Well, I think it is Rule 24 and

Rule 23, Your Honor, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

10

THE COURT:

Of the rules?

Okay, I was looking

11

at the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Okay, let me get the

12

rules.

13

into substance and rules, because that is really what we

14

have done, and they don't tell you where they are going

15

to put them.

16

Judgement and an Appeal. You are right. Well, I will

17

tell you what I think, where I am having a problem, Mr.

18

Bugden, is that I don't think, at least it doesn't appear

19

to me from Rule 24, that the introduction of evidence as

20

to the —

21

Your Motion for New Trial specifies "(1) Facts proven at

22

trial do not constitute the public offense of securities

23

fraud."

Now, what they have done by breaking rules up

Here they are.

Rule 23 and 24, Arrest of

Well, first of all, let me go back a step.

24

MR. BUGDEN:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
"(2) Other good cause for arrest of
21
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1

judgment."

Now, I think that is too broad.

2

MR. BUGDEN:

3

my memorandum of law.

4

But I have been very specific in

THE COURT: Well, I know, but you weren't in

5

the motion.

6

I guess that is where we get into this business of about

7

ineffective assistance of counsel.

8
9

The motion is the functional document here.

Be that as it may, I don't think we need
evidence on that.

It seems to me that what we are

10

talking about is whether or not the Court upon argument,

11

and you pointed out where you thought the deficiencies

12

are, can make a judgment as to whether your motion is

13

well taken or whether it isn't.

14

MR. BUGDEN:

15

I am prepared to argue.

I am

ready to roll.

16

THE COURT:

All right.

I don't think we need

17

evidence on these matters.

As a matter of fact, I don't

18

see a provision in Rule 24 to the introduction of

19

evidence.

20

tried.

21

I wasn't the finder of fact, but I was there.

22

through the trial and you can tell me what you want to

23

tell me, and I can take your argument under

24

consideration, as well as opposing counsel's, and make a

25

determination as to whether I agree or disagree on either

That is, evidence about how the trial was

I mean, I don't need any evidence.
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I was there.
I sat

1

side.

But I don't think I need, with all due respect to

2

Mr. Brass, who I highly regard as a lawyer, I don't think

3

I need him to tell me about the trial of lawsuits.

4

am saying is, I don't think extrinsic evidence at this

5

point really is proper.

6

evidence that I have to make a decision on is present

7

within the four corners of the record of this case.

8

MR. BUGDEN:

I really don't.

All I

I think the

Well, as I have already

9

articulated to the Court and I thought in fact you had

10

agreed with me, I mean, I thought I heard you say that.

11
12

THE COURT:

You may have heard a lot of things,

MR. BUGDEN:

My motion, Your Honor, is that we

I agree.

13
14

have some guidance from the rules as to what is relevant

15

and in this case one of the two prongs of the Strickland

16

standard that I have to satisfy is that the

17

representation fell below an objective standard of

18

reasonableness.

19

relevant.

20

opinion about whether or not —

21

think, to decide whether or not objectively speaking

22

certain things fell below an objective standard of

23

reasonableness.

24
25

So Mr. Barbers subjective opinion is not

I haven't asked this attorney to render an
I mean that is for you, I

Then prong two is "but for those omissions, or
errors, or conduct, is there an undermining of confidence
23
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1

in the jury's verdict?"

Is there a reasonable

2

probability of a different result?

3

is your call.

4

But on the question of "will it be useful to the Court to

5

have evidence with regard to two specific issues," is all

6

I have talked about, I think, with regard to Mr. Brass,

7

the significance of an opening argument.

8

secondly, with regard to a Subscription Agreement.

9

we are talking about three different words we have heard

Again, I believe that

I think that that is your determination.

And then

10

not today, but I will refresh your recollection.

11

was a Pre-Offering Booklet.

12

THE COURT: Yeah.

13

MR. BUGDEN:

14

And

There

There is a Suitability

Questionnaire.

15

THE COURT: Yeah.

16

MR. BUGDEN:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BUGDEN:

And finally, the —
The Subscription Agreement.
Thank you, the Subscription

19

Agreement.

Here we have Virl Thornton, Count 1, a signed

20

document where he has signed a document that advises him

21

of the possibility of future payments.

22

issues that I have asked Mr. Brass about are the opening

23

argument and the significance in the securities fraud

24

case.

25

or not that is something that you would want to put

Okay.

So the two

And secondly, the Subscription Agreement, whether

24
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1

before the jury, that the investor himself, who is saying

2

this is a material omission by the broker, by the dealer,

3

whether or not the fact that the investor actually signed

4

a document putting him on notice, is that important? I

5

recognize that you can make those judgments.

6

that, but as a defense counsel with vast experience, and

7

as you said "with all due respect to Ed,"

8

you respect, someone that I think you recognize to be a

9

well-known, extremely competent and efficient defense

I recognize

someone that

10

lawyer.

11

issues and then on the question of relevance and the

12

Strickland standard talking about objective

13

reasonableness, a standard of objective reasonableness,

14

will this evidence, that is the testimony of Mr. Brass,

15

assist you with regard to determining whether or not it

16

is more probable or not that there was a deficient

17

performance here; whether or not they reached level one,

18

that is, objectively, reasonable, competent counsel. So

19

I have put on competent counsel to say, to at least

20

discuss the importance of that opening argument.

21

Okay, I am asking him some questions about those

THE COURT:

The problem I have with that

22

approach is don't we then have the other side putting on

23

Mr. Barber himself or somebody else who says, "Well, we

24

simply disagree under the terms and conditions that were

25

present in this case at the time and place that it was
25
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1

tried.

2

done."

We think that the other strategy was better

3

MR. BUGDEN:

Okay, but here is the crux and you

4

have said it today and we discussed it whenever we were

5

here before, and that is, that case law talks at great

6

length about whether or not a particular action was a

7

strategic decision.

8

then historically the courts have said that the defendant

9

himself is stuck with that result.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BUGDEN:

And if it is a strategic decision,

That is right.
If it is a strategic decision

12

then, even if it is the wrong judgment call, we just

13

can't have a remedy for that kind of a problem.

14

understand that.

15

time and in fact Mr. Barber has made statements to me

16

which would suggest this was not a strategic decision.

17
18

Okay, I

But in this case you had evidence last

MR. SONNENREICH:

Now, we are getting really

into hearsay.

19

MR. BUGDEN:

Well, that is why it is important.

20

The evidence last time were that we had statements from

21

Mr. Harry that Mr. Barber said that he forgot to give an

22

opening statement, and that he forgot to introduce the

23

document.

24

perspective, there is no strategic decision-making.

25

Well, obviously, Your Honor, from a logical

THE COURT:

In that case, you are right.
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1

MR. BUGDEN:

Well, that is why it is important.

2

THE COURT: Well, all right, but Mr. Brass

3

doesn't have to testify to that.

4

MR. BUGDEN:

He can testify as to —

again, as

5

to the second prong.

6

but I think that it is useful and helpful to the Court to

7

know from a defense attorney's perspective why an opening

8

argument might be important, why it might be considered

9

important.

10
11

I am not asking him his opinion,

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bugden, how many cases do
you think I have tried here?

12

MR. BUGDEN:

13

THE COURT:

Tons.
Yeah, a lot more than any trial

14

counsel does.

How many cases do you think I tried for 30

15

years as a trial lawyer?

16

of an opening statement but there are times when I have

17

waived them and I don't think —

18

be awfully difficult for either side to present evidence

19

which says that the waiver or non-waiver of the opening

20

statement was an act of incompetence.

21

are saying is Mr. Barber admitted at some point, the

22

horrors of the record, that he plain forgot to do it, was

23

going to do it but failed to do it, then you may have an

24

entirely different question.

25

don't.

I mean, I know the importance

I think it is going to

Now, if what you

Maybe you do. Maybe you

Maybe it is no harm anyway.

But the point I am
27
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1

making is, I don't think we need evidence to make the

2

determination as to why you give opening statements. I

3

know why you give opening statements, so do you, so does

4

everybody else that got out of law school and every tried

5

a lawsuit.

6

What I would think we ought to do here, because

7

if we don't we are going to retry the trial of this case,

8

and that is going to take as long as the trial did, and

9

when we get through we are not going to get any better

10

result, I'm afraid.

11

form of an ordinary motion, like we do all the time, you

12

can support it with all of your affidavits, valid

13

affidavits, why you ought to be entitled to the relief

14

you want.

15

I would like you to tell me in the

Now, we will let him do the same thing on the

16

other side.

17

you feel there are legitimate issues of fact about the

18

trial itself that needs evidence, we will discuss that

19

and I will decide whether or not we will allow that

20

evidence to be put in at some point.

21

what I am saying?

22

If when we get through with that, either of

MR. BUGDEN:

Not really.

Do you understand

I don't have any

23

other evidence I intend to present.

I have presented

24

what I intended to present on ineffective assistance of

25

counsel.

The other arguments are all questions of law.
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1
2

THE COURT:

All right, okay.

Maybe we are

getting to where we are going anyway.

3

MR. BUGDEN:

I am there.

4

THE COURT: Well, you didn't get to cross.

5

MR. SONNENREICH:

Your Honor, it does occur to

6

me that we have both briefed the matter about as fully as

7

we re-brief it in a repeat briefing.

8

have been terribly specific, but the memorandum was

9

adequate and I think I was able to adequately brief it,

The motion may not

10

although I had to incorporate some stuff because I was

11

short on time, that they incorporated in their earlier

12

memorandum, in my memorandum.

13

read through the whole package, I think there is adequate

14

law on both sides.

15

But given that, if you

As for Mr. Barber, quite frankly it would be

16

the defense who has the burden of putting on and showing

17

that Mr. Barber forgot to put him on.

18

other day with respect to Mr. Harry's testimony was that

19

if Harry said he forgot, it can only go to state of mind,

20

and that there are any number of reasons that Barber

21

might have said that to Harry.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. SONNENREICH:

Your ruling the

That's true, right.
So I am not intending, if the

24

affidavit doesn't come in, I don't think I am going to

25

call Mr. Barber either and we won't have any additional
29
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1

evidence and we can go straight to argument.

2
3

MR. BUGDEN:

Then they are ready to argue. I

am ready to argue.

4

THE COURT:

If the affidavit does not come in?

5

MR. SONNENREICH:

Right, if the affidavit

6

doesn't come in.

If it comes in, great.

I have already

7

moved for its admission.

8

feeling is and my argument is, that the burden of proof

9

with respect to whether or not Mr. Barber forgot, with

If it does not come in, my

10

respect to whether —

11

all the rest, that is on the defendant clearly.

12

going to put him on.

13

sitting here.

14

THE COURT:

as to Mr. Barber's reasoning and
I am not

He can call him if he wants. He is

I think clearly the burden of proof

15

— Well, it may not be proof at this point.

16

of persuasion, at the very least, on these motions is the

17

defendant's.

18

that.

19
20

It is burden

I don't think there is any doubt about

MR. SONNENREICH:

So, I am ready to proceed

unless —

21

THE COURT:

I will tell you what I am going to

22

do.

I sort of had to do what we did with Mr. Brass

23

because he was in a world of hurt, if you'll pardon the

24

expression.

25

back here and hear the balance and let you cross at a

He needed some relief.

We have to get him

30
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1

later date. We will afford you the opportunity to do

2

that.

3

Mr. Bugden, I am going to allow his testimony

4

to stand.

5

let's —

6

I am going to get the affidavit in. And then

What more do you want to do?
MR. BUGDEN:

Then I need to put on Mr. Barber

7

and cross examine him, if you are going to allow his

8

affidavit because I have had conversations with Jim.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. BUGDEN:

11

position is that with regard —

12

question of what is good for the goose is good for the

13

gander.

14

hearing, counsel stipulated.

15

receipt of that affidavit.

16

I think it is hearsay.

17

it is something that counsel has prepared and it is

18

something that I have had conversation with Mr. Barber

19

and Mr. Barber has said other things to me, things that

20

are not included in the affidavit.

21

picture.

22

All right.
And just for the record, my
this isn't just simply a

When the affidavit was presented at the earlier
He had no objection to the
I object to this affidavit.

Whether it is notarized or not,

So it is not the big

It is not a complete picture.
MR. SONNENREICH:

Which is why I can introduce

23

the affidavit.

24

discuss anything they want to do by way of calling him.

25

The witness is right here and he can

THE COURT:

Let's do that and then let me hear
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1

your arguments.

And then if there is something more that

2

we need to do before I make a decision, and one of them

3

is going to be I am going to go back and go completely

4

through your memorandums again, but if before I do that,

5

and before I make a final determination you need or you

6

think you need to talk with the Court about other

7

evidence coming in, or something of the sort, you can do

8

that.

9

trying to get a handle on this thing so that we don't re-

I am not trying to short circuit anybody.

10

try the trial.

11

trial.

12

I am

That is, the procedure of trying the

MR. BUGDEN:

Well, I wonder since Mr. Barber

13

has been inconvenienced, if it would make sense to put

14

him on the witness stand now.

15
16

THE COURT:

Yeah, let's inconvenience him some

more.

17

MR. BUGDEN:

Is it your ruling that you are

18

going to admit his affidavit over my objection, is that

19

the ruling?

20

THE COURT: Well, I will tell you what I am

21

going to do.

Let's put him on the stand and let him

22

testify.

23

to use the affidavit.

When we get through, maybe we don't even have

24

MR. SONNENREICH:

25

MR. BUGDEN:

Okay, you are calling him?

I don't know.

Who is calling him?
32
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1
2

MR. SONNENREICH:

I said all I need is in the affidavit.

3
4

You said you are calling him.

MR. BUGDEN:

The Judge isn't allowing the

affidavit in.

5

THE COURT:

No, I didn't say that.

I said if

6

anybody wants to put him on the stand, we will let him

7

testify and maybe we won't even use the affidavit.

8

the other hand, he is going to offer the affidavit.

9

probably going to grant it and then you can call him if

On
I am

10

you want.

11

affidavit you say, needs to be explained and broadened,

12

and so on and so forth.

13
14

I mean, the reason you want to call him is the

MR. BUGDEN:

All right. Well, I will call Mr.

Barber.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SONNENREICH:

17

All right.
Your Honor, is the affidavit

in or out, or we don't know?

18

THE COURT: We don't know.

19

MR. SONNENREICH:

20
21

Then I will withdraw the

affidavit if he is going to put him on the stand.
THE COURT:

22

All right.
JAMES N, BARBER

23

Called as a witness on behalf of the defense, after

24

having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified

25

as follows:
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1
2

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUGDEN:

3

Q

Would you state your name for the record, sir.

4

A

James N. Barber.

5

Q

Mr. Barber, were you the attorney of record for

6

Mr. Harry at the trial in this matter?

7

A

I was.

8

Q

And, Mr. Barber, as you think back to the trial

9
10

proceedings, can you recall whether or not you gave an
opening statement?

11

A

12

statement.

13
14

Q

I am certain that I did not give an opening

Do you recall whether or not you reserved your

right to give an opening statement?

15

A

Yes, I did.

16

Q

And do you recall whether or not you had a

17

conversation with Mr. Harry concerning the decision to

18

reserve that opening statement?

19
20

MR. SONNENREICH:
conversation.

21

THE COURT: Well, the question can be answered

22

yes or no.

23

Q

24
25

Foundation as to time of the

(By Mr. Bugden) Did you have a conversation

with Ron about whether or not you would reserve it?
A

I believe that there were comments exchanged
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1

between us about that, the fact that I had not done so.

2

Q

Do you remember who was present?

3

A

Just he and I.

4

Q

Would it have been on the first day of trial,

5
6

or when would it have been, Mr. Barber?
A

I think that I probably advised him, I don't

7

recall a specific conversation in which I did it, but I

8

think I probably advised him of my initial decision to

9

waive.

And the reason I did that —

Oh, you didn't ask

10

me that.

11

conversation after no opening statements was given prior

12

to the initiation of the calling of the defense

13

witnesses.

14

Q

And then I believe there was another

Let's talk about that conversation.

That is a

15

conversation you had with Mr. Harry about your failure to

16

give an opening statement; is that right?

17

present?

Who was

18

A

I believe that such a conversation occurred.

19

Q

And do you remember where that occurred?

20

A

It was either in this courtroom —

and you need

21

to understand, Mr. Bugden, I am trying to reconstruct

22

what occurred from the best of my recollection about it.

23

But I think if such a conversation occurred, it either

24

happened right there at counsel's table, we were sitting

25

over there, I believe, or in the hall adjacent to the
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1

courtroom.

2

Q

And when you spoke with Mr. Harry about not

3

giving an opening statement, do you remember whether you

4

told him you forgot to give it?

5
6
7

A

No, I do not specifically recall having said

that.
Q

Again, you have already acknowledged you did

8

not give an opening statement.

With regard to not giving

9

an opening statement, did you give —

did you consider

10

the merits of either giving an opening statement or not

11

giving an opening statement before you didn't give the

12

opening statement?

13

A

Well, in the first place I did, yes. At the

14

first place, I elected not to give an opening statement

15

because the witnesses in the case, I think, made somewhat

16

inconsistent and difficult statements to deal with.

17

were all three hostile, and therefore I did not believe

18

it advisable to stand up and tell the jury what I thought

19

they were going to say when I didn't know what they were

20

going to say.

And in the second instance —

21

Q

22

understand.

23

Barber, you are saying you decided that you were not

24

going to give an opening statement?

25

A

They

Okay, now, let me just stop you so I
You are saying before the trial began, Mr.

I decided I wasn't going to give it at the
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1

beginning of the State's case.

2

Q

Oh, all right.

3

A

That is correct.

4

Q

You used the word "waive," but you decided to

5

reserve the opening statement?

6
7

10

A

Have it your way.

Q

And then so when you made the decision to

reserve it, you apparently intended to give an opening
statement at the start of your case; is that right?

11
12

THE WITNESS:

MR. SONNENREICH:

Your Honor, he is leading his

witness.

15
16

Your Honor, is that a question or

not?

13
14

That is what I meant to say,

yes.

8
9

So you decided to reserve it?

THE COURT:
Q

Yes, that is a leading question.

(By Mr. Bugden) What were your intentions, Mr.

17

Barber, when you reserved the right to give an opening

18

statement?

19

A

I thought my general impression there was that

20

if I felt at the end of the State's case that an opening

21

statement was appropriate and helpful, I would give one.

22

But I still had the right not to give one and therefore I

23

had not made any electable determination one way or the

24

other.

25

Q

When the defense began its case —
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1

A

I think I intended to give one though, Wally.

2

Q

Thank you. When you began your case and didn't

3

give an opening statement, at the precise moment that you

4

called your first witness, did you go through a thought

5

process where you considered the merits of "Okay, I am

6

not going to give an opening statement"?

7

going to give an opening statement"?

Or "Okay, I am

8

A

9

Q

Thank you.

10

A

Which is just what I said in my affidavit.

11
12

I do not believe I did.

MR. BUGDEN:

I will ask that be stricken and

ask that Mr. Barber respond to my questions.

13

THE WITNESS:

14

THE COURT: Well, I will strike it. We may get

15
16

I will.

the affidavit in, but that is all right.
Q

Go ahead.

(By Mr. Bugden) Mr. Barber, in a number of

17

conversations you and I have had over the last several

18

days, both yesterday and then today, did you tell me that

19

you forgot to give the opening statement?

20

A

I may have used the words "I forgot."

21

Q

Thank you.

You have answered my question.

22

With regard to the introduction of the Subscription

23

Agreement relating to Virl Thornton, do you acknowledge,

24

Mr. Barber, that you had in your possession the

25

Subscription Agreement at the time of the trial?
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1

A

I believe I did, yes, or Mr. Harry had it in

2

his possession but I was aware of its existence and the

3

fact that it was available to us.

4
5

Q

And were you also aware that it was signed by

Virl Thornton?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

And were you also aware, sir, that that

8

Subscription Agreement set forth the possibility of

9

prospective payments with the Red River?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And is it true, sir, that you didn't introduce

12

the Subscription Agreement through Virl Thornton?

13

A

That is true.

14

Q

And would it be accurate to say, sir, that you

15

forgot to introduce the Subscription Agreement?

16

MR. SONNENREICH:

17

THE COURT: Well, no, I think that is a fair

18
19
20
21
22
23

question.
Q

Your Honor, leading again.

I will allow it.
(By Mr. Bugden) Would it be fair to say you

forgot to introduce it through Virl?
A

I cannot answer that question in the form in

which you place it to me.
Q

Let me ask a different question then, Mr.

24

Barber.

In conversations that you had with me both

25

yesterday and today, did you advise me that you forgot to
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1
2

introduce it?
A

In that form, no.

I told you, and I used that

3

word "undoubtedly" in connection with extended

4

conversations about why it didn't get in. That I did do.

5

Q

Thank you.

And did you also acknowledge in

6

conversations with me, Mr. Barber, that if you had an

7

opportunity to re-try this case, you would indeed attempt

8

to introduce the Subscription Agreement through Virl

9

Thornton?

10

A

Did you tell me that oust yesterday?
What I told you was is that when Ron reminded

11

me that I hadn't done it, I attempted to do it. And if I

12

had it to do again, I would probably put it in.

13

MR. BUGDEN:

14

THE COURT: Thank you.

15

MR. BUGDEN:

16
17

Thank you.

That is all I have.
You may cross.

Actually, let me just ask several

other questions.
Q

(By Mr. Bugden) Mr. Barber, between the time

18

that you were retained by Mr. Harry and the time that

19

this case went to trial, did you have problems with or

20

did you —

21

there?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And is it true that —

24
25

Did you have a heart attack, let's start

THE COURT: Well, between the time you were
retained and started to work on this case at the time it
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1

was tried?

2
3

THE WITNESS:
yeah.

That is my recollection of it,

When was it tried?

4

MR. SONNENREICH:

5

THE WITNESS:

October?
December.

December, oh, that's right. I

6

think that I was retained early in the summer.

7

heart attack did come in that interim.

8
9

Q

Yes, the

(By Mr. Bugden) Is it also true, Mr. Barber,

that you suffer from a diabetic condition?

10

A

That is correct.

11

Q

And is it also true, sir, that in the last six

12

months you have been involved in an automobile accident

13

where your diabetic condition contributed to the

14

accident?

15

A

Within the last six months, yes.

16

Q

And what are some of the symptoms associated

17

with your illness or with the diabetic condition?

18

A

Mobile unconsciousness.

19

Q

Would it be fair to say you are more forgetful

20

now than you were prior to the onset of your illness,

21

sir?

22
23
24

A

I have no way of knowing because I have had it

since I was 11.
MR. BUGDEN:

That is all I have.

25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1
2

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. SONNENREICH:

3

Q

Mr. Barber, in your opinion what was the

4

situation in this case at the time that the prosecution

5

rested?

6

A

Well, specifically vis-a-vis what?

7

Q

Okay.

8

First of all, what was your opinion with

respect to the length of the trial at that time?

9

A

It was dragging unmercifully.

10

Q

And did you have an opinion as to the effect of

11

that upon the jury?

12

A

Yes.

13

jQ

What was your opinion?

14

A

Though I did not have the sense that the jury

15

was angry that it was dragging, I thought the jury might

16

be prone to reward those who would get on with it.

17

Q

Did you have an opinion at that time as to

18

whether you had been able to communicate the theory of

19

your case to the jury through cross examination?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

What was your opinion at that time?

A

I believe that the jury understood the issues.

23

Q

How many witnesses did you intend to call?

24

A

Mr. Harry and I had discussed the witnesses and

22

25

r

I think we'd decided that three or four representing
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1

persons that had been subjected to the bamboozling

2

blandishments of the offerer of the securities and then

3

individuals in his own association of brokers who had

4

sold them would comprise our witness list, as well as

5

myself.

6
7

Q

But, in fact, you only called the two brokers

and Mr. Harry, correct?

8

A

That is correct.

9

Q

Yeah, okay, I understand what you are saying.

10

Same guy.

Did you give a closing argument in the case?

11

A

Yes, I did.

12

Q

Did the fact that you only had a few witnesses,

13

and then expected to give a closing argument, how did

14

that relate to your not giving an opening statement?

15

MR. BUGDEN:

Your Honor, that is ~

16

THE WITNESS:

17

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Bugden?

18

MR. BUGDEN:

I doubt that it did.

Well, I think that the question

19

requires the witness after the fact to quarterback and

20

reinterpret what he did, when he has now acknowledged,

21

for example, with regard to opening statement, that he

22

forgot to give it.

23

THE COURT:

I don't know that he really

24

acknowledged that.

By the same token, Mr. Bugden, the

25

questions you asked him about, would he now introduce in
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1

evidence the Subscription Agreement, is the same nature

2

of question, looking back at it, has he got a view.

3

in this case, I think what is sauce for the goose is

4

sauce for the gander.

5

Q

And

I will allow it.

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) Let's discuss this

6

Subscription Booklet that we didn't get in through Virl

7

Thornton and attempted to get in through Ron Harry.

8

A

Actually, tried to get it in through you, Mr.

9

Sonnenreich, but I knew it wouldn't come in through Mr.

10

Harry and I needed your stipulation to get it in and you

11

wouldn't give it to me. That is actually what happened.

12
13

Q

That is when Mr. Thornton had gone to Arizona,

for the record.

14

A

That is correct.

That is right.

15

Q

Did you cross examine Mr. Thornton during the

16

trial?

17

A

I did.

18

Q

And did you cross examine him with respect to

19

issues that were the same basically as the issues raised

20

by that Limited Partnership Subscription Booklet?

21

A

Well, they were issues related to it.

I don't

22

believe I talked to him about most of the same issues,

23

no.

24
25

Q

Did you feel that your cross examination of Mr.

Thornton was adequate?
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1

A

It was insufficient to get Mr. Thornton to say

2

what I wanted him to say, but I am afraid I had exhausted

3

my ability to get him to say it.

4

Q

5

Fair answer.
MR. BUGDEN:

I wonder if we could just have Mr.

6

Sonnenreich ask questions and not editorialize.

7

object.

8
9

THE COURT:
Q

Yeah, limit your comments, counsel.

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) Now, did you receive a

10

list of documents?

11

Mr. Sonnenreich and Mr. Bugden.)

12
13

(Off the record discussion between

MR. BUGDEN:

Ask him about the three sets of

points and I will know what you are talking about.

14
15

I will

MR. SONNENREICH:
Q

Okay.

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) In your earlier affidavit

16

there were three sets of talking points or whatever about

17

Mr. Isaacs, Mr. Thornton and Mr. Brgoch.

18

attached as Appendix 3, 4 and 5 to the Memorandum in

19

Support of the Motion for New Trial or in the

20

alternative, a Motion in Arrest of Judgment.

They were

21

MR. BUGDEN:

Actually, let me interrupt you.

22

That is not accurate.

In the affidavit, two documents

23

were attached:

24

Subscription Booklet.

25

document was not discussed.

the Suitability Questionnaire and the
That is from the —

the third

>
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1

MR. SONNENREICH:

2

MR. BUGDEN:

3

MR. SONNENREICH:

The Pre-Offering Summary?

That is not one of the documents.
The points, not the Pre-

4

Offering Summary.

5

These, is what I am talking about.

6

The points, the talking points.

MR. BUGDEN:

Okay, I didn't understand what you

7

are talking about.

You mean the outlines, three of them,

8

bearing the name of Ike Isaacs or Frank Brgoch or Virl

9

Thornton, that is your question?

10

MR. SONNENREICH:

11

THE COURT:

12

May the Court see what you are

referring to?

13

MR. SONNENREICH:

14

introduced them as.

15

introduced, Your Honor.

16

Q

Let me check and see what we

(Pause) They were in fact

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) I give you Defendant's

17

Exhibits 1, 3 and 5.

18

trial?

19

A

20

That is correct.

Did you see those exhibits prior to

I believe that I —

you have given me 6 and 7,

as well.

21

Q

Okay, well, put those aside.

22

A

But 6 is the list of limited partnerships on

23

Thornton.

24

Q

Okay.

25

A

Yes, I received all of those prior to the trial
46
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1
2

from Mr. Harry, whom I believe prepared them.
Q

Each of these exhibits, there is a list of

3

suitability questions or issues or points, however you

4

want to phrase them, one for Mr. Isaacs, one for Mr.

5

Brgoch, and one for Mr. Thornton.

6

suitability in your cross examination of the witnesses?

7

A

Did you address

Yes. Well, using it in the plural, to my

8

recollection I addressed the issue of suitability with

9

considerable detail with Mr. Thornton.

10
11

And perhaps

somewhat less detail with the other two.
Q

There are also lists of limited partnership

12

portfolios for each individual.

You did not go in detail

13

on each one of those limited partnerships with each

14

individual, did you?

15

A

No, I did not.

16

Q

Why was that?

17

A

Well, a number of reasons.

One is that most of

18

them are not real estate limited partnerships, and I

19

doubted that but for a reference to them they are very

20

likely admissible.

21

direct testimony of each of these investors, at least

22

Brgoch and Isaacs, that the two of them claimed to have

23

expressly instructed Mr. Harry not to put them in any

24

more of those kind of deals before the Red River Limited

25

Partnership was presented to them.

But secondly, I was familiar with the

And I knew that both
47
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1

Mr. Brgoch and Mr. Isaacs were pretty much there to make

2

a speech and that every time I raised the issue, they

3

made their speech.

4

damaging to go through the detail of those and that the

5

return on that issue would not be very great.

6
7
8
9

Q

And so I thought it was going to be

Final question, did your health interfere with

your ability to participate in the trial?
A

Well, that is always a difficult decision and I

will concede that I don't know that I had the same energy

10

level then that I would have the prior year.

11

that I did not feel the stated condition of my health to

12

have imposed substantial inability to try the case.

13

Q

One last little minor matter.

But I felt

You mentioned

14

that you told Mr. Bugden that you quote "forgot" to make

15

an opening statement perhaps in the last couple of days.

16

Can you elaborate why you used the word "forgot"?

17

A

Well, I think I did tell Wally, as part of a

18

longer statement about the issue, that I forgot to make

19

the statement.

20

counsel, was that at the time that I didn't stand up and

21

commence to make an opening statement, I didn't engage in

22

an act of mental process about the issue of making a

23

statement at all. And in talking to Wally about it, I

24

thought I have expressed what happened, you know, five or

25

six different ways.

But what I intended to imply by that,

And I have tried each time to convey
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1

the same thing to him, and to you.

And that is, that I

2

did not engage in any mental process that I can now

3

recall about whether to make an opening statement or not

4

at the beginning of our case at the time that decision

5

was made.

6

with him this afternoon that the term Mforgot" covered

7

all the issues that were fair to be presented in that

8

respect because even though I didn't think about it at

9

the time and therefore in that sense forgot.

But I disagreed with Wally that when I spoke

I don't

10

think that, as he implied earlier, I had made a decision

11

to make such a statement and then forgot that I had made

12

the decision to do it.

13

had to do with the fact that I did not engage in the

14

processes to make a conscious decision at that time and

15

the extent to which they may have influenced that

16

decision or my forgetting to have made the statement, if

17

you will, I am not exactly certain of.

18

fair statement of the whole issue.

19

Q

I think that the other factors

I think that is a

Is what you are saying then that these

20

circumstances that existed, the ones that we discussed

21

about the length of trial, et cetera, may have been

22

responsible for not making a conscious decision to make

23

an opening statement.

24

MR. BUGDEN:

25

speculation.

That requires absolute

He is saying, "I don't remember that I made
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1

a reflective decision."

2

speculate.

Now he is asking him to

I will object to the form of the question.

3

THE COURT: Would you read the question back.

4

(Reporter read back the last question.)

5

MR. BUGDEN:

6

THE COURT:

7

I think that is further application

of his prior explanation.

8
9

"May have been responsible."

THE WITNESS:

I will allow it. Go ahead.

Those factors may have influenced

the fact that I forgot, let's put it that way.

I didn't

10

think it was very important to remember.

11

opposite of forgot, that is what I intended to tell both

12

you and Mr. Bugden.

13

Q

If that is the

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) In light of the

14

circumstances of the trial at this time, it did not

15

appear important to you then to sit down and really

16

analyze the question; is that what you are saying?

17
18

MR. BUGDEN:

I will object to that.

I will

object to the form of the question, Your Honor.

19

THE COURT: Why?

20

MR. BUGDEN:

He is, I think, completely

21

mischaracterizing what Mr. Barber has said before.

22

Again, he is asking him to second guess it, to

23

quarterback it now after the fact. When what he is

24

saying is, "I didn't go through a reflective process."

25

MR. SONNENREICH:

And I am asking why.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

MR. BUGDEN:

I had no conscious —

2

THE COURT:

3

to hear what you want to hear.

4

he is saying, not the way I hear it. Did you understand

5

the last question he just asked you, Mr. Barber?

Mr. Bugden, I think you are trying
That isn't exactly what

6

THE WITNESS: Yeah.

7

THE COURT: Well, I think I did too.

8

answer it?

9
10

Can you

THE WITNESS:

No, I have got to hear it again

now.

11

THE COURT:

Read the last question, Dorothy.

12

(Last question read back by the reporter.)

13

THE WITNESS: Well, I don't think I am saying

14

that either.

What I am saying is that I was satisfied to

15

proceed without making the opening statement and whatever

16

circumstances were then extinct that led me to be

17

satisfied, appeared to have discouraged from the fact

18

that I forgot to put the statement in, to spend any more

19

time thinking about it or analyzing that prospect. I

20

can't express it any more clearly than that.

21

THE COURT:

I understand.

22

MR. SONNENREICH:

23

THE COURT:

That is all right.

Thank you.

Nothing further.

Mr. Bugden.

24
25
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1
2
3

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUGDEN:
Q

Mr. Barber, you did not make a strategic

4

decision to forego giving an opening statement.

5

was no analysis where you said strategically "I am not

6

going to make an opening statement"?

7

did it?

8

MR. SONNENREICH:

There

That didn't happen,

Your Honor, if that calls for

9

a legal conclusion as to what he says constitutes a,

10

quote, "strategic decision" within the meaning of the

11

case law, I object.

12

That is for the Court to decide.

THE COURT: Well, it is.

It is and while I

13

have some problems with the question and Mr. Bugden knows

14

what those problems are, I am going to allow you to

15

answer it.

16

Q

(By Mr. Bugden) You didn't go through a thought

17

process, a cognitive process at all with regard to the

18

opening statement?

19

A

That is correct.

20

Q

I will start there.

And because you didn't go

21

through a cognitive process, you didn't go through a

22

strategic decision-making process either, did you?

23

A

I don't know what the difference is.

24

Q

I am not sure I do either, but I am interested.

25

You didn't make a strategic decision to not give an
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1
2
3
4

opening statement?
A

I did not sit down and think, once again, about

whether I should make an opening statement.
Q

And what I understand you to have said now in

5

response to the State's attorney is that you reserved the

6

opening statement but had not decided whether you would

7

give one.

8
9
10

A

I just reserved it.

I didn't do any prior

consideration of whether I was going to give one again.
Q

And when you didn't give one, there was no

11

consideration.

12

right?

You forgot to give one at that time,

13

MR. SONNENREICH:

14

expressed what he meant by "forgot."

15
16
17
18
19

Well, I'm sorry.

He has

THE COURT: Well, I understand that.

If you

can answer, let him.
Q

(By Mr, Bugden) You forgot to give one, isn't

that right, Jimmy?
A

In the sense that in light of all of those

20

other circumstances that I have given you about eight

21

times, I did not think about the process of not giving

22

the statement.

23

though, because I think it implies more than I mean to

24

say, and that is, that there was a reason to remember.

25

You understand what I am saying?

I am not going to say it is forgetting,

53
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1
2
3
4
5

Q
opening.
A

There was no thinking with regard to giving the
It just didn't happen.
It was a decision or non-decision that was made

given the applicable circumstances.
Q

And are you suggesting today, Mr. Barber, that

6

just somehow subconsciously these other things you have

7

told Mr. Sonnenreich about, that is, that the trial was

8

running on, that you thought that the jurors were bored,

9

that you thought you were losing the jury, you think that

10

just subconsciously helped you make the decision?

11

A

Of course.

12

Q

Oh, I see.

13

A

That is how you make decisions in trial.

14

Q

But you didn't make this decision, did you?

15
16
17

MR. SONNENREICH:
Q

Argumentative, Your Honor.

(By Mr. Bugden) You made no decision about an

opening statement, isn't that your testimony?

18

A

Is that a question?

19

Q

Yes, sir.

20

THE COURT:

21

THE WITNESS:

22

25

I will allow it.

Yeah, I didn't make a conscious

decision about it.

23
24

No.

MR. BUGDEN:

Thank you.

That is all I have,

Judge.
MR. SONNENREICH:

Just very quickly, Your
54
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1

Honor.

2
3
4
5
6

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. SONNENREICH:
Q

Mr. Barber, how long have you been a trial

attorney?
A

About 20 years.

7

MR. BUGDEN:

8

MR. SONNENREICH:

9
10

13
14
15

No, he got into the question

of whether he does it consciously or subconsciously, Your
Honor.

11
12

This is beyond the scope.

THE COURT:
Q

All right.

(By Mr. Sonnenreich) Mr. Barber, how many cases

have you tried, approximately?
A

Oh, I have no idea.

Apparently not as many as

Mr. Brass.

16

Q

More than a few cases?

17

A

Yeah, more than a few.

18

Q

Tried maybe more than a few cases a year?

19

A

Not anymore.

20

Q

Not anymore, just a few a year?

21

A

Uh-huh.

22

Q

Is it safe to say you have tried at least a

23

hundred cases?

24

A

I would say so.

25

Q

Do you always make every single decision in a
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1

case as a matter of conscious thought?

2

A

No.

3

Q

Do you make many decisions just subconsciously

4
5

as a matter of reflex?
A

If you want to call that making a decision,

6

yes. What you do is act on the basis of the

7

circumstances as you then perceive them.

8
9

MR. SONNENREICH:

Thank you, no further

questions.

10

MR. BUGDEN:

11

THE COURT:

12

(No objection from counsel.)

13

THE COURT:

14
15

I have nothing else.
May this witness be excused?

Mr. Barber, you may step down.

may be excused.
All right now, I think, Mr. Bugden, I

16

understand.

I am not saying you can't argue.

17

the point.

I am trying to tell you where I am.

18

MR. BUGDEN:

19

THE COURT:

20

position is in regard to the —

21

evidence is concerned.

22

MR. BUGDEN:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

You

That isn't

Yes, sir.
I think I understand what your
that is, as far as the

Yes, sir.
In regards to the issue of Mr.

Barber not making an opening statement.
MR. BUGDEN:

Thank you.
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1

THE COURT:

And I think I understand the

2

testimony as it has come in on your issue as to the

3

failure to introduce the Subscription Agreement.

4

MR. BUGDEN: Yes.

5

THE COURT:

And your position is that that is

6

all the evidence that we need and you are prepared now —

7

I am not trying to put words in your mouth —

8

now prepared, we can go forward with the rest of this,

9

for lack of a better way of phrasing it with my

10

inadequacies, a normal procedure to argue the motion.

11
12
13

but you are

MR. BUGDEN:
my side.

I am ready.

I have the spurs on

I am ready to roll.
THE COURT:

The spurs aren't in your side. I

14

am in pain.

15

satisfied at this point that I now have before me the

16

evidence, if we want to call this evidence or whatever,

17

all of the extrinsic materials I need now to make a

18

decision on this case?

19

All right now, Mr. Sonnenreich, are you

MR. SONNENREICH:

Your Honor, with the possible

20

question of one thing, and that is that we have the

21

preliminary hearing transcript in front of you.

22

important that I can reference that transcript and

23

reference the references in it to quote Exhibit D-l.

24
25

It is

Now, I can put on witnesses who can tell you
exactly what D-l is. The transcript describes it
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1

somewhat in its description of exhibits.

2

"Questionnaire Subscription Booklet."

3

what it was, but I do need to know that that issue has

4

been resolved so you know what the transcript is talking

5

about because our argument, of course, to give you the

6

one-second version, is that Virl Thornton had already

7

testified that he didn't see the pages in the

8

Subscription Agreement that are the key pages. That is

9

our reading of that transcript.

10

It calls it a

I can tell you

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bugden, I don't want in

11

any way to impinge upon the procedural oars, substantive

12

prerogatives of you as counsel for your client.

13

other hand, it seems to me that what we are talking about

14

insofar as this document, the saying is that the document

15

we are talking about is really pretty much a housekeeping

16

matter.
I would agree.

On the

17

MR. BUGDEN:

I totally agree.

18

THE COURT:

19

Sonnenreich by being able to —

20

willing to accept his statement as a person who was

21

present at the time of the preliminary hearing in this

22

matter, that that is what those records refer to, that is

23

the document that those references refer to, then I would

24

suggest we can go ahead today and hear argument for a

25

somewhat limited period, and you can supplement the

If you feel aggrieved with Mr.
Well, if you are not
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1

identification of what that reference refers to by an

2

affidavit of an independent party present at the trial

3

who knows exactly what that is.

4

is, but it has got to be a bunch of other people who were

5

around at the time of the preliminary hearing.

6

"trial."

7

hearing.

8
9

I didn't mean that.

MR. SONNENREICH:

I don't know who that

I said

I meant the preliminary

Max Wheeler, for example,

could identify the documents since he produced them.

10

THE COURT:

All right, whatever.

And yet we

11

could —

12

argument for a period of time today.

13

is still a dispute about what that reference refers to,

14

we can have that affidavit produced.

15

satisfied, I will make a ruling one way or the other.

18

And if you want to do that, we can listen to

MR. BUGDEN:

And then if there

If you are then not

We can work it out.

I am sure we

17

can work it out.

I am not willing to take his

18

representation to you today without some discussion about

19

it with him, which we haven't had a chance to do yet; but

20

I am prepared to present argument and proceed.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BUGDEN:

How much time do you need?
Well, I think I probably need at

23

least half an hour to 40 minutes.

24

minimum.

25

THE COURT:

Half an hour at a

I understand.

I am not trying to
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

cut you short and, by the same token, I don't want to

2

keep running you around the horn and bringing you back to

3

here.

4

MR. BUGDEN:

We could at least, I would think,

5

address the Strickland vs. Washington today.

6

evidence is fresh in your mind.

7

standard.

8
9

THE COURT:

We can talk about the

Can we do that in, say, 15 minutes

on the side?

10
11

The

MR. BUGDEN:

I am sure I can.

I will be less

than that.

12

THE COURT:

All right then, what I want to do

13

is this. . . (Court and counsel discussing a continuation

14

date.)

15

Let me make another statement here.

I am just

16

gradually, God, believe it is gradually —

17

why it is, I can go out to Tooele and I get further and

18

further behind here.

19

and they make time.

20

don't.

21

and I have not had the time to put into this file what I

22

want to.

23

went through them, but I have got to say that it was

24

rather hurriedly.

25

I don't know

Everybody else goes out to Tooele
I don't know how they do that, but I

I am just now catching up from my Tooele syndrome

I want to read both of these memos again. I

MR. BUGDEN:

I know that you will find that it
60
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1

is enthralling reading.

2

THE COURT:

I know I will.

The trial was an

3

enthralling trial.

(Courtroom laughter.)

4

I like about stocks is the fact they produce income, and

5

mine don't. But I want to find some time when we can do

6

this that will give you gentlemen enough time to be

7

thoroughly satisfied that you have gotten over it in its

8

entirety.

9

that point thoroughly, word for word, conversant with

10

your briefs which is going to take me probably four or

11

five hours, three or four hours, to go through them and

12

re-read and so on.

13

week following next week and the week following that.

14

The judicial conference is being held the 21st through

15

the 24th and I am taking three days of the following

16

week.

17

about doing it on Friday, the 1st of May, at 2:00, and

18

let's plan an hour to an hour and a half to the outside.

19

Is that satisfactory, Mr. Sonnenreich?

And by the same token, I would like to be at

I have the same kind of a problem the

What about —

Why don't we set this for — What

20

MR. SONNENREICH:

21

THE COURT:

22

Yes, it is.

I will give you each a half hour

right now on the —

23

MR. BUGDEN:

24

THE COURT:

25

The only thing

Ineffective.
And then I will have that in mind

when I read this thing this weekend, then you can come
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1

back and give me a half hour each on the balance of your

2

arguments.

3

(Court and counsel discussing continuation of

4

further court dates.)

5

MR. BUGDEN:

6
7
8
9
10

May 1 is great, if we could do it

then at 2:00.
THE COURT:

I'll do it at 2:00 if that is when

you want to do it.
MR. SONNENREICH:
THE COURT:

11

whole thing that day.

12

the day until 7:00.

That works for me.

We will do that. We can do the
I'll give you the whole rest of

13

MR. BUGDEN:

Okay.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. BUGDEN: Great.

16

MR. SONNENREICH:

Is that satisfactory?

Your Honor, in order to speed

17

things up, obviously with me copying opposing counsel, I

18

would like to send you some supplemental briefing

19

material mainly in the form of —

20

of the preliminary hearing to look at with respect to

21

these issues.

22

THE COURT:

indicating which pages

I have no objection to that, but I

23

don't want anymore argument.

I don't want anything new.

24

If you want to give me something that will help me get to

25

where you want me to go in the record, I will do that.
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1

Now, I don't mind that, a carbon copy of Mr.

2

Bugden.

Mr. Bugden, if you have references that you wish

3

to bring to the Court's attention, you may do the same

4

thing.

5

anything new, but if you want to give me some references,

6

you may do so.

I don't want more argument.

7

MR. SONNENREICH:

I don't want

I do have one significant

8

after-discovery case which I just came upon the last day

9

or two in Tenth Circuit, and I have a copy on that. Not

10

with elaboration, but here is the case and one paragraph.

11

THE COURT:

Yeah.

All right now, if we are

12

going to do that, let's do the whole thing on that date

13

rather than today, Mr. Bugden, is that all right?

14

MR. BUGDEN: Sure.

15

THE COURT:

Because what I will do is we will

16

come on at 2:00.

If you guys need three hours, we will

17

go right down the trial.

18

meantime, I will get through the briefs in their

19

entirety.

Don't worry about me not remembering the

20

evidence.

It is clear in my mind where we are and what

21

we are talking about.

22

MR. BUGDEN:

23

with —

24

is not underlined?

25

I hope we don't.

In the

Your Honor, may I verse the Court

I have underlined those.

MR. SONNENREICH:

Do you have a copy that

What is that?
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1

MR. BUGDEN:

2

he was before you a month ago.

3

The transcript of Mr. Harry when

MR. SONNENREICH:

My copy is not underlined but

4

I have written in it.

It has yellow outlining.

5

I photocopy, I don't think it will show.

6

mind.

7

MR. BUGDEN:

8

THE COURT: Sure.

9

MR. SONNENREICH:

Mine, if

I think I do

Could we submit that to you?

I can do that at the same

10

time that I indicate the pages, which I will do by Monday

11

or Tuesday, I believe.

12

MR. BUGDEN:

Your Honor, I would appreciate it

13

if you would rule, and I think it is appropriate at this

14

time for you to rule that Mr. Barber's affidavit, the one

15

that the State wants to introduce, will not be received

16

cause he has testified.

17
18

MR. SONNENREICH:

It was already withdrawn,

Your Honor.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BUGDEN:

Yeah.

It wasn't offered.

So you are clear when you sit down

21

and look at this stuff, what I think you should have is a

22

packet of exhibits that Kathy can —

23

separate packet from the earlier hearing, the March

24

hearing where my client testified.

25

an affidavit from Mr. Barber that was received.

she had it in a

Then we will include
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1
2

THE COURT:

THE CLERK:

I had it and gave it to one of the

attorneys earlier.

5
6

THE COURT:

Now, are these the documents you

talk about?

7

MR. BUGDEN:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

Kathy, dig

that stuff out.

3
4

That is in the file.

them all together.

Yes, sir.
Give them to Kathy and she will put

I will have my homework on this case

done by Monday afternoon of this coming week.

11

MR. SONNENREICH:

Your Honor, I believe that

12

Mr. Barber has already waived his right to sentencing

13

time and the timeframe for Mr. Harry.

14

another waiver on the record?

15
16

MR. BUGDEN:

Could I get

He will waive that. We want you

to have a chance to look at the briefs.

17

You have the right to be sentenced in a speedy

18

fashion.

Actually, the statute talks about between 2 and

19

30 days after a jury verdict or a finding of guilt. Are

20

you willing to waive your statutory right?

21

MR. HARRY: Yes.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. HARRY: Yes.

24

THE COURT:

25

You are?

Okay.

Now, if either counsel feel

aggrieved about the Court's handling of this matter with
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1

Mr. Brass's testimony or anything else, if you want to

2

bring it to my attention by motion, you can do so. I

3

didn't in any way mean to dis-accommodate anybody, nor to

4

cut you off from any of your rights.

5

advise of the premises.

6

think we haven't done that we ought to, or in any way

7

where somebody's rights have been trampled upon, please

8

let me know.

9

exactly.

10
11

I wanted to fully

So if there is something you

I am trying to avoid those problems

Is there anything further then?
MR. BUGDEN:

Nothing further from the

defendant.

12

MR. SONNENREICH:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

13

THE COURT: Well, that will be the procedure we

14

will follow.

If there is nothing to come before the

15

Court this afternoon, we will be in recess.

16

MR. BUGDEN:

17

MR. SONNENREICH:

1 Q

Thank you.

^

Thank you.
*f>

^

^

^

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1
2
3
4

REPORTERS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

5
6

I, DOROTHY L. TRIPP, C.S.R., do hereby
certify:

7
8

That I am one of the Official Court Reporters
of the Third District Court of the State of- Utah.

9

That on Friday, April 10, 1992, I reported

10

the testimony and proceedings, to the best of my

11

ability on said date in the above-entitled matter,

12

presided over by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat in the

13

Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of

14

Utah: and that the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to

15

66, inclusive, contain a full, true and correct account

16

of said proceedings of motion hearing to the best of my

17

understanding, skill and ability on said date.

18
1
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9

20
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21
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF
VS
HARRY, RONALD ALAN

CASE NUMBER 901901580 FS
DATE 04/10/92
HONORABLE RICHARD H MOFFAT
COURT REPORTER OROTHY TRIPP
COURT CLERK KBG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
HEARING
PRESENT: DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. SONNEREICH, DAVID
D. ATTY. BUGDEN, WALTER F.

THIS CASE COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR A FURTHER HEARING
ON THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ARRESET OF JUDGMENT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
ED BRASS IS SWORN AND EXAMINED IN BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS, FURTHER HEARING OF THIS MOTION IS
CONTINUED TO MAY 1, 1992 AT 2:00 PM.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

MINUTE ENTRY

z

Case No.

vs.

:

JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

RONALD ALAN HARRY,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

901901580 FS

:

The Court having considered the Motion for New Trial or in
the Alternative, Motion
pleadings

on

file

in Arrest

in regard

of

thereto

Judgment, all
and

having

of the

heard

oral

argument in two separate hearings and now being fully advised in
the premises makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Motion

for

New

Judgment are both denied.

Trial

and

the

Motion

in Arrest of

The Court is of the opinion that the

six points raised by the defendant are without merit.

Point one

is that the Court should not have allowed the State's expert
witness

to

express

an

opinion

as

to

materialality in a securities fraud case.

what

constitutes

The brief answer as
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STATE V. HARRY

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

to all of the issues raised by the defendant is that they have
been met and the Court's opinion is based upon, inter alia, the
arguments contained within the State's Memorandum in Opposition
to the Motion for New Trial or Arrest of Judgment.
However,

specifically

the

first

argument

is met

by

the

recent Utah case State v. Larsen, found at 180 Utah Advance
Reporter

13

decided

February

7,

1992.

This

issue

was

specifically decided in favor of allowing the expert testimony
and

in

fact

the

expert

involved

in

that

case

immediately

preceded the expert in this case as the Director of Registration
for the Securities Division of the State of Utah.
Point two is also answered by the Larson case in that the
distinction

between

"willfulness"

and

"specific

intent

to

defraud" was discussed and the case held that willfulness was
the

proper

standard

under

the

Utah

Securities

Act.

The

defendant's point three claims that good faith is a complete
defense to prosecution under Utah Code Annotated Section 61-1-1
(1),

(2), (3) and 61-1-2-1.

Again because of the holding in

Larson a complete discussion of which will found in the State's
Reply Memorandum, the Court is of the opinion that under the
circumstances

herein

the

instruction

given

was

completely

adequate.
Point

four

is a claim

by the defendant

counsel was ineffective in assisting him.

that his trial

This claim raises a
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great deal of concern on the part of the Court because it has
become fashionable as a defense tactic to throw the original
trial counsel in criminal cases to the wolves on the platter of
ineffective assistance of Counsel giving little or no credence
to the circumstances of the trial.

The trial court supervised

the proceedings in this case and is of the opinion that there
was no ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court does not

believe that trial counsel's performance fell below an objection
standard of reasonableness.

The Court certainly does not feel

that the failure to make an opening statement in any way reduces
effectiveness of counsel.

That is often done and in the facts

before the Court in this case is impossible to determine that
failure to make an opening statement would have altered the
outcome of this case in any way whatsoever.
introduction

of

the

subscription

booklet

to

The question of
the

Red

River

Mountain Project appears to the Court to be much more a tactical
decision than it does to be ineffective assistance of counsel.
There is certainly no evidence here that would tend to show that
introducing the booklet would have altered the outcome of this
case.

As a matter of fact there was no way of knowing what the

testimony might have been by Mr. Thornton if the document had
not been used but there is some substantial reason to believe
that his testimony could have been damaging to the defense.
As to points five and six the Court is of the opinion that
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Count 4 and Counts 2 and 3 were properly pled and the Court so
ruled on motion during trial.

As a matter fact as is noted in

the opposition memorandum Judge Fuchs at a preliminary hearing
on this matter ruled that Counts 2 and 3 were sufficiently pled
and there has been no new argument or evidence in support of the
defendant's position raised at any time.
Counsel for the Sta^e will prepare an appropriate order.
DATED this

^ ^

day of May, 1992^-
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